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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the epistemology of memory is a neglected and useful 
explanatory resource in the philosophical treatment of problems associated with 
introspection. Our vocabulary of introspection is uniquely confused and 
unhelpful among accepted modes of knowledge, and a number of options are 
available to improve matters: we might (i) attempt to make introspection terms 
more scientifically respectable, or (ii) offload some of introspection’s duties 
onto other modes of knowledge. This latter approach has received a good deal 
of attention in contemporary self-knowledge literature that aims to explain 
introspection ‘economically’. However, one approach to an economic theory of 
introspection has largely escaped detailed attention in recent literature. This, 
broadly, is Ryle’s (1949) suggestion that memory can explain much of what we 
take to be introspection. The aim of this thesis is to gauge the extent to which 
that suggestion, in general, might be helpful in resolving some intractable 
problems in the literature on self-knowledge.  
 To motivate the inquiry, I point to a far-reaching convergence in our 
thinking about introspective failure and memory failure, and suggest that this 
convergence extends to introspective success. To test the extent of the 
convergence, I categorise a range of purported features of introspective thought 
into a set of desiderata that can be set against a theory to measure its success. I 
then argue that the epistemology of memory plays an important role in 
explaining how a prominent theory of self-knowledge meets a number of these 
desiderata; that memory can explain or contribute to explanations of the three 
main desiderata; and that a theory of self-knowledge constructed around a 
standard case of recollection can meet most if not all of the desiderata for a 
theory of self-knowledge.  
 
	 3 
Table of Contents 
 
 
ABSTRACT	 2	
TABLE OF CONTENTS	 3	
INTRODUCTION	 6	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	 9	
DECLARATION	 10	
CHAPTER 1: FAILING TO KNOW OUR MINDS	 11	
INTRODUCTION	 11	
1. FAILING TO KNOW OUR LEXICON	 15	
2. IMPROVING OUR LEXICON	 22	
3. MEMORY AND INTROSPECTIVE FAILURE	 25	
3.1 COGNITIVE BIAS	 28	
3.2 CONFABULATION	 30	
3.3 CHOICE BLINDNESS	 31	
4. VARIETIES OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE FAILURE	 37	
5. MEMORY AND INTROSPECTIVE SUCCESS	 39	
CONCLUSION	 41	
CHAPTER 2: DESIDERATA FOR A THEORY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE	 43	
INTRODUCTION	 43	
1. PECULIARITY AND INTROSPECTION	 47	
1.1 INTROSPECTION AND WAYS OF KNOWING	 50	
1.2 PECULIARITY	 55	
2. VARIETIES OF IMMEDIACY	 58	
2.1 EVIDENTIAL AND EXPLANATORY IMMEDIACY	 61	
3. EPISTEMIC SECURITY	 68	
3.1 TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF EPISTEMIC SECURITY	 69	
3.2 COGITO-LIKE JUDGEMENTS	 73	
3.3 FALLIBILITY, ONTOLOGICAL DISTANCE, AND PARITY	 75	
3.4 MODEST APPROACHES TO EPISTEMIC SECURITY	 77	
4. UNIFORMITY, ECONOMY, AND TRANSPARENCY	 80	
4.1 UNIFORMITY	 80	
4.2 ECONOMY	 83	
4.3 TRANSPARENCY	 84	
5. ADDITIONAL DESIDERATA	 86	
5.1 AGNOTIC ACCESS	 87	
5.2 PRESERVED ACCESS	 88	
5.3 EVALUATIVE ACCESS	 89	
	 4 
5.4 SELF-BLINDNESS	 90	
CONCLUSION	 90	
CHAPTER 3: TRANSPARENCY, DELIBERATION, AND MEMORY	 93	
INTRODUCTION	 93	
1. TRANSPARENT SELF-KNOWLEDGE	 94	
2. TRANSPARENT DELIBERATION	 96	
2.1 OBJECTIONS TO THE DELIBERATIVE VIEW	 98	
3. TRANSPARENT INFERENCE	 101	
3.1 THE CONTAMINATION OBJECTION	 104	
4. MNEMIC AND DELIBERATIVE SCHEMAS	 107	
4.1 IMMEDIACY AND RECALL	 108	
4.2 DELIBERATION AND RECALL	 108	
4.3 NEW BELIEF FORMATION	 109	
5. TRANSPARENCY AND UNIFORMITY	 111	
5.1 PROCEDURES FOR BELIEF, DESIRE, AND INTENTION	 113	
6. TRANSPARENCY AND DOXASTIC DELIBERATION	 119	
7. MEMORY, EVIDENCE, AND BELIEFS ABOUT EVIDENCE	 123	
CONCLUSION	 128	
CHAPTER 4: MEMORY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE	 130	
INTRODUCTION	 130	
1. KINDS OF MEMORY	 131	
1.1 FACTUAL MEMORY	 136	
1.2 DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE	 138	
2. MEMORY AND FIRST-PERSON PECULIARITY	 138	
2.1 THE INTUITIVE PECULIARITY OF MEMORY	 139	
2.2 RECALLING FIRST-ORDER AND SECOND-ORDER BELIEFS	 141	
2.3 PECULIARITY AND THE DOXASTIC SCHEMA	 147	
3. THE IMMEDIACY THESIS	 152	
3.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL IMMEDIACY AND INFERENCE	 155	
3.2 EPISTEMIC IMMEDIACY AND INFERENCE	 157	
4. EPISTEMIC SECURITY	 162	
4.1 EPISTEMICALLY BENEFICIAL MEMORY EFFECTS	 164	
4.2 EPISTEMIC SECURITY AND POSITIVE EPISTEMIC STATUS	 166	
4.3 IMMUNITY FROM ERROR	 170	
4.4 DELIBERATION-RESISTANT ATTITUDES	 171	
CONCLUSION	 173	
CHAPTER 5: DOXASTIC RECOLLECTION	 175	
INTRODUCTION	 175	
1. THE TRANSPARENCY–TRANSITION PROBLEM	 177	
1.1 INFERENCE AND REFLECTION	 178	
1.2 THE TRANSPARENCY–TRANSITION ASSUMPTION	 183	
1.3 DELIBERATION AND THE TT ASSUMPTION	 186	
1.4 TRANSPARENCY AND THE TT ASSUMPTION	 189	
2. TRANSPARENCY AND SELF-ATTRIBUTION	 191	
3. DOXASTIC SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS RECOLLECTION	 194	
	 5 
3.1 NON-DELIBERATIVE DOXASTIC SELF-KNOWLEDGE	 197	
4. MEETING SELF-KNOWLEDGE DESIDERATA	 199	
4.1 PECULIARITY, IMMEDIACY, AND EPISTEMIC SECURITY	 199	
4.2 UNIFORMITY, ECONOMY, AND TRANSPARENCY	 202	
4.3 ADDITIONAL DESIDERATA	 203	
5. QUERIES AND OBJECTIONS	 205	
CONCLUSION	 208	
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK	 209	
APPENDIX 1: CHOICE BLINDNESS AND INTROSPECTIVE COMPETENCE	 212	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	 251		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 6 
Introduction 
 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the epistemology of memory is a neglected and useful 
explanatory resource in the philosophical treatment of problems associated with 
introspection. I explore a way of improving matters with regard to our 
vocabulary of introspection that has been neglected in much contemporary 
literature. Given a broad-ranging convergence in our thinking about 
introspective failure and memory failure, I suggest that it might be productive to 
investigate how far that convergence extends to introspective success. A 
positive response to that question is likely mean a positive response to the 
question of whether memory can explain what is thought special or distinctive 
about self-knowledge.  
Broadly, the aim of the thesis can be cast in Ryle’s terms: it is to gauge 
the extent to which memory might ‘carry the load of which introspection has 
been nominated the porter’ (Ryle 1949). The correspondingly broad claim is 
that a good deal can be gained by considering our views of memory when 
thinking about problems usually associated solely with self-knowledge. The 
following breakdown marks the main specific claims for which I argue in each 
chapter. 
 In chapter one, I argue (i) that memory can play an important role in 
explaining what we often think of as introspective failure, and (ii) that it is 
worthwhile investigating whether that convergence in our thinking extends to 
cases of introspective success. I suggest (iii) that a promising way for the inquiry 
to proceed is by outlining the desiderata against which the success of a theory of 
self-knowledge might be measured.  
 In chapter two, I consider a range of features thought to account for 
what is special or interesting about knowledge of our own minds and present a 
list of desiderata—minimal criteria, ideal desiderata, and additional criteria—
against which any theory of self-knowledge might be measured. In chapter 
	 7 
three, I set a prominent approach to self-knowledge—the Transparency 
approach—against a number of these criteria. I argue that a particular view of 
memory plays an important role in explaining the epistemic desiderata for 
doxastic self-knowledge on one version of the approach. I conclude (iv) that the 
epistemology of memory plays an important part in explaining introspective 
success on such a view, and (v) that this strengthens the case for an inquiry into 
the extent to which memory might be explanatory in the domain.  
 Chapter four explores the question of whether memory might explain, 
or contribute to the explanation, of the three minimal criteria from chapter 
two. These are: Peculiarity, Immediacy, and Epistemic Security. I argue that 
there are a surprising number of options available for each of the three 
desiderata, and suggest (vii) that this merits the construction of a theory that can 
be tested against the full list of desiderata.  
In chapter five, I highlight a problem in the literature on Transparency 
accounts (e.g. Byrne 2011; Boyle 2011) that appears to negatively affect the 
ability of a number of accounts to meet a number of specific criteria. The 
problem, I argue, is an assumption based on too strong a conception of the 
requirement of Transparency accounts to explain self-ascription. I argue that we 
should reject the assumption, and that a weaker conception of the requirement 
(a) better captures the range of data that needs to be explained, and (b) better 
fits standard conceptions of the important features of Transparency. 
With a weaker conception of the self-ascription requirement in place, I 
outline what I take to be plausible candidate for a standard case of doxastic self-
knowledge that can be appropriately described in memory terms. I construct 
the outline of a theory around this case and set it against the full range of 
desiderata from chapter two. I show that such a theory can fare well against all 
three kinds of desiderata. In my final section of the chapter, I offer a range of 
pre-emptive responses to questions and concerns, some of which will form the 
basis of further work. The overall conclusion for the thesis is two-fold: (viii) a 
theory of self-knowledge with the epistemology of memory playing the main 
	 8 
explanatory role can be surprisingly successful when set against desiderata that 
one might commonly find in the self-knowledge literature—in at least some 
important cases, self-knowledge can be accurately described as a kind of 
remembering; (ix) and inquiry into the explanatory capacity of memory with 
regards to the domain of self-knowledge is able to shed light on a number of 
intractable problems in that literature.  
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1 
 
Failing to Know Our Minds 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Why is knowledge of our minds so apparently easy to come by and so hard to 
explain? On some views, we can barely go wrong when conducting inquiries 
into our minds. On others we are pitiful, and introspection—or whatever 
special method we are supposed to deploy—is a kind of comforting illusion. If 
we are to accept introspection, and its cognate locutions, to represent an 
authentic way of knowing—that is, the kind of thing to which one can refer as 
an explanation of putative knowledge1—it is likely that neither of these views is 
correct since neither infallibility, nor pervasive error, help to provide such an 
explanation. Nevertheless, both positions lie on a broad spectrum of views, still 
defended in some form, about the reliability of introspection. When compared 
to other ways of knowing, the diversity of considered opinion with regard to 
reliability ought to be cause for consternation, especially as we seem prepared 
to accept a number of intuitions about the kind of access to our minds that 
introspection affords (see Ch. 2).  
Part of the problem, no doubt, is that the term suggests—literally or 
metaphorically—a quasi-perceptual (e.g. Shoemaker 1994; Byrne 2005) 
phenomenon for which none of our usual cognitive apparatus is apparently fit. 
Given that the interior of the human body is not obviously a good place to look, 
the term is either misleading or we are in need of a dedicated cognitive faculty 
with a specific remit to extract meaningful data from what is, essentially, meat.  
If introspection as ‘looking inwards’ seems implausible, then, perhaps 
we might see if looking outwards fares better (e.g. Byrne 2005, 2011a). 																																																								
1 This follows Cassam (2007a) 
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Although the suggestion sounds quirky, it retains some key elements of the 
quasi-perceptual view and has rightfully gained a good deal of traction. (After 
all, what could be worse than conoscenza con carne?) But explaining how one 
knows one’s mind by looking outward brings its own challenges: Is it something 
that happens quickly and immediately or slowly and deliberately? How is 
thinking about the world supposed to tell us anything about our minds?  
To analyse the problem we need to consider the basic ingredients of 
introspection and—assuming it is meant to issue in knowledge—these seem 
straightforward enough. Introspection, at base, must be (or involve) the 
correct, usually time-sensitive attribution of some fact of the matter about 
oneself, to oneself. On this description, one might expect our science of 
introspection to fall within the reasonable limits of any form of knowledge that 
deals with contingent matters. No-one genuinely claims we cannot get it wrong 
when it comes to our attempts to learn by hearing, seeing, smelling, or feeling, 
etc., and no-one—at least no-one offering a theory of perception—supposes we 
cannot get it right either. But our thinking about introspection does not seem to 
remain within these limits (or many limits at all). Theories leave subjects 
infallible, or wholly ignorant; introspection can be quick or slow, immediate or 
mediate; it can provide conclusions based on evidence, or based on nothing; it is 
either a form of looking inward, or a form of looking outward. And many of 
these options cannot be referred to in order to sufficiently explain the body of 
putative knowledge with which they are concerned. 
Perhaps the sensible thing to do when faced with such situations in 
philosophy is to walk away. But since the problems of introspection intersect 
with many other areas of philosophy, this will only delay the inevitable. One 
might, then, look instead at the farthest ends of the spectrum to see which 
views, if any, can be ruled out. At the optimistic end of the spectrum are views 
that leave ordinary subjects with almost unimpeachable access to the contents of 
their minds. Such views are not widespread, but are defended. They are not, 
however, generally defended in an unrestricted form, and it is not clear that 
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anyone ever has defended them in that form (Greenough 2012; also Ch. 2). (I 
return to these below.) Very pessimistic views are not particularly widespread 
either, but they are not in short supply and tend to claim corroboration by 
empirical evidence.2 One particularly bleak view suggests that introspection is a 
confluence of unreliable processes that we cannot hope to untangle, and allows 
that almost any number of introspective methods combine to provide an 
ultimately useless capacity (see Eric Schwitzgebel 2008a, 2009).3 A different 
kind of pessimism sees talk of introspection as a kind of simile in which subjects 
peering into an imaginary realm, when in fact the way we know ourselves is 
much the same way as we know about others (see Ryle 1949).  
The bleak view leaves us with an unusual excess of both good and bad 
fortune: ostensibly competing epistemic and metaphysical theses turn out to be 
correct, except in the one respect for which they have been developed—to 
explain knowledge in the domain; an abundance of lemons, with no prospect of 
lemonade. The second view leaves us on a par with others when it comes to 
knowing our minds, and it has persisted well (e.g. Carruthers 2011) despite its 
success usually relying on ‘slight’ exaggerations (see Byrne 2012). Without 
these exaggerations, it looks as though there is some advantage, however 
modest, to having the mind one is inquiring about.  
Over the next few chapters, I explore an idea that has accompanied this 
latter view but has not persisted nearly as well in the literature, perhaps because 
it has never received a thoroughgoing treatment, comes in scattered references,4 
																																																								
2 The claims against which empirical evidence is effective are a matter of some controversy (see e.g. 
Stoneham 2004, §6).  
3 It is not made explicit that this is the considered overall view. It is, however, a combination of views 
expressed over the two cited works. 
4 Alex Byrne (2011a) refers briefly and suggestively to recalling that p as being part of the standard case of 
doxastic self-knowledge (see Ch. 3) (in private correspondence Byrne informed me that chapter of his 
forthcoming book on self-knowledge will discuss memory in greater detail, but the content—at the time of 
writing this work—is not ready to be cited); Eric Schwitzgebel (2009) refers to memory both in relation to 
Transparency accounts and self-scanning mechanisms (see Ch. 4). Psychological literature on memory 
covers more ground, although it is not always clear which philosophical questions this might answer. For 
example, Martin Conway (2005) writes about the Self Memory System (SMS). Literature on self-
consciousness and memory can be traced back some way, with a discussion of Thomas Reid’s (1785) essay 
unfortunately finding no natural home in this work. More recently, J. L. Bermúdez (2012, 2013, 
forthcoming) has discussed the inter-dependence of memory and self-consciousness (see Ch. 5), although 
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or is left implicit. One of its clearest articulations is in Ryle’s Concept of Mind, 
where it can be read as two independent thoughts: firstly, that we have given 
the term ‘introspection’ much to do that can be explained by our ordinary 
faculties; and secondly, that much of its work should have been apportioned 
specifically to the genuine faculty of memory.5 The first thought has flourished 
in recent approaches to self-knowledge, even those that afford a good deal of 
first-person privilege.6 The second has been largely forgotten.  
The aim here is not to analyse the thought as it appears in Ryle, or 
elsewhere—Ryle was railing against Cartesianism, and a number of other 
articulations are too brief or suggestive for detailed commentary—although 
these attempts do provide a helpful point from which to begin. The aim here is 
to see if there is something to that second thought, in general, that may help 
shed light on some intractable problems in our thinking about self-knowledge. If 
there is something in it, a number of philosophers may have been looking down 
the wrong end of the telescope. If there is not much in it, I may have added to 
the list of puzzles in the study of this domain, since it is increasingly apparent 
that our thinking about self-knowledge and our thinking about memory are 
tightly connected.  
My main claim is a positive one: a good deal can be gained from 
considering our views of memory when thinking about problems usually 
associated solely with self-knowledge. This is especially pertinent given what has 
now become a staple assumption when theorising about the domain; that we 
should first exhaust the explanatory powers of our normal faculties before 
inventing new ones. I argue that a surprising amount of what we take to be 
special about self-knowledge can be, at least partially, explained by 
independently plausible views of memory. Success will either suggest that there 
																																																																																																																																																						
discussions of self-consciousness and self-awareness do not always sit naturally beside discussions of self-
knowledge as it appears in much of the literature discussed here.	
5 Ryle usually refers to ‘retrospection’ (e.g. 1949, p. 148) and has a specific use for the term not intended 
here.  
6 For example, Alex Byrne’s view, it has been noted (see Carruthers 2011) leaves us with something close to 
infallibility.  
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is an important explanatory role for memory in what we take to be special about 
self-knowledge, or that self-knowledge is not, strictly speaking, special in those 
ways, at least as we tend to articulate them.7  
In this initial chapter, I aim to motivate the inquiry. In §1, I suggest that 
one way to think about our poor handling of the concept of introspection is to 
see it as a kind of lexical problem that might be solved by offloading some duties 
onto knowledge domains with more developed lexica. We have already seen 
such an attempt in the casting of self-knowledge as either as kind of perception, 
or a perception-like capacity. Put baldly, since that approach has seen mixed 
results, we might try thinking of it as a kind of remembering. In §2, I provide 
initial grounds for suspecting that memory might be a suitable mode of 
knowledge to investigation by pointing to a connection between our thinking 
about self-knowledge failure and memory. In section §3, I separate varieties of 
self-knowledge failure to isolate those that tend to be of philosophical interest, 
and in section, §4, I consider two examples of self-knowledge failure that are 
regularly of philosophical interest. In the final section (§5) I outline an 
appropriate methodology for investigating whether memory can play a role in 
introspective success as well as failure.  
 
 
1. Failing to know our lexicon 
 
The casual reader may be forgiven for failing to see the history of philosophical 
interaction with introspection as a list of glorious triumphs. If one were to take 
caricatures of traditional positions seriously, it appears that philosophers lost 
their appetite for questioning assumptions on the matter, and left the ordinary 
humans with unrestricted and totally reliable access to their minds (Greenough 
2012, §1). Of course: 
 																																																								
7 This latter point has a precedent in the argument that the purported baselessness of self-knowledge cannot be 
what is special about knowledge in that domain, since baseless knowledge is either impossible or 
commonplace (see Cassam 2009). 
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It is not easy to see how this ever could have been plausible. In any case, it [is] 
widely seen as having been refuted by Freud, as well as by recent psychological 
research of a distinctly non-Freudian character which seems to show both that 
a vast amount of what goes on in a person’s mind is completely inaccessible to 
that person’s introspective consciousness, and, what is equally shocking to 
Cartesian preconceptions, that when people do report on their own mental 
operations, these reports are often wrong (Shoemaker 1990, p. 183). 
 
A better explanation of this perplexing error will refer to developments in the 
perceived targets of introspection—particularly in the twentieth century—
making traditional views of our abilities seem usually optimistic, with views 
aimed at describing the immediate objects of the conscious mind now 
understood as including deep and sub-conscious processes (see Moran 2001, p. 
5). Claims—for example, omniscience and infallibility with regards to our own 
mental states—have been confused and conflated (see e.g. Stoneham 2004;8 Ch. 
2); and explicit exceptions and concerns are largely ignored (e.g. both 
Descartes and Kant express reservations in some cases, see Ch. 2); and items 
rarely thought to be the objects of especially secure first-person judgements are 
used as counter-examples to introspective competence in general (e.g. character 
traits and irretrievably unconscious activity, see e.g. Schwitzgebel 2008a). 
Meanwhile, the weight of empirical research (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson 1977)—
doubtless aided by these factors—has appeared forceful against more optimistic 
views, even sometimes against the explicit advice of those who carried out the 
research (see Appendix 1, §1). And because empirical findings about 
introspection are usually subject to competing conceptual analyses (see e.g. 
Johansson et al. 2006, p. 675), the philosophical implications of the results are 
not all that easy to determine.  
The problem, in short, has taken on a lexical flavour: our lexicon of 
introspection terms is inconsistent, inefficient, and unhelpful in explaining the 
																																																								
8 Stoneham (2004) uses different terms, however, but the point is the same (see Ch. 2). 
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mode of knowledge it is intended to describe, especially when compared to its 
counterparts (e.g. in outer perception). To put it Ryle’s (1949) way, we can 
‘back up’ our assertions by saying we see, hear, feel, smell and taste, but saying 
that we introspect does not really work as a ‘final appeal’ (p. 143).9 Our lexicon 
for introspection does not simply need a bit of tidying up around the edges, it 
fails to match even the sparsest lexicon of its cousins in outer perception, that is, 
in terms of its ability to explain knowledge: its objects are confused, its methods 
fail to explain general or specific requirements of theories in the domain, and 
there appear to be no upper or lower limits in terms of supposed asymmetries 
with knowledge in other domains.  
These observations should be concerning if introspection’s direct 
associations with knowledge are to be retained. But assuming for the moment 
that the term introspection—however currently confused—is being used to 
pick out a body of putative knowledge that cannot be easily explained 
otherwise, there are a number of options for reducing the confusion. These 
include: (i) making its terms more scientifically respectable; and (ii) identifying 
any duties that can be offloaded onto capacities that explain knowledge in other 
domains. Both are exercises in tidying up our knowledge lexica more generally, 
so some brief remarks about comparative lexica will help to elucidate the task. 
A number of explanations are available for the difficulties facing our 
lexicon in the introspection case. The first, which we have already touched 
upon, is a kind of error theory about introspection: our introspection terms fail 
to refer, or at least fail to refer to a way of knowing. On this view, 
introspection differs from other putative ways of knowing in so far as it does not 
live up to the title. However, our knowledge lexica vary in quality and depth 
between and within ways of knowing in general. And this goes against the idea 
that failures to refine the introspection lexicon are down to its failure to be a 
genuine mode of knowledge. On a second view, introspection is genuine but we 
have hitherto failed sufficiently to develop a lexicon despite no serious obstacle 																																																								
9 Ryle (1949) asks whether being ‘conscious’ or ‘even vividly conscious’ should be a final appeal (p. 143). 
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to success. We have, as it were, somehow neglected to fill out the requisite 
detail to the appropriate standard. This, I take it, would be the kind of 
explanation a concerned ‘non-error’ theorist might offer. But the extent and 
duration of the problem count against that view: the difficulty stretches back to 
the Greek treatment of the issue, and the Greek response to the Delphic 
injunction—gnóthi seaftón—varied significantly. Within the space of a single 
Socratic dialogue it ranges from, ‘understanding myself as a whole person’, to 
understanding ‘my’ psyche, and then to understanding ‘the’ psyche; onto ‘an 
analysis of what each person is persuaded of and why’ (Griswold 1996, pp. 3f.). 
Elsewhere, it includes knowledge of one’s own ignorance. Aristotle’s thoughts 
on the matter extend the tally by introducing the suggestion that success for the 
self-knowing subject comes only by nurturing the right kind of human 
relationships (see e.g. NE 1170b5–7). And despite attempts in some intervening 
literature to restrict the scope of dialogue to specific classes of judgement or 
states about which the subject’s thinking can be especially privileged or secure 
(e.g. Burge 1996), the temptation to think that the questions of self-knowledge 
must be broad enough to incorporate some of the Greek concerns has a 
tendency to re-surface (see e.g. Cassam 2014; Schwitzgebel 2008a). These 
factors do not rule out the explanation, but they do suggest a particularly 
stubborn form of problem. 
To account for this stubbornness, a third explanation would see 
introspection and its cognate terms revealing a genuine way of knowing, but 
with the relevant facts difficult to code in one or more natural languages. Here 
we can make use of the term ‘ineffability’ as it has recently been employed in 
research on sense vocabularies (Levinson and Majid 2014). The facts relevant to 
introspection, on this explanation, could be either ‘strongly ineffable’ or 
‘weakly ineffable’. Facts ‘may be strongly ineffable in the nomological sense that 
in principle no language can express them, or merely in an empirical sense in 
that no languages actually do so’; they are weakly (or relatively) ineffable where 
they resist:  
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codability in language L by any of … three measures (i.e. coding in L is 
linguistically impossible, inefficient, or inaccurate or a combination thereof), 
compared either to some other domain in the same language, or the same 
domain in another language. (Levinson and Majid 2014, pp. 410–12)  
 
There is little reason to suspect that introspection facts are strongly ineffable, 
and this result would likely rule out introspection as a plausible way of knowing 
(at least as I have described it so far). But there does appear to be a case for 
weak ineffability. Coding has been less efficient and accurate than other domains 
of knowledge in English, and plausibly in other related European languages. So 
the third option is a good partial explanation of why our lexicon in this domain 
is persistently feeble. To illustrate, in English, it seems easier to ‘linguistically 
code colors than (non-musical sounds), sounds than tastes, tastes than smells’ 
(p. 415), thus smells might be considered ‘relatively ineffable compared to 
colors in English’ (p. 412).10 Since colour lexicons can vary dramatically across 
cultures, we might also want to say, for example, that in Yélî Dyne—a language 
with very few colour terms—colours are relatively ineffable in Yélî Dyne 
compared to English (p. 412). Introspection terms, in English and other 
languages, have been certainly less efficient and consistent than the outer senses 
above, so we might want to suggest that introspection terms are weakly or 
relatively ineffable in those languages. What is missing from the explanation is an 
understanding of why introspection facts might be difficult to code. Here, a 
number of suggestions are already available, and I propose another. 
 One way of explaining why a domain is relatively ineffable is to focus on 
cognitive architecture. Facial descriptions are difficult to code in most languages 
despite our outstanding capacity for facial recognition. One explanation of this 
in terms of cognitive architecture is that facial recognition is an ‘ancient 
mammalian trait’ associated with a specific region of the brain, and is thus a 																																																								
10 We can ignore that the fact some of these observations are confessedly based on ‘introspection’ (e.g. p. 
415) since the authors offer a range of examples based on empirical research.  
	 20 
‘classic Fodorean encapsulated module’ that deals specifically with visual input 
(p. 417). Thus we can name faces, but not describe them (Ibid.). Alternatively, 
we might consider that the problem is not one of encapsulation, but of 
‘competition for resources’: this will occur when two faculties use the ‘similar 
neural networks’, one attempt to explain why the olfaction lexicon is weaker 
than the colour lexicon (p. 418).11 Both are perhaps plausible explanations for 
specific differences in sensory lexicons, but are less plausible in the 
introspection case. A slightly more promising explanation predicts that only 
sensations and processes that consciously accessible will be accessible to 
language. Since the processes of introspection may be among many aspects of 
mental life not consciously accessible, we should expect our lexicon to be poor. 
This explanation, however, would fail to account for differences between sense 
lexica, because many of the processes of seeing, feeling, and hearing, etc., are 
similarly inaccessible to consciousness—it is usually the results of such processes 
that are consciously accessible, and this is true both for introspection and those 
senses.  
 A better approach suggests where ‘under-developed coding of sensory 
domains may reflect lack of cultural preoccupation’,12 we may ‘trade off relative 
ineffabilities in single sensory fields, with high codabilities of recurrent cross-
modal types’ (p. 421) depending on need and relevance. So, in the absence of a 
specific (perhaps industrial, or technological) need, a culture, or cultures are 
happy to deal in objects as they ‘come packaged by nature with their cross-
modal properties (a ripe mango has a certain color, taste, texture, shape, etc.)’ 
(Ibid.).  
Thinking about introspection in broadly this way might, firstly, help to 
explain why thinking in the domain tends to be muddled and, secondly, point to 																																																								
11 The explanation is due to Lorig (1999; in Levinson and Madjid 2014) is that both language and odours 
‘share complex temporal signatures’ (pp. 417–8).  
12 The ‘Vatican has maintained a reference set of 30,000 labeled color chips since the 1500s, in order to 
reproduce mosaics’ whereas cultures without colour technology show ‘limited abstract color terminology 
… people without musical instruments (like the Rossel Islanders) may have little use for a metalanguage for 
tone, cultures with limited cuisine … may not be conducive to elaborate vocabularies of taste and smell’ 
(Levinson and Majid 2014, p. 421).  
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a potential solution. Unlike many of our genuine perceptual abilities, there is no 
general cultural requirement for a detailed vocabulary of introspection, and 
given some basic observations about the limits of natural languages13 we might 
speculate that some of our linguistic capacity has been traded off in exchange for 
capacity in areas of more pressing linguistic need. We do appear to hold a range 
of assumptions and practices around introspection, and these assumptions and 
practices are probably good enough for us to go about a daily business. But all this 
leaves us with a range of phenomena with poorly individuated properties in that 
domain. In the case of the mango, at least the data are cross-modal and all 
sensuous. In the introspection case, the muddle will likely include both sensuous 
content (e.g. visual and olfactory information) and non-sensuous content (e.g. 
memory and memories, various forms of thinking and reasoning, and 
imagination). If we have, mistakenly or otherwise, joined these various 
elements together into single capacity or faculty, then it will be no surprise that 
our thinking can produce vastly different results. This is not to suggest another 
kind of error theory about introspection. There may be some unique element—
on top of the elements listed above—that leaves introspection worthy of a 
separate name. But it goes some way to explaining why attempts to refine our 
understanding of introspection, and its cognate terms, may have been frustrated 
by ignoring the contribution made by some of the main elements. 
In short, the particulars of de se thinking have been insufficiently or 
inefficiently coded into a functional introspection vocabulary. In part, this is 
likely to be because there has been no general cultural requirement for a 
detailed lexicon in the domain. But this has led us to adopt one that is made up 
of a variety of sensuous and non-sensuous phenomena. Identifying and 
untangling some of these elements is the business of forthcoming sections. In 
particular, I aim to identify and focus upon one element that appears to be 
bound up in de se thinking and suggest that the contribution it makes can 
																																																								
13 Although language is generative, ‘working vocabularies are relatively small (say of the maximum order of 
50,000 producible items)’ (Levinson and Majid 2014, p. 420). 
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improve our understanding introspective failure. If it does, it will be worth 
considering whether it can improve our understanding of introspective success 
too. 
 
 
2. Improving our lexicon 
 
In the introduction, I suggested that introspection appears to be an unusual way 
of knowing. In §1, I offered an explanation for this. Before proceeding, it will 
help to clear up a matter that is not often not made explicit—namely, what it is 
for something to be a ‘way of knowing’. Earlier, I implied that for knowledge in 
any domain to be deserving of the title, then it must have something to add in 
response to questions like, ‘How does she know?’. If, in pointing our selected 
terms, they fail to shed any light on this kind of question, then we ought to ask 
ourselves whether what we have pinpointed is a route to substantial epistemic 
success. Having such an assumption made explicit will provide a measure against 
which it is possible to weed out potential non-starters. Quassim Cassam offers a 
useful notion: 
 
Φ-ing that P is a way of knowing that P just if it is possible satisfactorily to 
explain how S knows that P by pointing out that S Φs that P. (Cassam 
2007a, p. 339) 
 
Using this as our measure, we might check which of our two options promises 
the most success.  
The first option was to attempt to make introspection terms more 
scientifically respectable. A number of attempts have been made along these 
lines. ‘Self-scanning’ mechanisms are one such attempt that sees subjects with a 
monitoring mechanism capable of scanning certain kinds of mental state (e.g. 
Nichols and Stich 2003). Here, I will briefly outline another option in keeping 
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quasi-perceptual thinking about knowledge in this domain. One can begin by 
splitting our perceptual apparatus between the outer and the inner senses. 
‘Inner sense’, in this case, is not the variety that meets with Ryle’s disapproval, 
but refers to physiological indicators of internal events and processes. Whereas 
our external senses can collectively be termed ‘exteroception’, we can group 
internal senses under the heading ‘interoception’. Interoception is the sense (or 
senses) ‘of the physiological condition of the body’ (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimanez 
and Constantini 2011). They proceed by means of stretch receptors, 
chemoreceptors, and the like, for low-level processes, and are often ‘managed 
preconsciously’ (Ibid.). However, they also encompass conscious sensations such 
as the fullness of the bladder, hunger, and nausea (Garfinkel and Critchley 2013, 
p. 231).  
In the philosophical literature, such matters are rarely treated as targets 
of introspection, although they are clearly the targets of self-knowledge, broadly 
conceived. And, assuming the proper targets of introspection have underlying 
physiological changes detectable via such senses, we have a potential strategy for 
improving matters with regards to this mode of knowledge. Initial steps, largely 
in the field of cognitive science, and typically with regards to emotions, have 
been made in this respect. Emotions are a good candidate on which to model 
this kind of mechanism, especially if one adopts a theory upon which they 
depend on ‘cognitive interpretations of physiological changes’ (Seth 2013, p. 
565; Garfinkel and Critchley 2013). If one can infer from these physiological 
changes (e.g. Seth 2013), then one has the beginnings of ‘scientifically’ 
appealing way to fill out the introspection lexicon that can be referred to in 
explaining how S knows that p (i.e. where p is a proposition about S’s emotional 
state). Of course much more detail will be required if such mechanisms are to 
satisfactorily improve how we see introspection. But the devil, in this case, is 
more likely to be found in the scope. It may be reasonable to suppose such a 
mechanism is plausible with regards to knowledge of our basic emotions such as 
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anger—which are thought to have ‘universal’ physiological correlates14—and it 
is potentially promising for a range of sensations (itches, tickles, and some 
pains), but things look less promising when one steps outside of that limited 
range. Mapping physiological changes to their interoceptive is counterparts 
worryingly complicated for emotions such disdain and contempt, and finding the 
physiological–inferential mechanism for beliefs and intentions looks implausible 
given the potentially infinite number available. (Which receptors, for example, 
indicate that one intends to go the nearest store and buy the smallest packet of 
wooden clothes pegs, as opposed to the second nearest store for the third 
smallest packet of plastic clothes pegs?) 
 Although this is not the only way one may attempt to refine the 
introspection lexicon with (broadly) scientifically respectable terms, it 
demonstrates a difficulty facing any attempt to cast the self-knowledge in terms 
of physiological events and processes: knowledge of many ‘introspective targets’ 
is complicated and fine-grained, and so it is hard to generate plausible 
explanations in purely physiological, or even quasi-physiological, terms. Because 
many of our mental states are not as easily mapped onto our physiology, 
adopting this strategy will likely require either an artificially restricted range of 
target objects, or the substantive revision of other—namely our folk 
psychological—vocabularies.  
 An alternative option was to offload some of introspection’s duties onto 
other ways of knowing—that is, to develop or refine our self-knowledge 
vocabulary by seeing how much explanatory work can be done elsewhere. This 
option has precedent in a number of theories of self-knowledge that aim to 
explain self-knowledge economically—that is, only by reference to capacities 
employed for knowledge in other domains. This approach in general has 
received a good deal of attention in contemporary literature (see e.g. 
Shoemaker 1994; Moran 2001; Byrne 2005; Fernández 2014), but here I would 																																																								
14 ‘Paul Ekman and colleagues … showed that some specific emotions, which they named basic emotions, 
appear to be expressed in the same way in every human culture where this has been tested. In particular, 
they found that basic emotions produce the same patterns of changes in the face’ (Zamuner 2013, p. 183). 
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like to focus on one aspect of the approach that has not hitherto received a great 
deal of attention; namely, by investigating the explanatory role that memory can 
play for knowledge in this domain. Although it has not received a great deal of 
attention, there are an increasing number of clues to indicate it is a connection is 
worthy of investigation. In the next section, I point to an idiosyncrasy in our 
general thinking about introspective ‘failure’ that is telling in this respect: we 
sometimes seem to bundle together cases of memory failure and self-knowledge 
failure.  
 
 
3. Memory and introspective failure 
 
In the broadest sense, forgetting one’s own age and shoe size are self-knowledge 
failures, although they are more likely to be of interest to clinicians, 
psychologists and cobblers than philosophers. One might worry that 
disregarding such failures and successes plays into a kind of Cartesianism that 
sees mental life and ordinary physical attributes as somehow separate issues (see 
e.g. Byrne 2011a, p. 201). However, this need not be the case. One’s 
knowledge of such details can usually be sufficiently explained in exactly the 
same way in our own case, in the case of others, and the world in general. 
Despite the protestations of a few (e.g. Ryle 1949; Carruthers 2011), it is not 
so easy to sufficiently explain how Sarah knows she intends to stop eating meat 
on New Year’s Day. Narrowing the scope of relevant cases, and untangling 
different kinds of self-knowledge failure will be an important part of reducing 
confusion in the domain (see §4).  
In a more restricted sense, on both commonsense and (some) theoretical 
views, self-knowledge failure and memory failure tend to converge in a number 
of cases. Peter stays out for after-dinner drinks later than he expressly intends, 
although this comes as no surprise to his companions. (He regularly expresses 
the intention to go home early, and regularly stays out late.) Assuming that 
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Peter genuinely believes he will go home early on each occasion, making sense 
of his forming the intention to Φ in the face of clear defeating conditions—such 
as a high probability that he will ψ instead—poses an interesting conundrum. 
One explanation is that all or most of the times that Peter ψs when intending to 
Φ are temporarily unavailable as evidence at the moment he forms the 
intention. And one way in which they might be unavailable is that they are not 
retrievable at the crucial intention-forming moment. Certainly other 
explanations are available: he might recall them and deem them irrelevant, for 
example. However, the memory explanation chimes anecdotally: often when 
one challenges a subject to recall the times they managed to Φ rather than ψ in 
such situations, their conviction that they will Φ weakens notably. It is at least a 
plausible explanation in cases of this kind, that whenever a subject forms an 
intention to Φ despite the presence of clear defeating conditions—namely that 
almost every time he intends to Φ, he ψs instead—that a failure to recognize 
those defeating conditions is a failure to retrieve the relevant information. And 
in such cases, were it not for this failure, the subject would not self-ascribe the 
intention, for Peter cannot intend to do what he knows he will not do. Thus we 
can describe such cases as memory failures. We might also want to call them 
introspective failures, since the subject has failed to know something important 
about himself. But how can this case be contrasted with the shoe size case? All of 
the data that Peter ought to have used when thinking about his intention is 
available third-personally. Thus if it is a failure, it is not a failure to discern his 
intention by means of introspection, but to discern his character. It is 
introspective failure of a kind, but introspective knowledge of character has 
rarely been thought to come with any significant degree of security.15  (We 
might be decidedly worse at judging our characters than observers in many 
cases.)  
																																																								
15 Gertler (2011b) has noted that what passes for privileged knowledge of character, might well be access to 
one’s intention, for example, to be courageous. 
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Let us amend the example. It is possible, having formed and self-ascribed 
the intention to Φ, that one gets oneself in a position to ψ instead. Sometimes 
one does this not due to a change of heart, or a form of akrasia: Φ–ing is what 
one has a mind to do, and despite putting oneself in a position to ψ, when one is 
reminded or queried upon what one intends, one realizes one’s error. For 
example, Susan intends to go home, but is enjoying after dinner drinks and rolls 
with the feeling. After a while she is reminded, and corrects course. Again it 
seems natural to describe such events in terms of memory—Susan intended to 
go home early, and forgot for some time. It is also possible to describe it as 
introspective failure:  
 
At t1, S believes that S is in mental state M (and is in M); at t2, S does not 
judge that S is in M (and is in M); and at t3, S judges that S is in M (and is 
in M)  
 
Again, of course, other descriptions are available. One might instead, suggest 
that Susan’s intentions first changed and then changed back, although it is 
possible to reconfigure examples for the current reading for duration. And in 
many respects, this is not a surprising form of introspective failure: having 
climbed the stairs with a specific purpose in mind, one sometimes finds oneself 
nonplussed—that is, until one is back down again (I take it in such cases one 
cannot self-attribute the specific intention at each point, even if one attempts 
to); complicated intentions16—for instance with regards to one’s life goals—
often require a good deal of effort to keep in mind; and if, per impossibile, one 
had to constantly be mindful of all one’s mental states, it would be difficult to 
get anything else done. We are not omniscient with regards our mental states, 
																																																								
16 Lewin (1951) distinguishes between two ‘concepts of forgetting’ with regard to intentions. The first is 
‘the usual conception of memory’ and the second relates to cases of intention that are ‘not carried out’. The 
two are independent, although he recognizes they may be connected (p. 106). I am referring to the 
‘memory’ variety, rather than the ‘not carrying out’ variety. 
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and we are forgetful. We can call this diachronic introspective failure for mental 
states.  
Accepting the analyses of these examples for the sake of argument, we 
might suppose that a number of experiences can be appropriately called both 
memory failure, and self-knowledge (or introspective) failure (although this is 
not to suggest that the descriptions will always be equivalent). What unites the 
two kinds of case is the passage of time. In one case, the requisite data for a 
successful judgment is accumulated over time; in the other, the requisite data 
for consistent judgement concerns a state that persists over time. We might 
venture, at this point, to make a descriptive claim:  
 
(DSK) in diachronic cases, our thinking about self-knowledge and 
memory sometimes converges such that a failure or gap in one domain 
either is, or can be partially explained by, pointing to failure in the 
other.  
 
One might think this is a quirk of the examples I have selected, or that instances 
of DSK are rare, so we ought to see if the DSK idiosyncrasy holds elsewhere.  
 
3.1 Cognitive bias 
Lists of human cognitive biases can be impressive reminders of the depth and 
range of our failings.17 A ‘good’ list can be disconcerting enough for some to 
conclude that humans cannot be close relatives of the rational beings they are 
assumed to be.18 Many cognitive biases are—or can be readily described in 
terms of—self-knowledge failure. A fairly harmless way to describe them that 
way, at least for the present purposes is to say that if a cognitive bias results in a 
subject making provably false statements about her mental states, events, or 
																																																								
17 See e.g. the Cognitive Bias Codex 2016 (Benson 2016).  
18 See e.g. Cassam (2014). Whether these are the right kind of examples to put pressure on claims to a 
subject’s first-person privilege is a matter for elsewhere.  
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processes, then the subject has prima facie failed, introspectively speaking.19 
Lists of cognitive biases also provide us with a way to gauge the degree to which 
our thinking about memory failure and self-knowledge failure converge: an 
abundance of cognitive biases are, straightforwardly, memory effects. We can 
call these the simple cases. A small sample of simple cases of cognitive biases that 
are explicitly referred to as memory effects might include: confirmation bias; 
consistency bias; crypto-amnesia; hindsight bias; humour effect; memory 
inhibition; misinformation effect; mood congruent memory bias; peak–end 
rule; placement bias; rosy retrospection; source confusion; suggestibility; 
telescoping effect; the verbatim effect … and so on.20 
Cognitive biases and memory effects serve as a kind of circumstantial 
evidence in support of (DSK), showing additionally that the convergence of 
thinking between the two domains goes beyond pre-theoretical thinking and 
into a significant range of empirical work in the area. Beyond that, the 
conclusions one can draw from the prevalence of memory phenomena in 
cognitive bias research are limited, unless one can conduct a meta-analysis of the 
literature, or an analysis on a case-by-case basis. The former may well be a 
worthwhile exercise, but it is not something that can be done here. Since the 
range of cognitive phenomena covered in cognitive bias research is broad, it is 
unclear how engaging in the latter would advance the main thesis under 
discussion. Instead, we might take this circumstantial evidence to be enough to 
move on to a related, but more interesting, question: whether memory failure 
can play a role in explaining self-knowledge failure for cases that are not 
recognised memory phenomena. In the following two sub-sections, I will 
outline two examples that indicate a positive response to that question.  
 
																																																								
19 The prima facie rider allows for the elimination of cases that we would be disinclined to accept as a 
genuine self-knowledge failure, but as the case is purely illustrative, I will not attempt to fill out the details 
here. 
20 See e.g. the Cognitive Bias Codex, 2016.  
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3.2 Confabulation 
In addition to the simple cases—in which cognitive biases are already recognised 
as memory effects—a number of cognitive biases that are not recognised as 
memory effects, are best explained as involving a failure, distortion or gap in 
memory. Confabulation is one such effect. As with a number of terms primarily 
studied in clinical cases—such as delusion (see Berlyne 1972)—definitions of 
confabulation tend to be constructed around the common source of data (see 
Appendix 1, §7), and so confabulations are often defined as ‘false narratives or 
statements about the world and/or self that unintentionally arise due to some 
underlying pathological condition’ (McVittie et al. 2014). Call this the 
Pathology view. Defining confabulation according to the Pathology view is a 
mistake. Empirical research tends to suggest that confabulation—or something 
very much like it—is widespread, and may even be the norm (see e.g. Hall et 
al. 2012).21  In one heavily cited example (Nisbett and Wilson 1977), non-
clinical participants over-selected items in arrays of identical nylon stockings 
due to position, while later denying the possibility that position might have 
affected choice when asked for their reasons (pp. 243f.). A key assumption 
behind the research is that participants ought either to recognise the role of 
position in their selection, or admit ignorance. This is diachronic self-knowledge 
failure with regards to one’s reasons (or other decisive factors in one’s decision-
making).  
Assuming the results are good, it would be foolish to reason from this 
finding about non-clinical participants—on the basis of the Pathology view—to 
the conclusion that cognitive pathology is widespread or the norm (even if it 
turns out to be true independently). We need not follow the definition too far 
down that particular rabbit hole. Perhaps providing a definition is too ‘thorny’ 
an issue (Sullivan-Bissett 2015), and we can work around the problem by 
pointing to a range of common, but neither necessary nor sufficient, features (p. 
																																																								
21 In Appendix 1, I argue that this is a needlessly pessimistic conclusion given the evidence, however, the 
conclusion—however implausible it may currently seem—may be shown to be true elsewhere.  
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4). But, pace those who espouse such a view, there is little need to be timid in 
defining such phenomena either. The basis of a useful definition can be traced 
back over a century (see Bonhoeffer 1901), and recognises a link between a 
failure or gap in memory and a tendency to confabulate (see Appendix 1, §7). 
From this view, we might describe confabulations as ‘statements or actions that 
involve unintentional but obvious distortions of memory’ (Moscovitch and Melo 
1997, p. 1018; following Berlyne 1972), a description still in currency. The 
view can accommodate clinical cases, because the cause of the memory failure 
can either be pathological or non-pathological, but it allows for non-clinical 
cases to be explained without resorting to mass attribution of morbidity (and it 
still de-stigmatises the phenomenon). (See Appendix 1, §7 for further 
discussion.) 
 
3.3 Choice blindness 
In addition to simple cases, and memory related phenomena such as 
confabulation, more complicated examples of introspective failure can also be 
best explained as involving a failure or gap in memory. One example is Choice 
Blindness. Choice Blindness sees subjects fail to know their minds in the 
following respect: when they make a choice, and offer reasons for that choice, 
they offer reasons that simply could not be their reasons for that choice (see 
Appendix 1, §1). In this respect it is similar to, and draws upon, the frequently 
cited, and sometimes misunderstood,22 work by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). It 
combines that research with Change Blindness 23  research and, conjuring 
tricks—or ‘magic’ (Hall et al. 2010)—to reverse a subject’s selection (in 
manipulated trials) and present them with the object they rejected as if it were 
their choice (see e.g. Johansson et al. 2008). Subjects are then asked to offer 
their reasons for the selection.  
																																																								
22See e.g. Schwitzgebel (2006) 
23 Change Blindness is an effect in which participants ‘fail to detect changes in a scene when the change is 
accompanied by some other visual disturbance’ (Johansson et al. 2008, p. 142).  
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In a study in which subjects were asked to select one of two faces on the 
basis of attractiveness, and then received their rejected choice as their own, the 
number of participants that detected the manipulation was low—‘no more than 
30% of all manipulated trials were detected’ (p. 144)—even with unlimited 
time to explain their preference. A large majority of explanations were clearly 
confabulatory, since subjects explained their selection by referring to features 
‘not possessed by the initially chosen face’ (Lopes 2014).  
 Numerous revisions have been made to address the methodological 
issues, and the effect appears to be robust. More recent versions of the studies 
suggest that the effect extends far beyond matters for which caprice might be 
excusable (e.g. simple matters of taste with no obvious repercussions), and to 
cases where we are generally held to be rationally criticisable, such as moral 
judgements (see e.g. Hall et al. 2012). For instance, subjects not only failed to 
notice when statements about moral positions were ‘reversed’ (p. 1), but 
argued ‘unequivocally for the opposite of their original attitude’ (p. 4). (See 
Appendix 1, §§2–3 for further details.) 
The implications of this kind of research for our status as introspectively 
competent rational decision makers (see Appendix 1; Davies 2015) can be 
initially unsettling. If the research is sound, then not only do we most often fail 
to notice our preferences and attitudes have been manipulated, but all-too-easily 
we offer explanations, and even argue, for choices that were not—and are even 
directly opposed to—our own. Standard explanations of the results tend to 
corroborate the feeling that the research is damaging. Dominic Lopes (2014, p. 
29f.) suggests we can choose one of two hypotheses to explain the effect:  
 
(1) We do not choose for reasons; we choose and provide reasons. The 
manipulation merely brings this out by setting up an unusual 
situation where the reasons miss their target.  
(2) Reasons offered for the choices do not ‘target [participants’] initial 
choice and preference’. The belief that they chose x ‘determines 
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their preference’ and so the reasons offered accord with their 
eventual preference. 
 
Both of these hypotheses do damage to our ‘conception of rational decision 
making’ (p. 30; Appendix 1, §4) because either our ‘choices are not based on 
the reasons we give’ or our attitudes are ‘fickle’ (Lopes 2014, p. 29f.). Either 
way our ‘reasoning about decisions is post hoc’ (p. 30).  
Whatever the merits of the two hypotheses, a number of concerns count 
against them (see Appendix 1, §5). Not least among these is the concern that 
the conclusions reach significantly beyond what the data suggests. We might 
reasonably take the data to show that in many cases, non-clinical participants—
and perhaps, therefore, the population more broadly—are willing to provide 
demonstrably false statements about reasons for their selections, in response to 
inquiries, and when they have failed to notice that their choices have been 
manipulated (Ibid.). But it is notable that a sizable proportion of participants 
detect the manipulation, and some offer statements that are true of their 
original choice but not true of the manipulated choice. These data are not 
irrelevant to an explanation of the phenomena. It is not irrelevant that some 
participants do perform the way one might expect of an introspectively 
competent decision maker, even if we are willing to accept that this happens 
somewhat less frequently than we might have thought. The two hypotheses on 
offer struggle to explain this feature of the data.  
An alternative explanation relies upon the assumption that some of our 
cognitive processes are such that, from the first-person perspective, transitions 
between those processes can sometimes go undetected (see Appendix 1, §8). 
While such an assumption is not wholly uncontroversial, it is quite safe: it is 
allowable even on some traditionally optimistic views of our introspective 
capacities (see Ch. 2). If one is willing to accept this assumption, then an 
explanation of the effect can proceed via a search for the appropriate processes. 
Promising candidates are processes involving factual memory and those, at least 
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partially, involving deliberation. At least in the conditions of Choice Blindness 
research, both are activities that that manifest some recognition of a question, 
and are typically Transparent to factual inquiry (see Ch. 3; Appendix 1). The 
main difference between them is that deliberation also aims at resolving an 
issue, whereas in cases of factual retrieval one has already resolved it. The 
respective epistemologies of deliberation and factual memory already provide 
good clues as to why it would be that a subject might transition between them 
without detection, especially in response to inquiries into what the subject 
thinks.  
Inquiries of the variety ‘Do you think that p?’ can be understood in more 
than one way—as an invitation to make up one’s mind, or an inquiry into what 
one already thinks. But keeping these matters apart is not straightforward, since 
the questions ‘Do I think that p?’ and ‘Is it the case that p?’ are either first-
personally indistinguishable (Edgley 1969, p. 90; in Moran 2001), or have a 
tendency to elide—with the former giving way to the latter (see e.g. Shah and 
Velleman 2005). The conditions under which one might successfully divine the 
attitudes one already has, therefore, can be expected to be limited at best. 
Whatever they are, they ought not include any making up of one’s mind, which 
would risk contaminating the result of the inquiry ‘by possibly altering the state 
one is trying to assay’ (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 507).  
 One way in which the participants of Choice Blindness research might 
have access to what they already think would be to pay attention to their ‘brute’ 
or ‘spontaneous’ responses.24 But this can only be part of the explanation, at 
best, since many sounds we spontaneously make with our mouths are not good 
indicators of what we think. 25  There is something helpful in the thought, 
however: whatever form our responses take, if they are to be a good way of 
knowing what we already think, then they must be non-deliberative, since 
																																																								
24 This is Shah and Velleman’s (2005) concern about Transparent reasoning as a way of knowing one’s mind. 
Moran (2012) argues that their view (a form of Neo-Expressivism) cannot explain self-knowledge.  
25 Moran (2011) makes this point against Shah and Velleman’s (2005) form of Neo-Expressivism. (See Ch. 3 
for a more in-depth discussion of what can be taken from this position.) 
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deliberation will risk contaminating the response whenever there is an internal 
change in the subject, or a change in her environment.  
The remaining part of the explanation can be found in our most plausible 
epistemologies of factual memory. These epistemologies of factual memory 
have the following three features: (i) a prima facie epistemic authority for a 
subject to continue believing in the absence of defeating conditions (e.g. Owens 
1999, p. 319); (ii) which allows a subject to relinquish her reasons after the 
attitude has been formed (p. 317); and (iii) phenomenological paucity (Teroni 
2015; see also Ch. 4; Appendix 1, §10 for a more complete discussion of these 
features).  
How does this help to explain Choice Blindness? A subject in Choice 
Blindness conditions forms or recalls an attitude when presented with a 
selection.26 In either case, the subject can rationally retain that attitude while 
relinquishing her reasons for it, and it may even be the norm to do so (see 
Owens 1999, p. 317). Presenting the participant with something other than her 
original choice is sufficient to disrupt the prima facie authority of the initial 
attitude in any case, but asking for reasons will likely reveal a gap in the memory 
of an unguarded participant. Thus, at least in part, the subject begins to assess 
the features in her environment with a view to resolving an issue—namely, by 
considering the features that go in favour of one selection over another, rather 
than a process which aims at retrieving factual information (no longer a viable 
source of the reasons one is required to offer). This transition can occur 
undetected, and so considering the matter afresh risks contaminating the self-
knowledge procedure as long as there has been a change in the individual or her 
environment. We know from the methodology of the research that 
manipulating the selections relies upon a change in the subject’s environment, 
and so whenever a subject considers factors in favour of one choice over 
another, she faces the very real risk of reporting upon features that could not be 																																																								
26 It will depend upon the specifics of the study. In the study involving faces, for instance it is more plausible 
that the attitude is formed upon seeing the faces. In the moral attitudes case, it is at least possible that the 
subject recalls a prior stance rather than forming a new attitude. 
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the decisive reasons for her original choice. On the other hand, the case in 
which the subject ‘remembers well’ is the one in which she will behave much as 
we would expect of a rational decision maker. 
This simple explanation of the data acknowledges the vulnerability of 
subjects to a specific variety of self-knowledge failure without accepting the 
catastrophic implications for our status as introspectively competent rational 
decision makers that are implied by the other two hypotheses.  
 
So far, we have seen that our thinking about introspective failure and memory 
converges in commonsense cases and a significant range of simple cognitive 
biases. Thinking about the role that memory plays also helps to improve 
explanations of phenomena such as confabulation, and complicated cases of 
introspective failure such as Choice Blindness. Were it not for an extensive 
literature that mostly ignores memory in the discussing self-knowledge, it 
would be tempting to say that it should form an essential part of theorising in 
this domain.  
Someone opposed to such a temptation is likely to object in the 
following ways: (i) commonsense examples are subject to a broad range of 
competing analyses; (ii) examples such as failure to know one’s character are 
beside the point since judgements about character are not supposed especially 
secure, and many of the cognitive bias cases are closer in nature to character 
judgements than they are to cases usually found in the philosophical literature on 
self-knowledge; and (iii) all of the other cases (e.g. those involving 
confabulatory reporting of reasons) concern diachronic self-knowledge and so 
will be susceptible to memory effects.  
 For the purposes of argument, I am happy to concede points (i) and (ii). 
The use of these examples is mainly to illustrate the degree to which our 
vocabulary and, to a significant degree, our theorising about phenomena in these 
two domains coincides when we have not taken pains to keep them apart. The 
third issue is more substantive, for it effectively suggests that pointing to cases 
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of diachronic self-knowledge failure begs the question by allowing memory to 
come into play, and thus it deserves a more complete response (perhaps more 
complete than can be afforded here). However, it should be noted that truly 
synchronic self-knowledge is an illusory phenomenon on all but a small number 
of self-knowledge theories (i.e. those which suppose an immediate metaphysical 
acquaintance with mental states). Scanning (Nichols and Stich 2003), 
deliberation (Moran 2001; Boyle 2011), reflection (Boyle 2009), and inference 
(Byrne 2011a), are all diachronic in some respect, and the latter two appear to 
have well-defined temporal components (I return to this point in Ch. 5). The 
spirit of the objection, I take it, is that there are importantly different varieties 
of self-knowledge failure, and for the point about memory to hit home, the 
examples used must be of a specific variety traded within a certain kind of 
literature. With regards to this issue, I am sympathetic. In the next section, I 
outline some varieties of self-knowledge failure that should be kept apart.  
 
 
4. Varieties of self-knowledge failure 	
On the basis of what has been considered so far, we might conclude that there 
is, in general, already an implicit association between self-knowledge failure and 
memory. Not only are the boundaries unclear (e.g. some memory failure is 
considered self-knowledge failure), but some clear cases of self-knowledge 
failure are best explained in terms of memory (i.e. considering the role of 
memory in these cases offers a better explanation than alternative explanations). 
(DSK) seems not only plausible, but fairly commonplace. The test of whether 
an investigation into memory’s role will help shed light on some of the more 
intractable problems of self-knowledge will be, in the first instance, whether it 
can shed light on those failures that tend to be the focus of philosophical debate. 
As we have seen, there is not one view in this respect: Greek Philosophy was 
concerned with a range of matters including soul and character; Early-Modern 
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Philosophy was largely concerned with the objects immediately accessible to the 
conscious mind; and contemporary philosophy has mainly focused upon 
intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, but has entertained a much 
broader range. One way to narrow the scope of an investigation is to isolate 
those items in our mental lives for which our judgements are thought to carry 
some special weight or privilege.27 Self-knowledge failure when it comes to 
those items is usually the stock and trade of philosophical discourse. With this in 
mind, we can differentiate between the following kinds of self-knowledge and 
their corresponding failures: 
 
(1) Introspectively unavailable (e.g. a blemish on the back of one’s head) 
(2) Conflux (e.g. character traits, motives, emotions) 
(3) Interoceptive (e.g. hunger, thirst) 
(4) Process (e.g. decision-making, reasoning) 
(5) Intentional states (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions)  
(6) Phenomenal character of experiences (e.g. seeing colours or objects) 
 
Varieties (1), (2) and (3) will not form a significant part of the discussion. There 
is no perceived privilege for objects of variety (1); at best, perceived privilege 
for objects of variety (2) is minimal, and while judgements concerning (3) are 
likely to carry some privilege, 28  they are not generally discussed in the 
literature. Since first-personal judgements about processes (4) and intentional 
states (5), and the phenomenal character of experience (6), are thought, at least 
sometimes, to carry a distinct weight or privilege, these will be the focus of the 
discussion. So far I have suggested that memory is taken to provide all or part of 
the explanation for many examples of introspective failure. For others, memory 
has no explicitly cited role, but it can still aid in improving our understanding of 
where things go wrong. Despite the explanatory value of memory for thinking 																																																								
27 See Gertler (2011b, Ch. 3) for a helpful discussion of narrowing the scope of self-knowledge inquiry.  
28 I assume here that privilege can be contingent, such that without the correct advances in medical science, 
or the correct apparatus, the subjects experiencing these phenomena is in a position of privilege.  
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about introspective failure, not much time has been given to the question of 
whether the epistemology of memory can help to explain introspective success. 
A positive response to that question, I take it, would require that the 
epistemology of memory can help to explain what we take to be special about 
self-knowledge, and this might seem initially implausible. In the final section, of 
this chapter, I want to explore how we might go about finding a positive answer 
to that question.  
 
 
5. Memory and introspective success 
 
In considering memory’s relevance to a range of introspective phenomena, we 
might consider two theses that appear in some guise the literature:  
 
(i) Memory plays a ubiquitous and indispensable role in human 
cognition. 
(ii) At least some features of memory and first-person thought 
coincide, or are importantly related.  
 
The two theses can be taken as starting points for distinct approaches to 
answering the question of whether the epistemology of memory can help to 
explain introspective success. The first often goes unchallenged in philosophical 
literature: memory is thought to be a necessary, ubiquitous, and largely 
involuntary feature of human cognitive operations (see e.g. Owens 1999):  
 
Our memory is not one more informational device which we can use or not as 
we please: it is fundamental to all cognitive transactions, including any that 
would be involved in establishing the reliability of memory itself. (Owens 
1999, p. 313) 
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‘Working’ memory is required for inference, and for the ‘stream of 
consciousness’ by which, on some accounts, we access our ongoing thoughts 
(see e.g. Carruthers 2015). ‘Procedural’ memory allows me to type this 
sentence without looking at the keyboard. And memory has a role in sensory 
perception—allowing for ‘persistence of vision’ in events that would otherwise 
seem broken, segmented, or static: a series of ‘frozen images interspersed with 
brief periods of darkness’ is seen as a ‘continuous scene’ at the cinema; a solitary 
glowing ember moved around in the dark can be seen as shapes, patterns, or 
letters (see Baddely 1999, p. 11). On a number of views, ‘almost everything is 
memory’ (Teroni 2005, p. 7), and because memory plays a fundamental and 
ubiquitous role in human cognition, a full suspension of one’s reliance on 
memory (if possible) would result in a suspension of one’s capacity for 
intellectual change (cf. Owens 1999). 
Striking clinical cases—demonstrating, for instance, the effects of 
chronic failure in short-term/long-term memory transfer—hint at just how 
alien human cognition would be without reliance on memory. And even in 
those cases many elements of the memory system (short-term, procedural, and 
sensory memory) remain in working order. Memory is not only fundamental to 
‘normal’ cognition, but generally features in ‘abnormal’ cognition too.  
Given its fundamental role in our cognitive operations, it may be 
tempting to reason as follows: (a) if memory is required for all ‘cognitive 
transactions’, it must be required for transactions that issue in self-knowledge; 
and so, sans memory (i.e. via a failure, gap, or distortion) self-knowledge 
involving any cognitive transaction would be impossible; (b) we can predict, for 
any given attempt at self-knowledge, that memory failure of the appropriate 
variety will result in, or contribute to, a commensurate failure in that attempt.  
Both of these statements may turn out to be true. But they do not 
promise a great deal in terms of strategy for the current investigation. The first 
amounts to a transcendental defence of a thesis not especially under attack, and 
they both fail to provide insight into the potentially interesting convergence 
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between memory and the features of self-knowledge that occupy philosophical 
discourse in the field—they are more concerned with whether memory is a 
genuine enabling factor in self-knowledge than with the particular explanatory 
contribution it might make. In contrast, the second thesis (ii) is a promising 
starting point since it allows for a understanding of how memory might be 
involved in first-personal thought rather than whether it must be.  
 In order to pursue that line of thought, the first step is to evaluate and 
prioritise a range of approaches, assumptions, and specific theses that have 
accumulated in the literature on self-knowledge and introspection with a view 
to producing a list of desiderata against which the success of a theory of self-
knowledge can measured.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have suggested that our vocabulary of introspection is uniquely confused 
among accepted modes of knowledge. Part of the problem is that introspection 
terms pick out a mixed bag of phenomena including a range of sensuous and 
non-sensuous content. Among those elements frequently conflated with 
introspection discourse are memory phenomena. The extents to which memory 
phenomena occur in such discourse suggest that there is a convergence in our 
pre-theoretical thinking about memory and self-knowledge. The prevalence of 
memory effects in cognitive bias research suggests that this convergence 
stretches to theoretical thinking too. While one might object that the 
convergence bespeaks a lack of conceptual clarity on the issue, one might also 
inquire as to whether this convergence is explanatorily useful. To demonstrate 
that it is useful, I provided two examples of diachronic self-knowledge failure 
that are better explained when the role of memory is made explicit.  
Despite the explanatory value of memory for thinking about 
introspective failure, not much time has been given to the question of whether 
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the epistemology of memory can help to explain introspective success. A 
positive response to that question would require that the epistemology of 
memory is able to help explain what we take to be special about self-
knowledge. I have argued that such an investigation may be fruitful in shedding 
light on some of the more intractable problems in our theorising about self-
knowledge. The first step in such an inquiry is to describe what features we take 
to be special about knowledge in this domain in such a way that the success of a 
theory of self-knowledge can be measured against them. This is the business of 
the next chapter.  
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2 
 
Desiderata for a Theory of Self-Knowledge 	
 
Introduction 
 
Philosophical interest in self-knowledge tends to focus on a number of 
asymmetries between first-personal and third-personal attribution, and on 
features of the first-person case that are purportedly distinctive of the domain.29 
The purpose of this chapter is to isolate these features and asymmetries, and to 
construct a set of desiderata that can be set against any theory of self-knowledge 
as a measure of its success. I divide the discussion of the desiderata into three 
varieties: ‘minimal criteria’, ‘ideal desiderata’, and considerations coherence 
and compatibility with cognitive phenomena 30  (‘additional desiderata’). My 
primary concern is with characteristics that are thought distinctive in that they 
are not exhibited in other knowledge cases (i.e. of others’ mental states, and the 
environment). These will need to be explained—or explained away—by any 
theory of self-knowledge to be considered successful.  
 A background assumption, and several discrete theses can be found in a 
number of prominent views about self-knowledge. The assumption is that we 
can have knowledge of our mental states, and I will leave this assumption largely 
unchallenged (see Ch. 1). The discrete theses concern how it is that knowing 
our mental states differs from other cases of knowledge.31 I will refer to three of 
																																																								
29 See e.g. Gertler (2011a, 2011b, Ch.1); Byrne (2011a); Fernández (2013). 
30 The terms are loosely due to Douglas (2013), although Douglas refers to ‘coherence’ issues as divided into 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ concerns. A more in-depth treatment of the desiderata than is possible here might 
make better use of the internal/external distinction. However, for the present purposes, I believe 
‘coherence and compatibility’ are sufficiently fine-grained. 
31 See e.g. Byrne (2011a). This latter carries with it another assumption: that knowledge of others’ minds, 
and knowledge of the environment are broadly of the same kind. This assumption does deserve to be 
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these discrete theses as the PIE theses, or PIE conditions for a theory. They are: 
(P) Peculiarity; (I) Immediacy; and (E) Epistemic Security. These will serve as 
‘minimal criteria’ for a theory of self-knowledge.  
 Each comes with associated questions: Must Peculiarity be explained 
through some special introspective faculty? If not, how it can be explained by 
reference only to those faculties required for knowledge in other domains? Is 
Immediacy to be read as psychological, epistemological, or explanatory? What 
are the implications of each? Is Epistemic Security a matter of degree or of kind? 
How secure is self-knowledge compared to knowledge in other domains? A 
discussion of issues arising from these questions makes up the first three sections 
of the chapter.  
There are also questions of whether a theory ought to explain access to 
all mental states, occurrences, and processes in the same way (it has generally 
been assumed that it should);32 whether this explanation ought to restrict itself 
to epistemic capacities deployed in knowledge of other kinds, or needs 
additional resources (it is generally assumed that metaphysical extravagance is to 
be avoided);33 and whether a theory is compatible with the transparency of first-
person thought (a recent pre-occupation in the literature). Call the first 
concerns about Uniformity, the second concerns about Economy, and the third 
about Transparency. Sometimes a theory is, or is not, Uniform, Economical, and 
compatible with Transparency as a straightforward consequence its structure (e.g. 
theories make use of a ‘special faculty’ will not be Economical), but this is not 
always the case.34  
These considerations will not determine the success of a theory in the 
same way that minimal criteria will: there are good reasons to question whether 
self-knowledge is a unitary phenomenon admitting of genuinely uniform 
																																																																																																																																																						
challenged, although it will not be the main focus of the investigation here and will be touched upon 
relatively briefly. 
32 See Boyle (2011) for a list of approaches that have subscribed to this assumption, implicitly or explicitly. 
33 See e.g. Byrne (2011a) for a helpful discussion.  
34 Contrast Cartesianism, for instance (see Ch. 1) with Transparency approaches (see Ch. 3). 
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explanation;35 some ostensibly good reasons for rejecting the notion of a special 
faculty (e.g. rejection of Cartesianism) do not count against all ‘special-faculty 
accounts’ of self-knowledge;36 and views of Transparency and its role in self-
knowledge vary considerably.37 Thus Economy, Uniformity, and Transparency 
are ideal desiderata. Whether there are good reasons to reject any of these 
desiderata is explored below.  
 Coherence and compatibility considerations will also bear upon our 
assessment of a theory.38 A theory must be internally coherent, of course, but it 
must also cohere with what we take to be right more generally (in the absence 
of principled grounds for revision). For the domain in question, massive 
introspective failure and/or incompetence, for instance, look likely to make 
impossible some epistemic capacities that we take ourselves to have (e.g. 
‘critical reasoning’),39 and may bring into question whether we are the rational 
decision-makers we take ourselves to be.40 We can accept that we probably 
over-estimate our competence in both of these respects, but we would need an 
especially robust reason to relinquish our claim to them completely. So, a 
theory must cohere with established cognitive phenomena unless it provides 
independent, principled reasons for rejecting them.  
I address four of these considerations in section five (§5). The first is a 
capacity to recognize that which we do not believe or know—that is, a subject’s 
capacity to identify her own ignorance or lack of belief.41 Call it Agnotic Access. 
The second—purportedly an implication Epistemic Security (E)—suggests a 
subject should have uncontaminated access to a mental state in place prior to the 
initiation of a self-knowledge procedure. 42  I take this capacity to be a 																																																								
35 See e.g. Boyle (2011) 
36 Modern proponents of ‘faculty accounts’ include David Armstrong’s version of the ‘Inner Sense’ theory 
(see e.g. 1981).	
37 For markedly different interpretations of Transparency, compare Byrne (2011a) and Boyle (2011). 
38 There is not enough space here to engage in a useful discussion on what makes a theory a good theory. See 
Douglas (2013) for a discussion about cognitive virtues in theory construction.  
39 See e.g. Burge (1994) 
40 This appears to be a consequence of some interpretations of empirical research such as Choice Blindness, 
although I argue against these views elsewhere (see Appendix 1)  
41 See e.g. Fernández (2013) for a discussion of the desideratum 
42 This ‘implication’ of Epistemic Security is discussed by Brie Gertler (2011a). 
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requirement for critical reasoning (although I do not argue for that conclusion 
here). Call this Preserved Access. The third, Evaluative Access, affords the subject the 
ability to reflect upon or assess her current mental states. The fourth and final 
consideration—whether or not a theory has damaging implications for our 
status as rationality creatures—I will call simply Self-Blindness.  
Following a discussion of each of these three varieties of desiderata, I 
conclude the chapter with a summary of specific formulations of these 
desiderata against which the success of any theory of self-knowledge can be 
measured. (In the following chapter, I set a recent theoretical approach to self-
knowledge against these desiderata.) 
 I have referred to three PIE theses, the explanation (or principled 
rejection) of which will serve as a main measure for the success of a theory of 
self-knowledge. These three minimal criteria—Peculiarity (P); Immediacy (I); 
Epistemic Security (E)—can be summarized as follows: 
 
(P) Self-knowledge is sometimes acquired via first-personally peculiar means 
(I) Self-knowledge is sometimes non-inferential or (in some other sense) 
immediate 
(E) Self-knowledge is epistemically secure compared to knowledge in other 
domains43 
 
The main aim of the next three sections (1–3) is to arrive at a formulation of 
each thesis against which the success of a theory of self-knowledge can be 
measured. In each case I argue for a conception that is a suitable measure of a 
theory’s success.  
 
 
 	
																																																								
43 The list is comparable e.g. to Gertler’s (2011b, p. 60), although diverges in the inclusion of immediacy.  
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1. Peculiarity and introspection 
 
In this section, I argue for a conception of Peculiarity on which it is a method or 
procedure by pointing to which it is possible, satisfactorily to explain how S 
knows her mental states, and that cannot be used satisfactorily to explain how S 
comes to know the mental states of others.  
A prominent candidate for asymmetry between first-personal and third-
personal access to mental states is the proposal that the former ordinarily 
proceeds via a different means to the latter (see e.g. Byrne 2011a; Gertler 
2011b). While our methods of coming to know, for instance, one’s character 
traits (e.g. courage) may be more or less the same in the first-person case and 
third-person case (Ch. 1), it is not easy to see how the contents of our thoughts 
and daydreams, for example, could be (see Byrne 2012). Generally, any 
perceived asymmetry goes in favour of the first-person, resulting in a kind of 
epistemic advantage, but while often related, the two issues they are 
independent in the sense that ‘neither entails the other’ (Byrne 2011a; also 
§1.3). 
The method by which we come to know our own mental states is 
commonly—within certain strands of analytic philosophy—labeled simply 
‘introspection’, although there is surprising diversity of opinion about what that 
means (Ch. 1).44 The Cartesian view sees introspection as a kind of ‘inward 
reflection’, a view that has survived in some form to the early twentieth-century 
psychological methodology,45 and no doubt still has a hold in commonsense 
psychology: there is a reason we are offered a penny for our thoughts (Gertler 
2011b); and the daydreamer’s unfocused gaze suggests she sees something we 
cannot see, etc. Despite its commonsense appeal, anti-Cartesian sentiment 
about self-knowledge has almost become dogma.46 It is sometimes associated 
with an implausibly high degree of reliable access to a subject’s own mind, and 																																																								
44 Compare ‘Inner Sense’ accounts (e.g. Armstrong 1981) with Evans-inspired Transparency accounts of 
introspection (e.g. Byrne 2005).	
45 See e.g. the work of Edward Titchener (1867–1927).	
46 Stoneham (2004) highlights some weak points in common cases against Cartesianism.  
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an implication that the subject is gazing into a, surely imaginary, ‘second world’ 
(see Ryle 1949).  
Philosophical opinion has shifted fairly quickly from seeing the mind as 
‘totally open to introspection’ to doubts about ‘the very reality of introspection’ 
(Moran 2001, p. 5); and from an association of mental events with those 
‘immediately present to consciousness’ (see Freud 1915; in Moran 2001) to 
doubt about whether any process or activity of the mind is conscious (see e.g. 
Dennett 1969). Gilbert Ryle saw introspection-talk as a kind of ‘simile’ based 
upon a Cartesian misconception of mind:  
 
the fact that we generally know what we are about does not entail our coming 
across any happenings of ghostly status … there are no such happenings; there 
are no occurrences taking place in a second-status world, since there is no such 
status and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of 
acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such a world. (Ryle 1949, p. 143) 
 
Ryle’s (1949) view suggests no difference (in kind) between first-person and 
third-person access to the mind is required to explain self-knowledge. 
Combined with the view that there is also no principled difference in Epistemic 
Security in the first-person case, we can call this the Parity Thesis (PT): 
 
(PT) There are no differences in kind between first-person and third-
person access to the mind, and first-person access affords no substantive 
epistemic advantage. 
The thesis has contemporary support in the work of Quassim Cassam (2014) 
and Peter Carruthers (2011) and amounts to a rejection of both Peculiarity (P) 
and Epistemic Security theses (E). However, with regards to the former, it must 
at least be a ‘slight exaggeration’ (Byrne 2012) since proponents of (PT) 
frequently depend on ‘silent soliloquy’ (Carruthers 2011; Ryle 1949), 
‘retrospection’ (Ryle 1949), or ‘occurrent conscious propositional attitudes’ 
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(Cassam, forthcoming) to explain our access to our own minds, and none of 
these is easily explicable in terms of third-person only access.  
The implications of doubts about access to conscious processes and 
activities are also questionable: they rely on the identification of the objects of 
first-person awareness with sub-personal, neurological, or computational 
processes; not the objects most commonly associated with first-person access to 
the mind:  
 
For the object of first-person awareness (on any account of it) is not all of 
psychological life, but primarily the states of mind identified under the 
categories of what is sometimes called “folk psychology”: the hopes and fears, 
pains and experiences we relate to each other in daily life, and not states or 
processes defined either neurologically or computationally. (Moran 2001, p. 
7) 
 
Failure to know these processes is self-knowledge failure of a kind, but does not 
obviously indicate general, or further specific, incompetence. Such processes 
can be viewed as ‘irretrievably beyond the individual’s control or consciousness’ 
(Burge 2011, p. 325) even if one thinks that self-knowledge of mental states is 
robust and reliable (see e.g. Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Schwitzgebel 2006; Ch. 
1, and Appendix 1). By contrast, the inhabitants of Freudian unconscious are, in 
principle, retrievable to the conscious mind (see Moran 2001, p. 7). So, neither 
sub-conscious processes nor Freudian unconscious present an immediate threat 
to robust self-knowledge of mental states achieved via some peculiar means and, 
notably, Parity theorists who are wary of introspection-talk, sometimes move 
its duties onto a more familiar cognitive faculty, and in so doing leave traces of 
unexplained self-knowledge.47  
																																																								
47 See Alex Byrne’s (2012) discussion of the problem as it applies to the thoughts of Ryle and Carruthers, 
and here in chapter one. 
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 The challenge, then, is not to eliminate Peculiarity completely, but to 
formulate it in a way that makes room for both metaphysically austere and 
extravagant conceptions, allowing the formulation to function as a minimum 
criterion that can accommodate a range of approaches. It is worth taking a brief 
look at the diversity of candidates that such a formulation would need to 
accommodate.  
 
1.1 Introspection and ways of knowing 
The range of positions that could need accommodating by a formulation of 
Peculiarity (P) includes: Acquaintance, Inner Sense, Rationalism, Transparency 
approaches,48 and Simple theory. In what follows I outline the main features of 
these views, and comment briefly upon their viability as (i) peculiar methods, 
and (ii) methods that allow us to retain the assumption (Ch. 1) that judgements 
about our mental states can lead to knowledge of those states. 
On the Acquaintance view, introspection is conceived of as a direct, 
unmediated awareness of, or metaphysical acquaintance with, our mental states. 
Because contact with the states is unmediated, it is unlike (outer) perception in 
that there is no room for a causal process—such as light reflecting onto the 
retina—that is, the room that sceptical scenarios tend to exploit.49 On this 
view, knowledge of our mental states is especially secure. It need not result in 
indubitability or infallibility (though some views do stress these qualities), but 
because it is knowledge of a different kind, at least some of the ways that knowing 
about the world may be subject to error do not apply when it comes to knowing 
our minds (see Gertler 2011b, Chs. 1, 4; Russell 1912).  
A challenge for the approach is that the metaphysical contact that 
eliminates some kinds of error also appears to make the explanation of how S 
knows—our adopted hallmark of knowledge—quite difficult. Whatever direct 
metaphysical contact might explain, it does not sufficiently explain of how S 																																																								
48 The grouping is broad and loose. As Brie Gertler remarks that none ‘of these theories is monolithic. Each 
admits of multiple versions, which differ in some details’ (2011b, p. 4).	
49 See e.g. Schwitzgebel’s (2008a) ‘alien neuroscientist’ that supplies us with misleading phenomenology.  
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knows about her mental states. So while it is easy to see how the method is first-
personally distinctive, it is not easy to see how we might accept it as a genuine 
route to epistemic success.  
Rather than focusing on the difference between our knowledge of our 
mental states and our knowledge of the world, the Inner Sense view, broadly 
speaking, point to the similarities (thus rejecting a central claim of Acquaintance 
theory). Introspection remains, ostensibly, a distinctly first-person method, 
since a subject has unique view of her own mind. But, in an important respect, 
there is no difference in kind between our knowledge of our own minds and 
knowledge of the environment. While a number of initial proponents of the 
approach held our access to our minds to be almost unimpeachable, if the 
mechanism is akin to ‘outer perception’ one can be wrong about one’s mind in 
the same kind of ways that one can be wrong about objects in one’s 
environment50 (Gertler 2011b, Chs. 1, 5). Thus, even though the view appears 
to provide a plausible first-person means of knowing our minds, its ability to 
provide any special security is open to challenge: first-personal privilege does not 
follow from a dedicated ‘inner’ sense alone.  
The Inner Sense view faces an additional challenge: in casting the 
subject’s relation to her mental states as one of an observer observing 
independent objects, it leaves open the possibility of ‘self-blindness’—that is, 
the inability of a creature to recognise its own thoughts and sensations. It has 
been argued that (Shoemaker 1994) self-blindness is not possible for rational 
creatures, and assuming the argument is successful,51 the Inner Sense approach 
may provide a plausible model of peculiar first-person access to minds, but not for 
the kinds of creatures that we happen to be.  
Inner sense theory leaves open another possibility: because the 
peculiarity is strictly contingent, one could, in principle, have the same access to 
																																																								
50 A point that allows more contemporary versions of the approach to enjoy plausibility in the face of 
concerns about high degrees of privileged access to our minds (see e.g. Armstrong 1993).  
51 Whether the argument poses a direct threat to Inner Sense theory has been brought into question by Amy 
Kind (2003) and Brie Gerter (2011b).  
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others’ mental states as one does to one’s own mental states (see Armstrong 
1993; Gertler 2015). (This need not concern us too much here, since we can 
restrict the inquiry to humans of this world.)  
Inner Sense emphasises the role of the subject as ‘observing’ or 
‘detecting’ her mental states—presenting the subject as standing in a passive 
relation to those states. This is a questionable fit for mental states such as pain 
and belief. Mere observation, especially on the perceptual analogy, fails to 
account for the apparent difference between my awareness that I see glass of 
water to the right of my computer screen, on the one hand, and my awareness 
of a dull ache in my right shoulder, or my deciding upon the best course of 
action, on the other (see Gertler 2011b; Schwitzgebel 2008b).  
Rationalist approaches, in contrast, emphasise the subject’s role as agent 
rather than patient (for at least some mental states). On this approach, we are 
authoritative about our mental states precisely because we are responsible for 
shaping them (Gertler 2011b). The processes leading to some mental states are 
activities—things that we do rather than things that happen to us (see Boyle 
2009), and our authority, at least in some cases, arises from a process of 
‘making up one’s mind’, or deliberating (Moran 2001; Boyle 2009). But where 
the Inner Sense approach fails to account for an apparent agency when it comes 
to knowledge of some states, Rationalism fails to account for an apparent 
patiency for others: beliefs, desires, and intentions seem a good fit, but 
‘experiences’, sensations, and sometimes daydreams (see Boyle 2009, 2011; 
Gertler 2011b) are prima facie unresponsive to reason: ‘to be a thinker and an 
agent is to be capable of a kind of activity that stands in contrast to the passivity 
of sensation’ (Boyle 2009).  
Contemporary rationalist accounts (e.g. Moran 2001, 2012; Boyle 
2009, 2011—usually give a central role to the ‘“transparency” of one’s own 
thinking’ in highlighting what is distinctive about self-knowledge:52  
 																																																								
52 The term is attributed by Moran to Roy Edgley (1969).	
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Ordinarily, if a person asks himself the question “Do I believe that P?”, he will 
treat this much as he would a corresponding question that does not refer to 
him at all, namely the question “Is P true?”. And this is not how he will 
normally relate himself to the question of what someone else believes. (Moran 
2001, p. 60) 
 
The notion of ‘introspection’, here, takes a turn away from an ‘inward’ glance 
or reflection. The first-person and third-person cases remain different, because 
in the first-person case one’s attitudes are immediately responsive to facts about 
the world, whereas facts about the world have no immediate relevance when we 
try to ascertain what someone else thinks. (In some cases, this difference is 
thought to allow for an epistemic distinctiveness or security.) Remarks from 
Gareth Evans (1982)53 make the extent of the turn explicit:  
[In] making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or 
occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. (Evans 1982, p. 
255) 
Transparency approaches vary widely: not all focus on the Rationalist’s 
concerns; acknowledge, or seek to explain, an epistemic asymmetry; and not all 
aim at a uniform explanation of self-knowledge.54 Of course, a solely outward-
directed inquiry does not provide a sufficient explanation of self-knowledge, 
since the conclusion of such an inquiry refers to the world, not the self. So it is 
usually conceded that there must be some transition from the former conclusion 
to the latter. A pressing question for Transparency approaches is, therefore, 
how a conclusion about the world, p, can bring about a (rational) self-ascription: 
I believe that p. (See Chs. 3, 5.) 
One Transparency approach (see Byrne 2005, 2011a) sees introspection 
as partially constituted by a world-to-mind inference. A conclusion about the 																																																								
53 See also Alex Byrne (2005, 2011a) 
54 Though this appears to be the aspiration of Evans (1982); Moran (2001); Byrne (2011a). 
	 54 
world, p, can form the basis for a self-attribution of a belief—I believe that p—if 
one follows a rule or schema that takes one from the former to the latter. 
(Whether or not this kind of Transparency approach meets other desiderata 
such as Uniformity is a matter for elsewhere.) 55  A clear challenge for this 
inferential Transparency view is whether a world-to-mind inference is plausibly 
a way of knowing since it is ‘neither deductively valid or inductively sound’ 
(Byrne 2011a). Boyle (2011) describes the inference as ‘mad’.56 (See Ch. 3 for a 
discussion of Transparency accounts.) 
Shah and Velleman (2005) suggest one can know one’s beliefs by ‘posing 
a question whether p and seeing what one is spontaneously inclined to answer’; a 
process in which the question serves as a ‘brute stimulus’: ‘One comes to know 
what one already thinks by seeing what one says—that is, what one says in 
response to the question whether p (p. 506).57 But observation of one’s response 
to brute stimuli alone looks insufficient for knowledgeable self-attribution of a 
belief unless one is also happy to accept sneezes (Moran 2012, p. 221) and other 
spontaneous oral noises to ‘give voice’ to such states. 
‘Simple theories’ of introspection aim to offer an alternative to both 
‘observation’ and ‘inference’ by suggesting that one can know one is in a 
conscious state by ‘forming a belief on the basis of that very conscious state’ 
(Peacocke 1998; Smithies, forthcoming). Being in pain alone, for instance—that 
is, the ‘experience of pain’—can be ‘a thinker’s reason for judging that he is in 
pain’ (Peacocke 1998, p. 72). An attempt (Smithies, forthcoming) to extend the 
scope of the approach to a range of states can be stated as follows: 
 
																																																								
55 See Byrne (2011a) in favour, and further discussion in Ch. 3. 
56 Boyle contrasts this to a ‘reflective’ approach to explaining Transparency (Boyle 2012) on which the 
subject takes different sort of step: ‘from believing P to reflectively judging (i.e., consciously thinking to 
himself): I believe P’. This step is not a ‘transition between contents’ but ‘a coming to explicit 
acknowledgement of a condition of which one is already tacitly aware’ (p. 5). 
57 The view is attributed to Dorit Bar-on (2004) although Bar-on’s position here is not with traditional 
epistemic concerns, but with ‘giving voice’ (p. 318) to states in much the same way as one might say let out 
yelp in response to a painful stimulus.  
	 55 
you know by means of introspection that you are in some mental state M when 
you believe that you are in M on the basis of a reason that is constituted by the 
fact that you are in M. (Smithies, forthcoming) 
 
Thus, the explanation can be argued to extend to beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, and may offer an alternative answer to the Transparency question: 
one does not move from one state (a belief about the world) to another state (a 
belief about one’s state of mind). Rather, one’s being in the former state is our 
reason for believing that we are in that state.  
 
1.2 Peculiarity  
The foregoing discussion reveals, firstly, that use of the term ‘introspection’ for 
views as diverse as Acquaintance and inferential Transparency views suggest it 
has become shorthand for whatever method is used to assay one’s mental states 
(see also Smithies, forthcoming); and secondly, highlighted the fact that a 
number of accounts appear to fall short of sufficiently explaining knowledge in 
the domain. With these two things in mind, characterising Peculiarity in light of 
this should (i) avoid prohibiting, at the outset, the possibility that any of these 
approaches could be correct given (ii) that just how they sufficiently explain of 
knowledge in the domain is given due attention.58 
 A sufficiently broad notion of Peculiarity is offered in Byrne’s (e.g. 
2005, 2011a) ‘peculiar access’: 
 
one has peculiar access to one’s mental states if ‘one has a way of knowing 
about one’s mental states that one cannot use to come to know about the 
mental states of others’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 202) 
 
																																																								
58 We might add a third point that emphasises that the inquiry relates to humans of this world (thus allowing 
for contingent forms of Peculiarity). Cassam (2014) dedicates a good deal of space to emphasising the 
dangers of theorising on the mistaken basis that we are some other, more competent, species. 
	 56 
The majority of approaches outlined will be captured by this notion of 
Peculiarity as long as they turn out to be bone fide ways of knowing (although 
we have seen that there is doubt in some cases that aim to explain knowledge,	59 
let alone those for whom traditional epistemic pressures are not a central 
concern). 60  Since Byrne’s formulation captures a good range of theoretical 
approaches, and contains the knowledge requirement, the formulation has a 
good deal going for it. However, it offers little guidance on how we should 
think of the process as a way of knowing. Since whether a procedure can issue in 
knowledge is relevant to the characterisation of Peculiarity as I have cast it, 
some explicit guidance on this matter will be useful. To this end we can 
supplement Byrne’s formulation with our explanatory view of knowledge (Ch. 
1): 
 
Φ-ing that P is a way of knowing that P just if it is possible satisfactorily to 
explain how S knows that P by pointing out that S Φs that P. (Cassam 2007, p. 
2) 
 
Combining these two features leaves us with a more comprehensive guide to 
what is required for a subject’s access to her own mind to be peculiar: 
 
Peculiarity—a method or procedure by pointing to which it is possible, 
satisfactorily, to explain how S comes to knows her mental states, and 
																																																								
59 See Ch. 3 for a discussion of whether Alex Byrne’s self-knowledge procedure is genuinely peculiar in this 
sense. Byrne describes a challenge to his approach that suggests it leads to a ‘paradox’: the procedure itself is 
a prima facie plausible route to knowledge and the Transparency of belief is ‘obvious once pointed out’, but 
the inference ‘could hardly be worse, and so the second-order beliefs it yields will not be knowledge’ 
(Byrne 2011a, p. 204).  
60 Some versions of Expressivism—for example, the Simple Expressivism attributed to Wittgenstein—deny 
‘that utterances like “I’m in pain” are even truth-apt, let alone reflect knowledge of one’s mental states’ 
(Gertler 2015, §3.8). Acquaintance approaches, on the other hand, leave no obvious room for the kind of 
cognitive achievement associated with knowledge, and thereby do not explain how knowledge by such 
means is possible. By analogy, I have direct contact with all 206 bones in my body, but this mere fact goes 
no distance at all towards explaining how it is that I come to know that number. Beliefs formed through 
such a method would be ‘too close to their objects to qualify as genuine, substantive knowledge’ (Gertler 
2015).  
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that cannot be used satisfactorily to explain how one S comes to know 
the mental states of others.  
 
To see whether this is a useful arrangement, we can set it against a number of 
the examples covered above. 
I suggested above that one concern about Acquaintance theory is that 
direct metaphysical contact alone looks insufficient for knowledge. (We can 
assume the challenge has gone unanswered for the purposes of this discussion.) 
If such an acquaintance holds, it would evince a difference between first-person 
and third-person access to one’s mental states, and this meets the second half of 
our formulation, thus establishing a first-person/third-person asymmetry. 
However, it would fail to meet the first half of the formulation because the 
contact in question does not, as yet, satisfactorily explain how S comes to know 
her mental states (pointing to metaphysical acquaintance alone is insufficient 
explanation). 
One might think that Byrne’s formulation of Peculiar Access already 
covers such cases—it stipulates that a method should be a way of knowing, and 
if Acquaintance is not, then it does not meet the standard. In this case, my 
amendment has added no value. An example that may help to demonstrate its 
value, however, is Byrne’s own attempt to explain Epistemic Security. Byrne’s 
rule takes the subject from p to I believe that p and is meant to be knowledge-
conducive in part because it is strongly self-verifying (see Byrne 2011a) in the 
first-person case. Peculiarity is meant to be explained because following the rule 
in the third-person case ‘will often lead us astray’ (Ibid.). However, to say that 
that a method will often lead us astray is not the same thing as saying it is a 
method that cannot be used, only that it is a markedly less successful method. 
Playing badminton on one leg might lead to a largely poor run of results, but, 
unlike trying to play with no racket, it is still a way of playing badminton. So, at 
the very least, it is not clear that Byrne’s account of the self-knowledge 
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procedure meets his own formulation of Peculiar Access.61 However, it does 
look reasonably promising against my amended formulation. Assuming for the 
sake of argument that the world-to-mind inference is, in fact, knowledge 
conducive, one could satisfactorily explain how S comes to know about her 
mental states by pointing to the rule. On the other hand, one cannot not 
satisfactorily explain how S comes to know the mental states of others solely by 
pointing to the same rule.62 The amendment I have introduced is modest, but it 
will produce different results than Byrne’s formulation (including when it 
comes to Byrne’s view), and it is one way to make the knowledge requirement 
explicit. From this point, by ‘Peculiarity’, I mean the formulation above.  
 
 
2. Varieties of Immediacy 
 
The Immediacy criterion requires that a theory of self-knowledge explain the 
thesis that self-knowledge is distinctive in that it is immediate or non-inferential. 
In this section, I briefly point to a number of ways the thesis has been articulated 
in the literature, and refer to three possible readings of the underlying intuition: 
explanatory, epistemic, and psychological immediacy. I argue that while one 
reading—explanatory immediacy—should be rejected, 63  psychological immediacy 
should remain a minimum criterion for a theory, and epistemic immediacy should 
be retained as an ideal desideratum.  
The thesis I wish to capture, for the purposes of compiling a list of 
desiderata, is the underlying intuition behind the claim that self-knowledge is 
immediate, groundless, baseless, non-evidential, or non-inferential. For the purposes 
of the argument, I take these terms as attempts to describe common 
phenomena: in some core cases, it is (i) difficult for a subject to make sense of 																																																								
61 In private correspondence, Byrne (in 2016) has suggested that he perhaps should have worded this 
differently. Certainly, however, following the rule in the third-person case ‘isn’t a good idea’. 
62 One may also need to point, for instance, that medium-sized dry goods are predictable and stable, and 
form a good part of what preoccupies the average person, and that together with a largely reliable set of 
shared senses (and so on) this helps to ensure any reasonable level of success that could be achieved.  
63 Following Cassam (2009) 
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requests for reasons or evidence for a self-ascription, and she cannot always 
provide them; and (ii) the fact that a subject cannot always provide reasons or 
evidence does not count against her being knowledgeable about such states.  
 One might first try to understand the phemomena in terms of 
commonsense psychology (see e.g. Roessler’s 2013 discussion), and the case, 
psychologically speaking, for immediacy is fairly strong. Take standard cases of 
our knowledge of our own abilities:64  
 
A character in a P. G. Woodhouse novel is asked whether she can speak 
Spanish and replies ‘I don’t know: I’ve never tried’. The point here is that in 
order to know that you can speak Spanish you don’t need to have tried and 
failed to speak Spanish … You ‘just know’ that you can’t speak Spanish 
(Casssam 2014, pp. 34–5) 
 
Alternatively, take self-attribution of intentions. A natural response to inquiries 
into how one can tell that one intends to go to the cinema might be to insist that 
going to the cinema is just what one is minded to do (Roessler 2013, p. 42). In 
describing our day-to-day self-ascriptions of intentions, there does not appear to 
be a great deal more to say. The question for our current purposes is whether 
there is a great deal more to say about the significance of immediacy, 
epistemically speaking.  
One way to explain these phenomena is to suggest that that knowledge 
in this domain, unlike knowledge in general, does not typically have, or require, 
the support of reasons or corroborating evidence. Crispin Wright’s (2000) 
remarks65 on groundlessness in the case of knowing that one is in pain are a helpful 
expression of this thought:  
 
																																																								
64 Though not ‘level of ability’, for which evidence tends to show we are susceptible to all sorts of biases. 
See e.g. the literature on Depressive Realism (e.g. Alloy and Abramson 1988).  
65 See Cassam (2009) 
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The demand that someone produce reasons or corroborating evidence for such 
claims is always inappropriate. There is nothing (in that sense) upon which the 
claims are based. (Wright 2000, p. 14) 
 
Whereas it may be natural to think of knowledge of others’ mental states as 
being based upon interpretation (i.e. inferences from behaviour), such an 
explanation is not available in the first-person case, or at least it cannot be the 
basic case (Wright 2000, p. 16) because there are limits to what can be 
explained that way:  
 
When Emma interprets her reaction to Harriet's declaration as evidence that 
she herself loves Knightley, there is an avowable ground—something like ‘I 
am disconcerted by her love for that man and, more so, by the thought that it 
might be returned’—which is a datum for, rather than a product of, self-
interpretation. (Wright 2000, p. 16) 
The example is meant to show is that successful self-interpretation in some cases 
relies upon data that is drawn from ‘non-inferential knowledge of a basic range 
of attitudes and intentionally characterized responses’ (p. 16), and so self-
interpretation cannot be all there is to self-knowledge, even if interpretation is 
all there is to knowledge of others’ minds. If we accept that knowledge of 
others’ minds is inferential, based on interpretation, there is an asymmetry 
between first-person and third-person knowledge of mental states that is a 
candidate for a distinctive epistemic mark of self-knowledge. 
 I take it that the argument does enough to invite a response from any 
Parity theorist, and more specifically those who defend the view that self-
knowledge is self-interpretation. Available responses include a rejection of the 
conclusion that self-interpretation relies on data that is non-inferential, for 
example, by suggesting that an inference is present but undetected; 66  or 
accepting the thesis that self-knowledge is non-inferential, but rejecting the 																																																								
66 Inferentialism of this (interpretive) variety has support from e.g. Carruthers (2011) and Cassam (2014). 
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assumption that knowledge of other minds is (essentially) inferential.67 I will 
briefly touch upon both in attempting to explore whether Immediacy can be 
characterized as describing an interesting epistemic feature of self-knowledge.  
 
2.1 Evidential and explanatory immediacy 
We have allowed that there are excellent grounds for the commonsense 
psychological view that self-knowledge is immediate. This in itself neither 
supports nor eliminates a further epistemic reading of immediacy, and in this 
section I will explore two possible versions of such a reading courtesy of Cassam 
(2009). Cassam (2009) suggests that there are two plausible (epistemic) notions 
of the idea that there is nothing upon which a subject’s claims about some of her 
mental states are based (see §1.2 above): explanatory baselessness and evidential 
baselessness. Cassam argues that if self-knowledge is baseless at all, it cannot be 
baseless in the explanatory sense, and so it must be baseless in an evidential 
sense. But since ‘evidential baselessness’ is ‘relatively commonplace’ (in 
particular, it occurs outside of the domain of self-knowledge), it is not the 
notion of evidential baselessness that captures what is ‘epistemologically 
distinctive’ about self-knowledge. Being a relatively ‘commonplace’ 
phenomenon, evidential baselessness does not require any ‘special explanation’ 
(p. 3). It is worthwhile considering some of the main points in Cassam’s 
argument.  
 
2.1.1 Evidential Immediacy 
To state that one’s awareness of x is evidentially baseless is to state, roughly 
speaking, that one’s awareness of x is not ‘inferred from observational 
evidence’; ‘evidentially baseless knowledge is knowledge that is not evidence-
mediated … not inferred from observational evidence’ (Cassam 2009, p. 6), or 
‘not inferred from anything epistemically more basic’ (Moran 2001, p. 10; 																																																								
67 The prospect of non-inferential knowledge of the mental states of others is also not particularly popular, 
but has been argued for in some depth e.g. by Will McNeill (2012). 
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Ibid.). A few points of clarification: knowing by ‘inference from observational 
evidence’ is not the same as knowing by observation (pp. 8–9); and, arguably, a 
cognitive transition can be ‘evidence mediated’ without involving an inference 
(much depends on one’s view of ‘inference’).68  
  The former case is illustrated by Austin’s (1962) remarks that a pig 
coming into view does not ‘provide me with evidence that it’s a pig, I can now 
just see that it is, the question is settled’ (p. 115). 69  Evidence of ‘porcine 
presence’ might include buckets of pig food: 
 
Yet pig food can be present without any pig being present. In contrast, the 
visible presence of a pig isn’t an indication of its presence and does not leave 
open that there is no pig in the vicinity. (Cassam 2009, p. 8) 
 
Thus, when one knows that a pig is present by seeing that there is a pig present, 
one’s knowledge ‘is evidentially baseless even if it is based on observation’ (p. 
8). And so, in perception, we have a plausible example of evidentially baseless 
knowledge that is not self-knowledge. Other candidates include testimonial 
knowledge (p. 7) and—often taken to be the standard contrast case to self-
knowledge—knowledge of other minds, for example, our knowledge that 
someone is in pain (e.g. McDowell 1998, pp. 304–305) or angry (e.g. McNeill 
2012): 
  
In such cases, it will be inappropriate to describe one’s knowledge ass 
‘mediated’ by awareness of outer manifestations. Moreover, if one can 
literally see that someone is in pain … then the resulting knowledge is 
evidentially baseless in the sense in which a lot of ordinary perceptual 
																																																								
68 See Boghossian (2014), who suggests that philosophers have allowed themselves to use the term freely, 
without explaining what it means. Space prohibits in-depth discussion of the term in this chapter, although 
the issue does receive further attention in chapter four of this volume.  
69 Also in Cassam (2009) 
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knowledge is evidentially baseless. That is … when one sees that someone else 
is in pain that settles the question.70 (Cassam 2009, p. 14)  
 
So we can perfectly well make sense of how self-knowledge could be immediate 
(baseless) in the evidential sense. However, the fact that this kind of knowledge 
can be found in a number of examples outside of the target domain counts 
against its ability to shed much light on ‘what makes self-knowledge special’ (p. 
4). (At the end of the section I remark upon whether this is enough to see 
Immediacy removed from our list of desiderata.) 
 
2.1.2 Explanatory Immediacy 
An alternative notion of baselessness is explanatory (Cassam 2009). We saw, in 
Austin’s example, that knowledge can be observational without being inferred 
from observational evidence. In such cases, knowledge is explained by one’s 
seeing that there is a pig present. That is, there is something that one can say in 
response to inquiries about how it is that one knows there is a pig present: one 
sees, and thereby knows; or one knows by seeing (e.g. Cassam 2009, p. 8). In 
contrast, a case of explanatory baselessness would see the subject with ‘nothing 
illuminating’ that ‘can be said in answer to the question “How do you know?”’ 
(p. 6): 
 
On this account, to know that P baselessly would be to know that P without 
their being any substantive explanation of one’s knowledge that P (Cassam 
2009, p. 6) 
  
We have seen this is not the case in Austin’s pig example, and arguably it is not 
the case for testimonial knowledge: I may be presently unable to tell you that 
testimony was the source of my knowing that oxygen is released from boiling 																																																								
70 Cassam lists three conditions here: ‘(1) when one sees that someone else is in pain that settles the 
question, (2) seeing that another person is in pain entails that he is in pain, and (3) when one knows that 
another person is in pain by seeing that he is one does not infer or conclude that he is in pain’ (2009, p. 14). 
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water, but my current inability to provide that information does not detract 
from it being a good explanation of how I came to know it (p. 8). The difficulty 
with the explanatory notion of baselessness is that it is hard to square with the 
intuition that if one knows that p, there must be a ‘specific way’ in which one 
knows that p (p. 12).71  
 A promising example in favour of the ‘explanatory’ notion of immediacy 
is pain, which we can accept for the sake of argument is evidentially baseless (p. 
11):  
 
when I know that I am in pain, there is no answer to the question ‘How do 
you know?’ … this is one of those occasions on which the question ‘How do 
you know?’ is ‘at least absurd, and perhaps unintelligible as a question’ 
(Cassam 2009, p. 10)72 
 
A quick response might suggest the worry is down to a confusion between 
conversational impropriety and a form of epistemic achievement: a natural 
candidate for the explanatory basis of one’s knowledge that one is in pain is that 
one feels—or feels that one is in (p. 11)—and thereby knows, that one is in pain. 
But we can strengthen the case by considering a particular view of pain that 
would bar this response. On some accounts, feeling pain and being in pain are 
the same thing (see e.g. Shoemaker 1994, p. 128; here in Cassam 2009, p. 10) 
and since there is no ‘ontological distance’ between the two, feeling pain, cannot 
really be a way of knowing that one is in pain, since, ‘one cannot know that P 
simply by its being the case that P’ (Cassam 2009, p. 10).73  
 However, although ‘S feels pain’ cannot be a way of explaining S’s 
knowledge that she is in pain, the propositional attitude ‘S can feel that she is in 
pain’, which requires the concept pain is a more ‘advanced cognitive 
achievement’ and bypasses a ‘sensible ontological distance’ requirement for 																																																								
71 Whether one accepts Cassam’s (2007a) explanatory view of knowledge, of course, will affect one’s view 
of such a point. I have taken his view to be independently plausible (Ch. 1).	
72 Cassam quotes Hampshire (1979, pp. 282–3) in the passage.  
73 See the Acquaintance view of self-knowledge for an analogous concern (§1.1). 
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knowledge (p. 11).74 Thus, regardless of whether feeling pain and being in pain 
are the same thing, knowing that one is in pain by feeling that one is in pain is a 
genuine explanation of how one knows that one is in pain, and so it does not 
‘come out’ as explanatorily baseless (Ibid.).  
 
2.1.3 Immediacy as a desideratum 
Cassam (2009) draws two conclusions: (i) that no self-knowledge is 
explanatorily baseless; and (ii) that some self-knowledge is evidentially baseless, 
but since evidential baselessness is a commonplace phenomenon it requires no 
special explanation. Those conclusions suggest we should reject at least two of 
the three notions of immediacy we have considered: explanatory baselessness 
because it is not a genuine ‘mode of epistemic access’, and evidential baselessness 
because it is not a unique mode. Since the commonsense psychological notion of 
immediacy with which we started is also plausibly commonplace, we might 
consider dropping Immediacy from our list of desiderata altogether. This would 
be a mistake.  
 Firstly, Cassam’s argument does not aim at eliminating all notions of 
baselessness, only two plausible epistemic notions. Perhaps epistemic 
immediacy in the self-knowledge case is different to immediacy in other cases, 
or self-knowledge might be both (a) immediate and (b) not another listed kind 
of knowledge (Cassam 2009). In the first case, we would need to stipulate the 
difference between immediacy in one case and immediacy in the others (i.e. 
highlight some epistemic feature or property that distinguishes the self-
knowledge case), and in the second another risk becomes apparent: 
 
Perhaps then what makes self-knowledge special is that much of it is non-
inferential, non-perceptual and not based on testimony. At this point, 
however, the claim that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive is in 
danger of reducing to the claim that self-knowledge is self-knowledge and not 																																																								
74 Cassam (2009) points to two other possible responses: one could reject that feeling pain and being in pain 
are one and the same thing; or one could reject the ontological requirement (p. 11). 
	 66 
some other kind of knowledge. Everything is what it is and not something 
else. (Cassam 2009, p. 15)  
 
Two things should be said about Cassam’s (2009) dialectical position: (i) the 
notion of baselessness is being evaluated as a candidate for the sole defining or 
distinctive epistemic mark or feature of self-knowledge; and (ii) Cassam is 
responding to a very particular kind of question: ‘How is it possible that our 
knowledge of our inner lives is baseless?’ (p. 16). The difficulty with this 
approach is that once one realizes there are no obvious obstacles to the 
possibility of baseless self-knowledge there is little force to the ‘How possible?’ 
question. But we need not agree that baselessness is meant to be the sole 
explanandum of self-knowledge.  
One reason for thinking that baselessness is meant to be the only 
epistemically distinctive feature of self-knowledge is that other candidate 
features have been discredited: 
 
more traditional accounts of what makes self-knowledge special have focused 
on its alleged infallibility or incorrigibility. Yet the suggestion that these are 
the epistemic privileges that make self-knowledge special faces some serious 
challenges, the main one being that much less of our self-knowledge in 
infallible or incorrigible than has traditionally been supposed (Cassam 2009, 
pp. 12f.) 
 
However, infallibility and incorrigibility are not the only forms of epistemic 
privilege worth considering (see §3) and in §1, it became apparent that the 
Peculiarity thesis is more robust than some Parity theorists would have us 
believe.75 So there is support for the thesis that Immediacy is one among a 
number of criteria rather than the only one. Thus we might amend Cassam’s 
‘how possible’ question to: ‘How is it possible that our knowledge of our inner 																																																								
75 Note that, as a ‘way of knowing’, some notions of Immediacy would fulfil the Peculiarity criterion. 
Explanatory baselessness, if it were an epistemic phenomenon, looks like one.  
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lives is peculiar, immediate, and affords a first-person epistemic advantage?’. 
Or, more pertinent to the present task, ‘How does a theory of self-knowledge 
explain these features?’  
Now the issue is whether Cassam’s concerns are enough for us to 
abandon Immediacy from our list of desiderata. A number of considerations 
suggest not: (a) this alternative version of the question has philosophical force 
that Cassam’s version lacks, because in the absence of examples that 
demonstrate knowledge with these characteristics occurs outside of the target 
domain, we might think this combination of features is unique or special; (b) this 
way of structuring the question does not face the same reduction problem. 
Regardless of the number of criteria that enter the list, it could turn out that 
self-knowledge is not the only form of knowledge that meets them; (c) the 
concerns do not (nor are they intended) to bring into question the target 
phenomena that give rise to the commonsense psychological view that self-
knowledge is immediate; and (d) at least some cases of epistemic immediacy are 
controversial (see e.g. Cassam 2009, p. 7) and/or rely on very specific notions 
of inference (e.g. McNeill 2012).76 Because, ‘we may fancy that we see and feel 
what in reality we infer’ (Mill 1882/1990, p. 20), the matter of deciding 
whether a cognition is epistemically or psychologically immediate sometimes 
appears to be speculation.  
 The upshot is that we have not seen enough to remove Immediacy from 
our list of desiderata altogether. In particular, a theory of self-knowledge should 
at least explain (or explain away) the commonsense psychological view that self-
knowledge is immediate based upon the initial phenomena, that is: (i) it is 
sometimes difficult for a subject to make sense of requests for reasons or 
evidence for a self-ascription, and she cannot always provide them; and (ii) 
sometimes, the fact that a subject cannot always provide reasons or evidence 
does not count against her being knowledgeable about such states. 
 																																																								
76 McNeill (2012) appears to draw a distinction between ‘epistemic inference’ and inference more generally.  
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Psychological Immediacy—a subject (S) can be knowledgeable about 
her current mental state (C) without being able to provide her reasons 
or evidence for self-ascribing mental state (C).  
 
In the event that we find good reason to ‘elevate it to the status of 
epistemology’ (Velleman 1989; in Roessler 2013) we might also retain an 
epistemic version of the notion as an ideal desideratum:  
 
Epistemic Immediacy—a subject (S) can be knowledgeable about her 
current mental state (C) without inferring that she is in (C) from reasons 
or evidence that she is in (C). 
 
For the forthcoming chapters, when I refer to ‘Immediacy’ (I), I am referring to 
the commonsense version of the thesis. Whenever I am referring to the 
epistemic version of the thesis I will make that explicit.  
 
 
3. Epistemic Security 
 
The aim of this section is to see whether there is anything worth retaining in the 
claim that self-knowledge places the first-person in an epistemically privileged 
position when it comes to knowledge of her mental states. I argue for a 
conception of Epistemic Security offered by Byrne (2011a), 77 on which ‘beliefs 
about one’s mental states are more likely to amount to knowledge than one’s 
corresponding beliefs about others’ mental states’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 202). In 
doing so, it will be helpful to highlight some common misconceptions of 
traditional views before moving onto more contemporary versions of the thesis, 
which propose a modest form of epistemic privilege. 
 																																																								
77 See also Byrne (2005), although there are minor differences between the two formulations.  
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3.1 Traditional notions of epistemic security 
A common foil for arguments against a certain approach to self-knowledge is 
Cartesianism. Loosely described, the position suggests that our access to our 
minds is complete and (almost) unimpeachable, although this is not the only 
thing that commentators have found objectionable.78 One way of attempting to 
capture the position is to say that it must be committed to both infallibility and 
omniscience about the mind:  
 
One is infallible about one’s own mental states if, and only if, one cannot have 
a false belief to the effect that one is in a certain mental state. (In other words, 
one’s belief that one is in a particular mental state entails that one is in that 
mental state.) One is omniscient about one’s own states if, and only if, being in 
a mental state suffices for knowing that one is in that state. (In other words, 
one’s being in a particular mental state entails that one knows that one is in 
that state.) (Gertler 2011a, pp. 61–2) 
 
Some philosophers call this combination of views Cartesian ‘transparency’ (see 
e.g. Carruthers 2011). To avoid confusion with the Transparency approach that 
is the focus of forthcoming chapters, I will use the term ‘Transpicuity’: one’s 
access to one’s mind is Transpicuous if and only if one is both infallible and 
omniscient with regards to its contents.  
 Something like the Transpicuous access view has been attributed, among 
others, to Descartes, and Kant,79 and it has been argued (Carruthers 2011, Ch. 
2) that such Cartesian assumptions are not only prevalent in Western 
philosophy, but are universal among humans, sometimes as ‘tacit assumptions’ 
rather than ‘explicit beliefs’ (p. 31). Whatever wide endorsement (p. 33) it may 
have enjoyed within and without philosophy, the view is now almost universally 
rejected as a serious attempt to characterize our access to our minds (see Ch. 1).  																																																								
78 See e.g. Ryle (1949,Ch. 6) for a sustained critique of the position as related to self-knowledge. 
79  Cassam (2003), for instance, suggests that Kant’s explanation of how transcendentally necessary 
conditions are meant to be known a priori (e.g. A13/B26) ‘relies on the somewhat Cartesian-sounding 
premise that what is internal to us is also transparent to us’ (p. 198). 
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In light of the fact that Transpicuity looks implausible in the face of 
supposed counterexamples, 80  including an increasing body of empirical 
evidence,81 it is appropriate to question whether anyone ever genuinely held—
or at least defended—such a view.82 Certainly Descartes’s preparations for the 
Meditations suggest that he was aware that self-knowledge does not always come 
easily (Gertler 2011b), and elsewhere he recognizes a number of difficult cases. 
In The Passions of the Soul Descartes suggests that those ‘most strongly stirred by 
their passions aren’t the ones who know them best’ (Passions I, 28). In the same 
passage he writes that the potential for confusion when it comes to our passions 
is due to ‘the soul’s close alliance with the body’. And later (Passions II, 147) 
states that since ‘commotions of the soul are often joined with passions that 
resemble them, they frequently occur with other passions, and they may even 
come from passions that are their opposites’:  
 
A husband mourns his dead wife, though he would be sorry to see her 
brought to life. Perhaps his heart is oppressed by the sadness aroused in him 
by the funeral display and by the absence of a person to whose company he 
has become accustomed. And perhaps some remnants of love or of pity occur 
in this imagination and draw genuine tears from his eyes. And yet, despite all 
this he feels a secret joy in the innermost depths of his soul. (The Passions of the 
Soul II, 147) 
 
Descartes, then, is unlikely to have taken ordinary thinkers to have 
Transpicuous access, at least with regards to the passions. A revealing passage in 
																																																								
80 For example: ‘Kate trusts a friend's insights into her own psychology, and so she believes the friend when 
he tells her that she wants to live in the country. But the friend is mistaken—Kate really wants an urban life, 
though she hasn’t reflected on her desires enough to realize this. Hence, Kate has a false belief about her 
own desires’ (Gertler 2011c). Note, the self-knowledge failure in this case also ‘undercuts the claim of 
omniscience: in the case described, Kate is unaware of her real desire, which is to live in the city’ (Gertler 
2011c).  
81 Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and research on Choice Blindness (e.g. Hall, Johansson, and Sikström 2008) 
are sometimes taken to be clear examples of how poor our access to our minds can be. However, the 
examples can be misleading if one does not keep apart different varieties of self-knowledge failure (see 
Nisbett and Wilson 1977, p. 255; Schwitzgebel 2006; Ch. 1, and Appendix 1). 
82 Patrick Greenough (2012) e.g. suggests that it is not clear that anyone ever did. 
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the Discourse on Method83 suggests that they do not enjoy Transpicuous access to 
their own beliefs either: 
  
I thought that in order to discover what opinions they really held I had to 
attend to what they did rather than what they said. For with our declining 
standards of behaviour, few people are willing to say everything they believe; 
and besides, many people do not know what they believe, since believing 
something and knowing that one believes it are different acts of thinking, and 
the one often occurs without the other. (Discourse on Method, AT VI 23) 
 
The passage shows that we can at rule out ‘omniscience’ from Descartes’ view 
since one’s first-order belief (Bp) can fail to issue in a corresponding higher-
order belief (BBp). It may also imply that we can go wrong about our minds 
when we think we do not believe something (i.e. ruling out infallibility as 
expressed above), and although it leaves open the possibility that Descartes 
thought that whenever we have a higher order belief (BBp) we will have the 
corresponding first-order belief (Bp) (see Stoneham 2004), this more restricted 
position suggests that many intended counterexamples, including the Freudian 
unconscious miss their mark.84  
 Immanuel Kant’s assertion that ‘It must be possible for the “I think” to 
accompany all my representations’ (B131–2) is sometimes taken as one example 
that betrays Cartesian sympathies (see Carruthers 2011, p. 27). Although the 
interpretation of this phrase is controversial, Kant elsewhere suggests that some 
aspects, or operations, of the mind ‘have not to be sought for without’ and 
‘cannot remain hidden from us’ (A13/B26). However, it is also clear that Kant 
is sensitive to the possibility that parts of our minds remain hidden:  
 
In fact it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with 
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in 																																																								
83 Stoneham (2004, p. 259) and Wilson (2014. p. 669, n. 3) also point to the passage.  
84 See Stoneham (2004) for a detailed treatment of this point. He refers to the position as ‘incorrigibility’ 
(see pp. 559–661). 
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conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the 
representation of one’s duty. It is indeed sometimes the case that with the 
keenest self-examination we find nothing besides the moral ground of duty 
that could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to 
so great a sacrifice; but from this it cannot be inferred with certainty that no 
covert impulse of self-love, under the mere pretense of that idea, was not 
actually the real determining cause of the will; for we like to flatter ourselves 
by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can 
never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our 
covert incentives since, when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not 
actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not 
see. (Kant 1785/1997, §2, 4: 407, pp. 19–20) 
  
The precise implications for Kant’s views of self-knowledge are open to debate. 
On one view the passage suggests that one cannot tell ‘which of our 
transparently-introspectable impulsions causes one to act on a given occasion’ 
rather than ‘a doubt about the accessibility of those impulses (Carruthers 2011, 
p. 27). However, the text is compatible with a reading upon which not all of 
one’s incentives (or impulses)85 are introspectively available. And in either case 
the possibility of error is evident. In the first case, the belief that one acted for 
ignoble reasons may be unavailable to, or obscured for one, precisely because 
one is inclined to think oneself noble. This puts the first person and third person 
in more-or-less the same position with regard to incentives, and this goes 
against the general Cartesian intuition that the first-person is at a distinct 
advantage. If some incentives are not introspectively available, then 
omniscience, on Kant’s view, must be false. 86  And access to inefficacious 
incentives has no obvious epistemic benefits. So, Kant did not support an 
unrestricted version of Transpicuity either.  																																																								
85 Alternative translations could be part of the issue here. Carruthers (2011) focuses on a key sentence that 
reads ‘get to the bottom of our secret impulsions’, rather than ‘get entirely behind our covert incentives’. 
Although it is difficult to see that the possibility that in either case some the impulsions or incentives 
themselves may be hidden from us has been eliminated.  
86 Much will rest on the view of incentives, here, but space does not permit a more detailed discussion.  
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 Whatever its origins, unrestricted Transpicuity is a mistaken view, but 
more restricted versions enjoy some contemporary support. Chisholm (1981), 
for instance, suggests that for a restricted class of states, anyone who is in such a 
state knows that she is in it such a state. Stoneham (1998) defends a form of 
incorrigibility via a ‘Containment Claim’—‘If someone believes that he believes 
that p, then he believes that p’ (p. 128).87 And support for the security of a 
limited class of mental state—cogito-like, and self-verifying judgements more 
generally—is still in currency (Burge 1996; Brown 2000; Byrne 2011a). Since 
some of these remnants will feature in the following chapters, it is worth 
expanding briefly. 
 
3.2 Cogito-like judgements 
Cogito-like judgements, such as those employed in Descartes’s anti-sceptical 
arguments, are a paradigm case of a class of judgements that are both 
epistemically special and environmentally neutral (Burge 1996, p. 91). Take ‘I 
am thinking that there are physical entities’, for example (p. 92). In order to be 
true, it is only required that ‘I am engaged in some thought whose content is 
that there are physical entities’ (Ibid.). Given the way that such judgements have 
been used in anti-sceptical arguments, it may be tempting to class among their 
qualities that they are beyond doubt. However, this would be wrong: 
The scope for human perversity is very wide. One could be so far gone as to 
think to oneself: ‘I do not know whether I am now thinking or not; maybe I 
am dead or unconscious; my mantra may have finally made me blissfully free 
of thought’. Such mistaken doubt would evince cognitive pathology, but I 
think it possible. (Burge 1996, p. 92) 
  
																																																								
87 Stoneham (1998) takes the belief claim (BBp → Bp) to be an instance of a broader claim ‘‘BAp → Ap’: if 
someone has a belief that he now holds some attitude to p, then he does. ‘BDp → Dp’ (for desire) and ‘BIp → Ip’ (for indifference) are also instances’ (p. 128). 
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It would also be largely irrelevant to their contemporary use in discourse about 
self-knowledge. A property that is of relevance is that the judgements are 
contextual self-verifying: ‘once one makes the judgement, or indeed just 
engages in the thought, one makes it true … One cannot err if one does not 
think it, and if one does think it one cannot err. In this sense, such thinkings are 
infallible’ (p. 92). On a certain view (Burge 1996; Brown 2000) this property 
plays an important role in underpinning a variety of epistemic capacities such as 
critical reasoning. If we are critical reasoners, and critical reasoning requires 
reliable judgements about our own beliefs, desires, and intentions, then we 
must be competent self-knowers in these respects.88 This appears to block a 
pernicious form of scepticism that suggests access to our minds is subject to 
‘massive and pervasive’ error (e.g. Schwitzgebel 2008a).  
 Two concerns arise about how such an approach can help to answer 
questions central to this chapter: (i) is how far such an approach can get us with 
regards to a theory of self-knowledge, and specifically its epistemic 
desideratum; and (ii) is how any abundance of true beliefs guaranteed by such a 
means would be explanatory of knowledge.  
With regards to (i), this kind of argument provides one good reason for 
thinking that judgements about one’s own mental states must be in some sense 
secure or reliable, without stipulating the precise method by which we come to 
know them. This preserves the independence of the Peculiarity and Epistemic 
Security theses. However, it appears to be silent on the degree of security 
afforded, and so our formulation of Epistemic Security criterion will need to be 
flexible on that matter. Chapter three examines (ii) in greater detail, but 
concerns in the literature include that self-verifying judgements are cheap and 
beside the point (Schwitzgebel 2008a), a mere ‘philosophical curiosity’ (Burge 
																																																								
88 This kind of strategy is in currency at the time of writing. Maja Spener employs a like-minded defence of 
our introspective abilities in ‘Introspection and Abilities’ delivered at the First-Personal Data conference, 
University of Bergen, 28–29 August, 2014. (It is vulnerable to a similar set of concerns.) For an interesting 
current use of self-verifying judgements in this literature, see Byrne (e.g. 2011a). 
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1996),89 and there are questions over whether they are knowledge-conducive 
(Byrne 2011a).  
 
3.3 Fallibility, ontological distance, and parity 
There are difficulties in characterizing Epistemic Security at the high end of the 
spectrum. Not only do positions such as Transpicuity look implausible, but as 
judgements about one’s mind become extremely secure, they begin to look less 
like cases of knowledge on our accepted view (see e.g. Acquaintance theory 
§1.1; and pain in §2.1.2). A theory of self-knowledge needs to leave room for 
explanation. This requires, plausibly, a degree of ‘ontological distance’ (Cassam 
2009), or room for cognitive achievement (e.g. Fernández 2013, pp. 33, 103), 
(Ibid.). This places an upper limit on degree of privilege that a theory can 
provide. Before saying more about characterisations of Epistemic Security that 
stay within that upper limit, I will briefly consider whether there is a good case 
for thinking there is lower limit.  
 Burge-style (1996) arguments suggest that we must have reliable access 
to our mental states, given that we do have certain epistemic capacities. We 
have seen that this access is likely to ‘sub-Transpicuous’, and needs to leave 
room for explanation (i.e. ontological distance, or cognitive achievement). But 
the Parity theorist may claim that all three conditions can be met without 
additional first-person privilege. The epistemic claim of the Parity Thesis is that 
there is no first-person epistemic advantage: 
 
Knowledge of what there is to be known about other people is restored to 
approximate parity with Self-Knowledge … residual difference in the supplies 
of requisite data makes some differences in degree between what I can know 
about myself and what I can know about you, but these differences are not all 
in favour of Self-Knowledge (Ryle 1949, pp. 137–8) 
 																																																								
89 Burge is reporting, here, rather than endorsing. 
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Echoing Ryle, Carruthers (2011) allows that there may be ‘more evidence 
available for interpretation in the first person than in the third’ but suggests this 
‘doesn’t always entail an increase in reliability’ because ‘sometimes the presence 
of more data doesn’t lead to more reliable conclusions’ (p. 24).90 Nevertheless, 
humans are exceptional mind-readers, and reliable first-person access to mental 
states can be explained by us ‘turning our mindreading capacities on ourselves’ 
(p. 5). Thus we have reliable access to our mental states that is fallible, and 
allows for explanation (the latter two because the process is interpretive).  
There are a number of concerns with this view. It seems patently false, 
for instance, to suggest that to know which dessert I most desire from the 
menu, that I would first need to observe which one I pick; or to know that I am 
in pain, I would need to observe and interpret the relevant pain behaviour. So 
the theory does not look promising for all states. Secondly (Wright 2000), it has 
been argued that self-interpretive work relies upon more direct, non-
interpretive access to a basic range of attitudes; or in Carruthers’s (2011) 
words: ‘the mindreading system needs to have access to the agent’s own beliefs 
in order to do its interpretive work’ (pp. 236–7).91 And thirdly, one might urge 
that no rational being could be (or at least is) ‘self-blind’ (Shoemaker 1994)—
that is, having third-person-only access to her mind. This latter concern goes as 
follows: if the objects of self-knowledge are thought of as being mere objects of 
observation, they will be thought of as independent of the subject (Speaks 
2004).92 But if they are conceived of as independent of the subject, then the 
(‘self-blind’) subject would appear alien: she would (a) fall into errors such as 
asserting Moore’s Paradoxical statements (e.g. ‘it is raining, but I don’t believe 
that it is’); (b) would be unable to share her beliefs with others, and would thus 
be unable to engage in co-operative endeavours’; (c) would be unable to engage 
in higher-order deliberation on lower-order states, and would thus be devoid of 
																																																								90 See Byrne’s (2012) review of Carruthers (2011) for a helpful discussion of the similarities between the two positions. 	
91 Carruthers is reporting on, rather than endorsing the objection. 
92 See: http://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/519-self-knowledge/shoemaker-self-
knowledge.pdf. 
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agency as we ordinarily see it; and (d) would regard herself as a ‘stranger’, for 
instance, in ‘observing [her] own pain-avoidance behavior without grasping her 
own pain’ (Gertler 2011c).93 The upshot is that while self-blindness may be a 
possibility, it is not an ‘actual condition’; ‘there are no individuals who have 
only third person access to their mental lives, with spared rational and other 
epistemic capacities’ (Byrne 2011, p. 213). Third-person-only access to our 
minds is, therefore, implausible (at least implausible enough to retain Epistemic 
Security among our desiderata). 
 To summarise, whatever formulation of (E) we rest upon should allow 
for the following: (i) fallibility; (ii) explanation; and (iii) reliable access to 
mental states; that (iv) affords some—however modest—advantage in first-
person cases. In the rest of this section, I briefly compare two ‘modest’ versions 
of the thesis, by which the success of a theory of self-knowledge might be 
measured.  
 
3.4 Modest approaches to Epistemic Security 
However we decide to articulate (iv) in the criterion that reflects (E) it will 
implicitly or explicitly refer to knowledge or knowledge-conduciveness. 
Ultimately, the first person must end up in a favourable position with regards to 
knowledge of her mind. But because we are aiming at a formulation that 
captures a diverse range of candidate theories, the mode of that privilege should 
remain open. In this section I contrast two approaches to explaining (E) that 
allow for first-person privilege to be relatively modest and argue that only is a 
suitable candidate for the purposes of this inquiry.94 
Jordi Fernández (2013) takes the desiderata for self-knowledge to be two 
features: ‘Special Access’ and ‘Strong Access’ (pp. 4–6.). Special Access relates to 
the source of justification for a subject’s beliefs about her mental states. Suppose 																																																								
93 Shoemaker’s conclusions have been the source of much discussion (see e.g. Gertler 2015). Space prohibits 
detailed treatment here. 
94 While the formulations allow for modest privilege, they sometimes deliver a substantive advantage. It has 
been commented that Alex Byrne’s (2005, 2011a) account, for instance, provides something close to 
infallibility (Carruthers 2011).  
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Jim believes that Sarah wants milk in her coffee. For Jim’s belief to be justified, 
it must be based on behavioural evidence and reasoning (pp. 4f.); perhaps Jim 
notices that Sarah chooses milk whenever the option is available, etc. Jim’s 
evidence is gathered by observing Sarah’s behaviour. By contrast, Sarah seems to 
know at least some of her mental states without the need to observe her 
behavior (it would seem odd if this were not the case at least sometimes) 
Fernández (2013) takes this apparent asymmetry to be a difference in the 
‘source of justification’—Jim observes and reasons or infers, and Sarah does 
not—that can be captured in the following principle (p. 5):  
 
For any S and S*, propositional attitude A and proposition P: 
Normally, if both S and S* are justified in believing that S has A towards P, 
then 
(1) S*’s justification for believing that S has A towards P relies on reasoning 
and behavioral evidence. 
(2) S’s justification for believing that she has A towards P relies on neither 
reasoning nor behavioural evidence. 
 
Fernández, in (2), takes the apparent lack of observation and reasoning at face 
value. (While we may resort to self-interpretation in some cases, we do not 
‘normally’ need to.)  
 Strong Access concerns the strength of justification. Normally, when 
Sarah claims to want milk in her coffee, we defer to her ‘opinion on the 
matter’: ‘By default, we seem to think that each of us knows best what is in our 
own minds, which suggests that we take it that our beliefs about our mental 
states are more strongly justified that anybody else’s beliefs about them’ (p. 6). 
This asymmetry can be captured by the ‘Strong Access’ principle (Ibid.): 
 
For any subjects S and S*, propositional attitude A and proposition P: 
Normally, if both S* and S are justified in believing that S has A towards P, 
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then S is more strongly justified in believing that she has A towards P than S* 
is. 
 
Fernández (2013) takes our deferral not only as a description of social and 
linguistic practices, but to reflect some genuine epistemic asymmetry.  
 Several aspects of these principles are worthy of note. Firstly, Special 
Access assumes without argument something that we have not yet established: 
that epistemic immediacy is a genuine feature of self-knowledge (§2). This is 
relevant to our inquiry because, in doing so, it might eliminate a number of 
theories worthy of consideration (e.g. it has been argued that the Transparency 
approach is a poor fit for an epistemic notion of Immediacy, see Cassam 2014; 
Ch. 3). Secondly, Strong Access assumes without argument that the advantage 
must be explained in terms of justification. Not only will this prematurely 
restrict our list of candidate theories but, for our purposes, would do so by 
begging the question as to how an individual ends up in a favourable position by 
fixing the mode of privilege.95 
 By contrast, Alex Byrne (2011a) offers a formulation of the Epistemic 
Security thesis that does not, ostensibly, eliminate any specific mode of 
privilege:  
 
one has privileged access to one’s mental states if ‘beliefs about one’s mental 
states are more likely to amount to knowledge than one’s corresponding 
beliefs about others’ mental states’. (Byrne 2011a, p. 202) 
  
There is, however, one clear concern: the formulation frames the epistemic 
advantage in Reliabilist terms. However, ‘more likely’, here, need not create 
the same kind of problem that justification-focused criteria do, and so this alone 
does not merit a reformulation. If we accept that ‘more likely’ can be read as 
																																																								
95 This is not to suggest Fernández (2013) begs the question in for his own project, in which he explicitly 
states that he wishes to see how far we can get given a specific (i.e. Internalist) notion of epistemic 
justification (pp. 41–5) 
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meaning that in the first person case one is ‘in a more favourable position with 
regards to knowledge acquisition’, then Byrne’s formulation meets our 
requirements in that it: (i) can be fulfilled without infallibility, (ii) allows room 
for the view of knowledge adopted here, (iii) allows access to be reliable, (iv) 
builds in a first-person advantage. For the chapters that follow, by Epistemic 
Security criterion I will, following Byrne (2011a), mean: 
 
Epistemic Security—‘beliefs about one’s mental states are more likely 
to amount to knowledge than one’s corresponding beliefs about others’ 
mental states’. (Byrne 2011a, p. 202)  
 
 
4. Uniformity, Economy, and Transparency 
 
With the minimal criteria in place, I now turn to concerns that have been 
brought into specific focus by developments in the literature that discuss 
Transparency accounts of self-knowledge (e.g. in Moran 2001; Byrne 2005; 
Boyle 2011). The first is whether a theory ought to explain access to all mental 
states, occurrences, and processes in the same way (Uniformity); the second, 
whether a theory ought to restrict itself to epistemic capacities deployed in 
knowledge of other kinds or needs additional resources (Economy); and the 
third, whether a theory is compatible with the transparency of first-person 
thinking (Transparency). In this section, I remark briefly on why we might wish 
to retain these as ideal desiderata—that is, while Uniformity, Economy, and 
Transparency will not be decisive in the success of a theory, they are ceteris 
paribus factors that count towards a theory’s success. 
 
4.1 Uniformity 
Theories of self-knowledge tend to aim at explaining first-person access to all 
mental states. A number that do not explicitly attempt this, proceed by 
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explaining a core case (e.g. belief), and suggest that the explanation for the 
target state is a good candidate to be rolled out to others. Gareth Evans’s (1982) 
remarks, for example, were directed towards ‘ways we have of knowing what 
we believe and what we experience’, but he expressed the aspiration that the 
approach would provide a ‘good model of self-knowledge’ in general’ (p. 255). 
The thought, often implicit, appears to be condition upon the success of an 
account of self-knowledge is that it can explain all cases of first-person authority 
in the same way (Boyle 2009, p. 141). Moran’s (2001) account appears to have 
fallen foul of the condition because it focuses on deliberative cases; ill-suited to 
self-knowledge of sensation, perception (see Byrne 2011a), and any state that 
does not ‘seem to be subject to our active control’ (Boyle 2009, p. 135). A 
surfeit of criticism suggests the assumption has been accepted, often 
‘uncritically’, by many writing in the field (p. 135), and Boyle (2009) suggests 
that we reject the assumption. However, it is actively embraced by Byrne (e.g. 
2011a), who explicitly aims to explain first-person authority for ‘judgement-
sensitive’ attitudes (Boyle 2009), sensation, perception, inner speech, and 
mental imagery with the same basic approach. Byrne’s (2011a) defends the 
assumption as follows: 
 
If the epistemology of mental states is not broadly uniform, then dissociations 
are to be expected. One might find, for instance, someone who knows what 
she believes like the rest of us, but whose independent mechanism for 
discovering her desires is disabled, leaving her with only a ‘third-person’ way 
of knowing what she wants. Such dissociations do not seem to occur however. 
(Byrne 2011a, p. 213) 
 
But these examples do not go against Boyle’s suggestion that a division ought to 
be made along Kantian lines: 
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we must distinguish between an active aspect of self-knowledge that is 
knowledge of ourselves as spontaneous beings, and a passive aspect grounded 
in our power of sensible receptivity. (Boyle 2011, p. 2) 
 
Both beliefs and desires fall under self-knowledge of the ‘active’ or 
‘spontaneous’ variety, so the problem of dissociation is not a live one for 
Boyle’s account. However, we may briefly consider whether clinical evidence 
might point to the kind of dissociations that Byrne has in mind.  
A promising example is somatoparaphrenia: a delusion in which a part of 
one’s body belongs to someone else (see Fotopoulou et al. 2011). In an 
intriguing piece of research, Fotopoulou et al. (2011) found that alternating 
first-person and third-person perspective—that is, ‘direct view’ and ‘mirror 
view’—could result in rapidly alternating judgements of ownership for the 
same limb. The study suggests that ‘limb disownership’ can be ‘altered using 
self-observation in a mirror, and in turn suggests dissociation between first- and 
third-person perspectives on the body’ (p. 3946). Moreover, because reinstated 
judgements of ownership were not permanent, it suggests that ‘the subjective 
sense of body ownership remained dominated by an impaired first-person 
representation of the body that could not be updated’ (Ibid.).  
 On its face, this is precisely the kind of dissociation that Byrne predicts 
for cases where the epistemology of mental states is not broadly uniform. 
However, the effect is far too local to demonstrate dissociation of that kind. The 
impaired first-person representation usually affects one limb as opposed to the 
whole body and so cannot be taken to suggest that an independent mechanism 
for this variety of self-knowledge has been disabled,96 and we should consider 
whether other cognitive impairments might better explain the condition.97  
																																																								
96 An exploration of what exactly it does tell us is worthy of more space than can be afforded here.  
97 Byrne footnotes a similar point about supposed examples of self-blindness in schizophrenia patients in 
Nichols and Stich (see 2011b, fn. 4) 
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 Other cases are worthy of attention,98  but for the moment, we can 
accept that, ceteris paribus, Uniformity Assumption provides an important 
guideline for theory construction in this domain.  
 
Uniformity—a satisfactory account of self-knowledge should be 
fundamentally uniform, explaining all cases of “first-person authority” … 
in the same basic way’ (see Boyle 2009, p. 141). 
 
The ceteris paribus clause allows for principled divisions along Boyle’s lines to 
be treated on a case-by-case basis (i.e. rather than built into the formulation), 
and in light of their performance with regard to the other desiderata.  
 
4.2 Economy 
Coherent arguments against ontological parsimony (or for metaphysical 
extravagance) are difficult to come across.99 When it comes to the domain in 
question, metaphysical ‘extravagance’ (see e.g. Byrne 2011a) sees us employing 
a dedicated faculty or capacities solely to explain self-knowledge, as opposed to 
faculties or capacities employed in other forms of knowledge. This kind of 
extravagance can be found, for instance, in contemporary, materialist 
descendants of Inner Sense views, such as Nichols and Stich’s (2003) 
‘monitoring mechanism’ (see also Armstrong 1981). 
 Economical theories suggest that self-knowledge and knowledge of other 
minds use the same cognitive apparatus (e.g. Ryle 1949; Carruthers 2011), that 
what is special about self-knowledge can be explained by ‘normal intelligence, 
rationality, and conceptual capacity’ (Shoemaker 1994; in Byrne 2011b), or that 
we are dealing with ‘merely a special deployment of powers possessed by 
anyone who can draw inferences about any topic whatsoever’ (Boyle 2009, p. 																																																								
98 Congenital analgesia is worth considering as a case a counter-example to Byrne’s argument that goes in 
favour of Boyle’s distinction.  
99 A few dotted examples that tug the intuition are can be found in the history of science. Francis Crick 
apparently thought it was ill-suited to biology, ‘where things get very messy’. For this and other examples, 
see Ball (2016).  
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1).100 While extravagance is not a bar to success on its own, other things being 
equal, an Economical theory of self-knowledge will be favoured over an 
extravagant theory.  
 
Economy—a theory that explains the distinctive features of self-
knowledge without recourse to capacities not employed in other 
domains of Knowledge (see also Byrne e.g. 2011a). 
 
4.3 Transparency 
Remarks about the Transparency of first-person thought and experience predate 
a recent Transparency ‘turn’ in the self-knowledge literature considerably. The 
transparency of experience as related to introspection can be traced back at least 
to G. E. Moore’s observation that experience is diaphanous: ‘when we try to 
introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue’ (1922). The thought 
is reflected in Ryle’s (1949) observation that some cognitive activities are found 
to be ‘oddly elusive’ (p. 134). Along with my inferring, deducing, concluding, 
and hearing: ‘my seeing of the hawk seems to be a queerly transparent sort of 
process’ (Ibid.).101  
 A number philosophers have adopted the view that this transparency as 
applied to first-person thought means that one can answer a question about 
one’s own mental state merely by attending to a corresponding question about 
the ‘topic’ of that state (see Moran 2012, p. 212), which is typically world-
directed rather than self-directed. Gareth Evans (1982) remarks, for instance, 
suggest that ‘in making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are … directed 
outward’ (p. 225). The general idea is that I can come to know my mind by 
attending to ‘the world at large’ rather than something ‘inner’ or 
‘psychological’.  
																																																								
100 Boyle, here, is commenting on the ambitious nature of Alex Byrne’s approach. 
101 Ryle thinks the problem arises because ‘these verbs are of the wrong type to complete the phrase ‘catch 
myself … ’ (1949, p. 134) 
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 Versions of the thought appear in the work of Edgley (1969), Evans 
(1982), Moran (2001), Shah and Velleman (2005), Boyle (e.g. 2009, 2011), 
Byrne (e.g. 2005, 2011a) and Fernández (2013), although accounts diverge 
dramatically (cf. Moran 2012, fn. 2). A common point of divergence is how one 
gets from the end of a world-directed inquiry that issues in a result about that 
world, to a conclusion about the self. Evans (1982) and Moran (2001) offer few 
clues as to the nature of that transition;102 Shah and Velleman (2005) adopt a 
variety of Expressivism (see 2005, fn. 29); Byrne (e.g. 2011a) suggests that 
there is a world-to-mind inference; Boyle proposes a ‘Reflective’ approach 
(2009); and Fernández (2013) offers a version of the ‘simple theory’ of 
introspection103 that he calls the ‘Bypass’ view. In some cases, the transparency 
of first-person thought plays a central role explaining how we know our mental 
states (Evans 1982; Moran 2001); and in others the nature of the cognitive 
transition to self-ascription provides the explanatory work: Byrne’s world-to-
mind inference is intended to explain what is special about self-knowledge; 
Boyle’s reflection reveals only what we, tacitly, already know; and for 
Fernández transparency is one of numerous desiderata for a theory—that it 
‘should explain why mental states are transparent when we attribute them’ 
(Fernández 2013, p. 38). 
The task of constructing a desideratum in this case is to find the elements 
of the Transparency thesis that are common to competing theories. Matthew 
Boyle’s attempt to do this is as follows:  
 
I can know various aspects of the nature, content, and character of my own 
mental states by attending in the right way, not to anything “inner” or 
psychological, but to aspects of the world at large. Indeed, it seems that, for 
various sorts of mental states, there is in the normal case no other way to 
attend to them: all there is for me to contemplate in my sensation of blue is 																																																								
102 Evans appears to think that one is ‘automatically’ in a position to self-ascribe; Moran (2001) suggests that 
we do so immediately. 
103 See Declan Smithies (forthcoming) 
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the (apparent) blueness of some worldly thing, and all there is for me to attend 
to in my belief that P is the (apparent) fact that P. (Boyle 2011, p. 3).  
 
A formulation that is common to competing theories can make use of Boyle’s 
analysis:  
 
Transparency—a theory of self-knowledge should allow that there is 
nothing more to attending to some of one’s mental states than to 
attending to their concomitant features or facts. 
 
Given that it has become orthodox to insist upon some form of transition from 
the resulting from the activity, this will require further discussion (see Chs. 3 
and 5). However, unless otherwise stated, whenever I refer to Transparency as 
a desideratum, I refer to the formulation above.  
 
 
5. Additional desiderata 
 
A theory of self-knowledge should leave in place established cognitive 
phenomena unless it provides independent, principled reasons to reject them. In 
other words, a theory should not be excessively revisionary of our cognitive 
capacities. In this section I deal with four concerns: (§5.1) a theory should allow 
for knowledge of an absence of belief (Agnotic Access); (§5.2) the target of a self-
knowledge procedure ought not be altered by that procedure (Preserved Access); 
which is a requirement for, but independent of another kind of ability, that is 
(§5.3) to assess or reflect upon one’s current (pre-existing) attitudes (Evaluative 
Access); and finally, a theory of self-knowledge should—without excellent 
reasons to the contrary—preserve our status as rational creatures (§5.4 Self-
Blindness). I will briefly touch upon some reasons that we may wish to list these 
among our desiderata.  
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5.1 Agnotic Access 
It is a common assumption that in addition to knowing one believes that p, one 
can know that we do not believe p (or indeed have no attitude towards p 
whatsoever). A similar but more exacting expectation can be found in Plato’s 
Apology:  
 
So I withdrew and thought to myself: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that 
neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something 
when he does not, whereas when I do not know neither do I think I know” 
(Apology 21d) 
 
It is a reasonable expectation of a theory that I can be knowledgeable that I do 
not believe that p (or do not know that p) in the broadly the same way that I am 
knowledgeable that I believe that q (or I know that q) (i.e. I know it by the same 
method that I employ for self-knowledge in other cases). This becomes pressing 
if one accepts the Uniformity Assumption (see §4.1). It is also a reasonable 
expectation that if a theory of self-knowledge bestows some first-person 
epistemic security with regards doxastic self-knowledge, it should afford that 
same security with knowing that one does not believe (cf. Fernández 2013, p. 
71), 104  especially if it has been stipulated, or is implicit, that one can be 
knowledgeable about both cases in the same way. So, if we take the assumption 
seriously, it places constraints both on Peculiarity and Epistemic Security: 
  
Agnotic Access—A theory of self-knowledge should adequately explain 
how one could know that one does not have attitude (A) towards (p) 
 
Since not all theories of self-knowledge can comfortably explain Agnotic 
Access—it has been suggested that some Transparency accounts might 																																																								
104 Fernández calls this principle AB (Absense of belief) (Ibid.).  
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struggle105 in this respect, for example—it will be a useful test of a theory’s 
success. 
 
5.2 Preserved Access  
In §3, I suggested that we adopt Byrne’s (e.g. 2011a) conception of Epistemic 
Security. It has been argued (see Gertler 2011a) that there must be at least one 
important additional constraint on this feature of self-knowledge, namely that: 
 
If I have no belief that p (at t1) but consider whether I have a belief that p (at 
t2) I will not self-attribute a belief that p without creating a new belief. 
(Gertler 2011b, p. 5) 
	
The intuition that Gertler’s comment attempts to capture is that for a self-
knowledge procedure to be reliable, it must successfully identify states in place 
prior to onset of the initiation of the procedure, or at least not misidentify states 
formed during (or as a result of) the procedure as states in place prior to the 
initiation of the procedure. Preserving the first part of this intuition would 
prove exacting on a theory of self-knowledge because the creation of a new 
belief itself need not constitute a failure in self-knowledge. But there is a clear 
case in which the latter part of this intuition can be preserved even if a self-
knowledge procedure risks or results in the creation of a new belief—that is, 
just as long as one does not take that belief at t2 to be in place at t1 (i.e. one does 
not take the new belief to be a belief in place prior to the initiation of the 
procedure). The adjustment required is a minor one and, for brevity, the point 
could be left as Gertler puts it, but a more complete formulation of the 
constraint suggests as an important desideratum of a theory of self-knowledge, 
Preserved Access:  	 	
																																																								
105 This looks like a consequence of Gerter’s (2011a) concern (see Ch. 3).  
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Preserved Access—If (at t1) I do not believe that p, and I consider 
whether I believe that p, I will not (at t2) self-attribute a newly formed 
belief that p as the belief I held (at t1) or form a new belief that prevents 
access to a belief I held (at t1). 
 
This desideratum places an additional constraint upon the Epistemic Security 
criterion (E), by fixing the target of procedure as the belief in place prior to the 
initiation of whatever procedure is in use. If a procedure fails to meet this 
desideratum it will have failed also to meet (E). 
 
5.3 Evaluative Access 
Preserved Access is, I want to suggest, an enabling condition for something 
close to a commonsense view of critical reasoning, where the latter is a subject’s 
ability to assess or reflect upon her current attitudes. This separate capacity may 
follow from the mechanism or procedure that a theory of self-knowledge 
deploys, though it need not. Going in favour of its addition to the list of 
desiderata is that it is either assumed or explicitly argued for in a good deal of 
the literature (e.g. Burge 1996; Brown 2000; Crane 2014). However, this is 
not always the case, and some philosophers (explicitly or implicitly) doubt 
either that we ordinarily have the capacity as commonly conceived (Nisbett and 
Wilson 1977; Dennett 1969), or that it is valuable in the way we take it to be 
(Kornblith 2012).106 Here is what I mean by Evaluative Access:  	
Evaluative Access—a subject has evaluative access if that access allows 
her to assess or reflect upon her current (pre-existing) attitudes in light 
of her available evidence and the norms she accepts. 	
An expectation that Evaluative Access should be explained by a theory of self-																																																								
106 Kornblith (2012) talks of ‘Reflection’ rather than ‘Critical Reasoning’ but a good deal of the activity that 
I am trying to capture here is covered in his discussion. 
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knowledge is too strict a condition. However, if a theory of self-knowledge 
assumes that Evaluative Access is possible, that theory ought to have explained 
how it is, or at least not make it impossible by its own lights. 
 
 
5.4 Self-Blindness 
At the end of §3, we saw that some views of self-knowledge allow for the 
possibility of self-blindness. We could expect the self-blind subject to: (a) fall 
into errors such as asserting Moore’s Paradoxical statements (e.g. ‘it is raining, 
but I don’t believe that it is’); (b) be unable to share her beliefs with others, and 
would thus be unable to engage in co-operative endeavours’; (c) be unable to 
engage in higher-order deliberation on lower-order states, and would thus be 
devoid of agency as we ordinarily see it; and (d) regard herself as a ‘stranger’, 
for instance, in ‘observing [her] own pain-avoidance behavior without grasping 
her own pain’ (Gertler 2011c).  
 Since there are no real-life cases of individuals who suffer from self-
blindness, ‘with spared rational and other capacities’ (Byrne 2011a), a theory 
will be in a mess if it produces individuals who would suffer these symptoms. 
And so self-blindness produces a plausible negative constraint on a theory not to 
produce subjects that could be expected to suffer the symptoms listed above.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The forgoing discussion has provided us with a list of desiderata that can 
plausibly be applied to any theory of self-knowledge. The full list of desiderata is 
listed and numbered as follows:  
 
Minimal criteria: 
(I) Peculiarity—a method or procedure by pointing to which it is 
possible, satisfactorily, to explain how S comes to knows S’s mental 
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states, and that cannot be used satisfactorily to explain how one S 
comes to know the mental states of others.  
(II) Immediacy—sometimes, a subject (S) can be knowledgeable about 
her current mental state (C) without being able to provide her 
reasons or evidence for self-ascribing mental state (C).  
(III) Epistemic Security—one has privileged access to one’s mental 
states if ‘beliefs  about one’s mental states are more likely to 
amount to knowledge than one’s  corresponding beliefs about 
others’ mental states’. (Byrne 2011a, p. 202)  
 
Ideal desiderata: 
(IV) Epistemic Immediacy—sometimes, a subject (S) can be 
knowledgeable about her current mental state (C) without inferring 
that she is in (C) from reasons or evidence that she is in (C). 
(V) Uniformity—a satisfactory account of self-knowledge should be 
fundamentally uniform, explaining all cases of “first-person 
authority” … in the same basic way’ (see Boyle 2009, p. 141). 
(VI) Economy—a theory that explains the distinctive features of self-
knowledge without recourse to capacities not employed in other 
domains of Knowledge (see also Byrne e.g. 2011a). 
(VII) Transparency—a theory of self-knowledge should allow that there 
is nothing more to attending to some of one’s mental states than to 
attending to their concomitant features or facts. 
 
Additional desiderata: 
(VIII) Agnotic Access—A theory of self-knowledge should adequately 
explain how one can know that one does not have attitude (A) 
towards (p) 
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(IX) Preserved Access—If (at t1) I do not believe that p, and I consider 
whether I believe that p, I will not (at t2) self-attribute a newly 
formed belief that p as the belief I held (at t1) 
(X) Evaluative Access—a subject has evaluative access if that access 
allows her to assess or reflect upon her current (pre-existing) 
attitudes in light of her available evidence and the norms she accepts. 
(XI) Self-Blindness—a theory of self-knowledge should not leave 
subjects with third-person only access to their mental states.  
 
In the next chapter, I will apply some of these measures to an approach to self-
knowledge that has been the focus of much recent discussion in the literature. 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 93 
3 
 
Transparency, Deliberation, and Memory 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter one, I pointed to a number of ways in which our thinking about 
introspection and memory converge. I concluded that to gauge the extent of 
that convergence one might see whether memory can explain some of what is 
taken to be special about self-knowledge. In the last chapter I outlined some 
features of first-person thinking that tend to shape theories of self-knowledge, 
and suggested formulations of these against which one might measure the 
success of a theory. In this chapter I look at an approach to self-knowledge that 
has gained prominence in the literature—the Transparency approach—and 
argue that, on one version of the approach, the epistemology of memory will 
play an important role in explaining how the account meets a number of 
desiderata. 
The Transparency approach suggests that there is something in the way 
we go about responding to questions about mental states that can explain what is 
interesting or special about knowledge in the domain. But while a number of 
authors endorse a broad version of the Transparency thesis (e.g. Moran 2001; 
Byrne 2005; Boyle 2011a), or recognise its relevance to the epistemology of 
self-knowledge (Fernández 2013), notions of transparency are diverse, and the 
role those notions play in theories of self-knowledge varies.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. In §1, I outline the Transparency 
approach and highlight its core features. In §2, I discuss a version of the 
approach that emphasises cases of ‘making up one’s mind’, and point to a 
number of objections to that approach in line with desiderata from chapter two. 
In §3, I discuss an alternative view that aims to explain first-person privilege for 
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all mental states. I argue that the account constitutes progress for the approach 
with regards to several main desiderata. It also highlights an important 
contribution for our current inquiry: factual memory is likely to come into play 
if a Transparent and Economic account is to explain standard cases of doxastic 
self-knowledge. However, the view still faces a style of objection common to 
Transparency accounts. In §4, I highlight a version of that objection, and outline 
how the use of factual recall presents an initially promising response. In §5, I 
discuss the attempt to make the inferential Transparency account uniform. I 
suggest that this attempt makes the identification of the epistemology of 
memory being assumed a pressing matter for the account. In §6, I outline a view 
of the account’s success, including one plausible view of factual memory, and 
contrast that view with the account’s requirements for self-knowledge of 
intention. In §7, I explore three candidate views of memory that might explain 
how the account can meet the epistemic criteria outlined in chapter two, and 
reject all three as plausible views of memory given the account’s assumptions. I 
conclude that the account has the potential to meet the main epistemic 
desiderata for doxastic self-knowledge, if it makes use of an appropriate view of 
factual memory. Insofar as the account is likely to succeed in its attempts to 
explain bouletic self-knowledge, that success is also likely to be due to filling in 
the detail of the assumed view of memory. 
 
 
1. Transparent self-knowledge 
 
Experience has a diaphanous or transparent quality. In trying to introspect about 
one’s experience of ‘blue’ when observing a blue object (see Moore 1922), for 
instance, one comes up with ‘nothing but the blue’ (Byrne 2011a). Ryle (1949) 
echoes the thought:  
 
If I descry a hawk, I find the hawk but I do not find my seeing of the hawk. My 
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seeing of the hawk seems to be a queerly transparent sort of process, 
transparent in that while a hawk is detected, nothing else is detected 
answering to the verb in ‘see a hawk’. (Ryle 1949, p. 134)  
He extends the observation beyond sensuous experience to a range of activities 
including deducing and concluding (Ibid.). More recently, it has been suggested 
(see e.g. Evans 1982; Moran 2001) that the Transparency of our reasoning or 
attitudes may be the key to understanding what is special or distinctive about 
first-person attribution of beliefs. At its core, the suggestion is that questions 
about, for example, whether I believe that p, need not—and typically do not—
require the subject to focus on psychological facts, but are treated as—and are 
uniquely sensitive to—the non-psychological question, ‘Is p true?’. By contrast, 
this is not typically how the question is treated when it relates to another person 
(see Edgley 1969; in Moran 2001, p. 60). This core thought has been remarked 
upon widely in self-knowledge literature since the turn of the twenty-first 
century:  
 
the idea that our standpoint on our own mental lives is in some sense 
“transparent” to our standpoint on the world at large has played an increasingly 
prominent role in philosophical discussions of self-knowledge. This idea has 
inspired important work on how we know ourselves to hold “judgment-
sensitive” attitudes such as belief, desire, and intention, and it has also 
provided the impetus for a reconsideration of our knowledge of what our 
sensory and perceptual experiences are like. (Boyle 2011, p. 1) 
More specific claims about how this Transparency might explain how we come 
to know our own beliefs and other states often follow Gareth Evans’s (1982) 
remarks that, ‘In making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, 
or occasionally literally, directed outward’ (Evans 1982, p. 255). Despite a lack 
of argument, the claim is at least prima facie plausible, and the Transparency 
	 96 
‘intuition’ enjoys a good deal of support. 107  However, the intuition is 
accompanied by a ‘puzzle’108 (see e.g. Byrne 2005): How is it that conclusions 
about the ‘p-ishness of the world’ (Schwitzgebel 2011), or ‘how things stand in 
the world at large’ (Boyle 2011, p. 5) alone can reveal the answers to questions 
concerning contingent psychological facts about a particular individual? 109 
Responses to this puzzle can vary considerably. Before looking at two of them, 
it will be helpful to have in mind a clear expression of some common ground 
between proponents of the approach: 
 
I can know various aspects of the nature, content, and character of my own 
mental states by attending in the right way, not to anything “inner” or 
psychological, but to aspects of the world at large. Indeed, it seems that, for 
various sorts of mental states, there is in the normal case no other way to 
attend to them: all there is for me to contemplate in my sensation of blue is 
the (apparent) blueness of some worldly thing, and all there is for me to attend 
to in my belief that P is the (apparent) fact that P. (Boyle 2011, p. 3).  
 
In the next section, I briefly discuss a Transparency account that places making 
up one’s mind in a position of central importance in explaining what is special and 
distinctive about self-knowledge.  
 
2. Transparent deliberation 	
Evans (1982) provides the following example, which we can take for the 
purposes of discussion to be a standard case of doxastic self-knowledge: 
 
																																																								
107 Evans’s remarks, for instance, ‘strike many as one of those things that are obvious once pointed out’ 
(Byrne 2011a, p. 204). 
108 Some authors suggest that a number of puzzles arise from Transparency (e.g. Moran 2011). This one will 
be the main focus here. (See also Ch. 5). 
109 cf. Moran (2003): ‘how can a question referring to a matter of empirical psychological fact about a 
particular person be legitimately answered without appeal to the evidence about that person, but rather by 
appeal to a quite independent body of evidence?’ (p. 413).  
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If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?,’ I 
must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I 
would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world 
war?’ (Evans 1982, p. 225)  
 
This fits the profile of the intuition as described in §1, although notably, it 
appears to omit detail that would be helpful in answering the puzzle. One 
attempt to provide that detail is to gloss the cognitive transaction that occurs—
that is, to allow conclusions about the world to be (or become) conclusions 
about a subject’s psychology—as ‘automatic’ or ‘immediate’. What counts for 
‘immediacy’ in this respect often boils down to an absence of ‘inference’ (see 
e.g. Moran 2001, p. 91).110 (In Ch. 2, I called this ‘Epistemic Immediacy’.) And 
so, on an arguably natural reading of Evans’s world war example above,111 the 
self-knowledge procedure that is intended to explain what is special about first-
person ascriptions of mental states is a process of deliberation that results in an 
‘immediate’ transition from a conclusion about the world to a conclusion about 
oneself:  
  
I address myself to the question of my state of mind in a deliberative spirit, 
deciding and declaring myself on the matter, and [do] not confront the 
question as a purely psychological one about the beliefs of someone who 
happens to be me. (Moran 2001, p. 63)112 
 
This view suggests one can know that one believes that p by considering the 
question of whether p is true and that knowledge comes about immediately once 
we ‘make up our mind’ (cf. Byrne 2005, p. 84). For the purposes of discussion, 
I will call this the ‘deliberative view’ of Transparency.  																																																								
110 Moran (2001) suggests that immediacy is ‘in a way that does not depend on any external “medium,” and 
which involves no inference from anything else’ (p. 91). For an expression of the thought as it refers to a 
related case of Transparency, see Shah (2003, p. 447) 
111 Byrne (2011a) suggests that the reading is uncharitable (p. 208, fn. 11) 
112  Moran (2001) makes a distinction between theoretical and deliberative questions, with the former 
‘answered by discovery of the fact of which one was ignorant’ and the latter ‘answered by a decision or 
commitment of some sort’ (p. 58). 
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2.1 Objections to the deliberative view 
On the basis of this outline, we can see how the view might measure up to a 
number of the criteria addressed in chapter two. The factors going in its favour 
include that it meets the Peculiarity (P) condition, just in case the Transparency 
intuition is true (i.e. that first-person cannot be used to sufficiently explain 
knowledge in the third-person case); it is an Economical view (i.e. no additional 
introspective faculty is required such as is the case with Inner Sense theories and 
their descendants); and so on.113 There are, however, a number of criteria 
where the view might come up short. For the present purposes, I will focus on 
two: Immediacy (both psychological and epistemic variants), and Uniformity.  
In chapter two, I suggested there are two readings of Immediacy worthy 
of attention: psychological and epistemic. 114  An initial challenge for the 
deliberative view is that it looks incompatible with psychological immediacy 
(see Cassam 2014), because the process of arriving at a conclusion sees the 
subject attending to ‘outward phenomena’ by engaging in a conscious activity 
that aims at resolving an issue (see Owens 2011, p. 262; Ch. 4), and this kind of 
conscious train of thought is not plausibly immediate in the psychological sense. 
Of course, deliberation need not be fully conscious in that sense, and decisive 
elements within this kind of reasoning are not always introspectively 
available.115 But even on a modest view of deliberation there must plausibly be 
some recognition that the deliberative question at issue is the one the subject is 
‘striving to answer’ (Shah 2003, p. 466) and so, on either view of deliberation, 
attending to the relevant phenomena is a process with distinct parts. 116 
Additionally, a number of the view’s proponents (e.g. Boyle 2009, 2011a) do 
not suggest that concluding that p automatically puts one in a position to believe 
that one believes that p. On the contrary, it has become a staple of the literature 
																																																								
113 Since this view is not the main focus of the chapter, my aim is not to provide it with the full critique that 
it deserves (and the view has already received a good deal of attention in the literature).  
114 Cassam (2014) offers the same distinction. 
115 I briefly discuss these possibilities in Appendix 1 
116 It has been noted that knowing one has reached a conclusion on this view is a ‘piece of self-knowledge 
that needs accounting for’ (Cassam 2014, p. 111). 
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to dispute over what the missing step might be.117 Options include inference 
(e.g. Byrne 2005) and ‘reflection’ (Boyle 2011). But since neither of these are 
obviously psychologically immediate, the deliberative view must overcome two 
obstacles to meet that condition: the apparent mediacy of deliberation, and the 
potential mediacy of any step that follows it.  
However, psychological immediacy does not capture what some 
deliberative views are trying to emphasise. The point can be—and often is—an 
epistemic one, concerned with the claim that our self-ascriptions are not inferred 
from ‘anything else’ (Moran 2001, p. 91). In this case the problem is how to 
make sense of the immediacy claim in light of the fact that that our conclusion 
about the world is reached by—that is based on—the relevant outward 
phenomena. Consider the following example response to Evans’s third world 
war question: 
 
Sandrine concludes that there will be a third world war due to a series of 
factors that she takes to go in favour of that conclusion: (i) a global rise 
in the popularity of extreme nationalist rhetoric; (ii) a scapegoating of 
immigrants and minorities for domestic economic decline; (iii) a 
breakdown in international trade and arms agreements; (iv) the 
repealing of human rights; and (v) her recognition that a combination of 
such factors have preceded global warfare in the past.  
 
Plausibly, when questioned about why she thinks there will be a third world 
war, Sandrine will offer these factors in her defence: Sandrine has reached her 
conclusion on the basis of these factors; that they are her reasons for her thinking 
the way she does. And so the deliberative view might also have a difficulty 
explaining epistemic immediacy.  
In the view’s defence, notions of inference can vary considerably. On 
one such notion, Sandrine has not inferred. The propositions that correspond to 																																																								
117 Byrne (2005, 2011a) suggests inference; Boyle (2011) ‘reflection’. 
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Sandrine’s thoughts (i) to (v) are not ‘premisses in an inference to the 
conclusion’ (see Cassam 2007b, p. 163) that she believes there will be a third 
world war. Granted the right notion of inference, then, epistemic immediacy—
where ‘epistemic’ refers to the presence of inference118—and can be present in 
even quite sophisticated thought processes. The notion of inference that allows 
for this is quite narrow, and so the value of the result may be diminished, since 
the more exacting one’s notion of inference, the less interesting non-inferential 
knowledge is likely to be (see Ch. 2; also Cassam 2009). However, because this 
is not the only difficulty for the deliberative view, we can grant a suitable notion 
of inference, and move on. The deliberative view, then, is not plausibly 
psychologically immediate, but can be epistemically immediate (given the 
‘right’ notion inference). I will now briefly turn to two further challenges for 
the deliberative view: (i) that it fails to provide an account of self-knowledge for 
all cases of first-person privilege; and (ii) that it fails to provide a full account of 
first-person privilege for belief. 
The first criticism is well trodden:119 even if such a view plausibly fulfils 
all other desiderata, it is difficult to see how it could provide a uniform account 
of self-knowledge (see Ch. 2, §4). Because the view takes the deliberative 
(active) case to be central, it fits mental states that are reason-sensitive, such as 
beliefs, but is ill suited to account for mental states that are passive, such as 
sensations; it seems clear that self-knowledge of some states is both ‘non-
observational and non-deliberative’ (e.g. appetites and ‘unconquerable’ 
emotions, Boyle 2009, pp. 138–9, fn. 8); and one might ask why deliberative 
self-knowledge is the important or ‘fundamental’ form of self-knowledge (Boyle 
2009, p. 140), that is: ‘the “one that makes the difference” between first-person 
																																																								
118 Cassam (2014) argues that the deliberative view is not epistemically immediate (on his notion of it) 
because ‘believing that you believe that P comes in part from your having justification to believe other 
supporting propositions’ (p. 112). So one can retain this notion of inference, and still be ‘in trouble’ (p. 
111) if the claim is meant to be that on the deliberative view of Transparency, self-knowledge is 
epistemically immediate in a more general sense.  
119 See Boyle (2009) for a discussion of those subscribing to the ‘Uniformity Assumption’. 
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awareness and the kinds of awareness we might have of the mental states of 
another person’ (p. 139).  
The issue becomes pressing because it is not just sensations, appetites, 
and unconquerable emotions that appear to be non-deliberatively accessible. 
This is the second challenge. ‘Brute’, ‘unreasoned’, or ‘recalcitrant’ (p. 138) 
forms of attitudes that are deliberatively accessible appear to be first-personally 
accessible without deliberation, and access to belief and desire in many typical 
cases does not require one to make up one’s mind either. My mind is already 
made up on the location of Nelson’s Column, and whether I would like to 
return to Vienna (cf. Byrne 2011a; Boyle 2009). (Notably, these examples do 
look like plausible cases of psychologically immediate self-knowledge.) So 
besides a questionable explanation of Immediacy, the deliberative view is 
unhelpful with regards to a range of mental states (i.e. it is not a Uniform 
account), and for some unremarkable cases of attitudes such as belief and desire 
(i.e. some standard cases doxastic self-knowledge). In the next section, I discuss 
an alternative view of Transparency that incorporates these unremarkable cases 
of self-knowledge and aims to provide a Uniform account of self-knowledge. 
 
 
3. Transparent inference 
 
In the last section, I discussed a version of the Transparency approach that 
focuses on cases of making up one’s mind, and pointed to a number of 
objections to that view. In this section, I outline an alternative view that tries to 
fill out some important detail thought missing in Evans’s (1982) remarks about 
self-knowledge of belief in terms of a world-to-mind inference, and show how 
it fares better against the desiderata laid out in chapter two.  
Alex Byrne’s Transparency view suggests the following:  	
Suppose that I examine the evidence and conclude that there will be a third 
world war. Now what? Evans does not explicitly address this question, but the 
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natural answer is that the next step involves an inference from world to mind: 
I infer that I believe that there will be a third world war from the single 
premiss that there will be one. (Byrne 2011a) 
 
An immediate difficulty with the suggestion is acknowledged by critics and 
proponents alike—the problem with reasoning from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p’ is 
that it is a poor pattern of inference: it is ‘neither deductively valid nor 
inductively strong’120 (Byrne 2011a, pp. 203–204). One critic (Boyle 2011) as 
urged that it is the kind of inference only a ‘madman’ could draw and this alone 
should be enough to show that an Inferentialist interpretation of doxastic 
transparency should be abandoned. I will leave this issue aside for the moment (I 
return to it in Chs. 4 and 5). 
On Byrne’s view, doxastic self-knowledge is achieved by means of an 
epistemic rule (Byrne 2005) or doxastic schema (Byrne 2011a).121 The rule for 
self-ascribing beliefs is BEL: ‘If p, believe that you believe that p’ (Byrne 2005, 
p. 95). As applied to Evans’s ‘third world war’ example, to answer the question 
of whether I believe there will be a third world war, I consider the evidence 
relevant to the question ‘will there be a third world war?’ If I conclude that 
there will be one, I believe that I believe that there will be a third world war. 
The ‘Gallois-style’ schema—which is meant to be equivalent to the rule—can 
be illustrated as follows: 
 
P  
I believe that P 
	
In general, the approach appears to be effective. Take the following example 
using the rule form of the procedure:  																																																									
120 ‘that p is the case does not even make it likely that one believes it is the case’ (Byrne 2005, p. 95)  
121 They are meant to be two ways of expressing the same procedure. 
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suppose that p is ‘it is raining’. To establish the antecedent of BEL, I look out 
of the window and occurrently judge, correctly, that it is raining. Because I 
recognize that it is raining, I implement the consequent, and so I come to 
believe that I believe it is raining … This latter belief will then be true. In 
general, whenever one implements the consequent of BEL because [one] 
recognizes the truth of the antecedent, the resulting second-order belief will 
be true (Gertler 2011a, p. 3).122 
 
If we accept, for the moment, the suggestion that the procedure is ‘strongly 
self-verifying’ in lieu knowledge-conduciveness123 we can see how the account is 
meant to meet two criteria: Epistemic Security (what Byrne calls Privileged 
Access) because ‘belief’s about one’s own mental states are more likely to 
amount to knowledge’ than beliefs about the mental states of others (Byrne 
2011a, p. 202); and Peculiarity (his Peculiar Access), because ‘the method only 
works in one’s own case: inferring that Andre believes that p from the premiss 
that p will often lead one astray’ (p. 207). (For a more detailed discussion 
Peculiarity on this account, see Ch. 4.)  
Like the deliberative view, the account is also Economical, but unlike the 
deliberative view, it promises a uniform explanation of self-knowledge. The 
account, of course, is clearly not epistemically immediate by the measure in 
chapter two (due to the presence of inference), but it can be psychologically 
immediate as long as the subjects are typically unaware of the inference.124 This 
is a promising start, so we might see how the theory fares in some other 
respects. I begin by highlighting a common style of objection to Transparency 
accounts.  
 																																																								
122 Byrne talks of belief rather than judgement, taking the latter to muddy the water, but the example can be 
reworked using belief.  
123  Byrne’s (2011a) argument here suggests the burden of proof, to show how the procedure is not 
knowledge-conducive, rests with the opponent. Although he does offer a number of suggestions (e.g. that 
the judgements are ‘safe’) in its favour. (see Ch. 4). 
124 While it might not be made explicit in the material cited here, Byrne does not intend to suggest this 
inference to be one that we make consciously. This matter was made explicit in response to questions at the 
Varieties of Self-Knowledge workshop in Harvard University (2016). 
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3.1 The contamination objection 
The inferential Transparency view looks amenable to cases of making up one’s 
mind, even if—unlike the deliberative view—it does not take these to be the 
fundamental, or core, cases of self-knowledge. The general concern is that it is 
difficult to see how Transparency accounts are meant to enable a subject to be 
knowledgeable of a state she is in prior to the initiation of whatever 
Transparency procedure is deployed. One potential response for the proponent 
of the deliberative view is unsatisfactory: we do have access to such states but 
knowledge of them is not the fundamental case of self-knowledge. The inferential 
Transparency view (Byrne 2005, 2011a), however, aims at explaining all cases 
of first-person privilege in the same way, and acknowledges that deliberation is 
not the standard or fundamental case of doxastic self-knowledge. In order to see 
whether that approach has something more illuminating to say about the 
problem, we can look at a clear articulation of the objection.  
Brie Gertler (2011a) suggests that following the ‘BEL’ rule (and by 
extension the doxastic schema) fails to account for a feature of Epistemic 
Security125 in need of explanation. The feature it fails to account for is that: ‘If I 
have no belief that p (at t1) but consider whether I have a belief that p (at t2) I 
will not self-attribute a belief that p without creating a new belief’ (Ibid.; see 
also Ch. 2, §5). The concern is this: since following such a rule or schema can 
result in the formation of a new belief, it cannot be a successful method of 
assaying what one believes or judges ‘at any moment other than the moment I 
complete my attempt’ to reason in accord with that rule or schema’ (Gertler 
2011a, p. 5).126 This presents a genuine challenge for the approach: a procedure 
that allows for the formation of a new belief that p in response to a question 
																																																								
125 Gertler is responding in part to Byrne (2005) and so uses his terminology. In the case of Epistemic 
Security (his Privileged Access), I have argued that Byrne’s formulation of the feature is a good one and 
adopted it (Ch. 2). 
126 As we saw in chapter two, this condition may need to be amended to include cases in which one has no 
belief that p (at t1), and one forms a new belief that p (at t2), but does not self-attribute the belief as a belief 
one held at (at t1)—that is, one recognises that this is a belief one has only now come to have. (This looks like 
a good bit of self-knowledge, rather than a self-knowledge failure.) This can be put aside for the purposes of 
this discussion. 
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about whether one believes that p is not a reliable method of assaying what one 
already believes.127 So a procedure will fail to explain Epistemic Security, then, 
as long as it fails to explain this feature of Epistemic Security. 
 The beginnings of a response to this problem lie in Byrne’s account, 
which seeks to explain knowledge in both deliberative and non-deliberative 
cases. While one might deliberate in response to a question in some cases—
when initially considering or reconsidering an issue—in many cases, my mind is 
‘already made up’ and: 
 
no deliberation about whether p immediately precedes my forming of the 
belief that I believe p. I conclude that I believe that Obama was born in 
Hawaii, not after considering the evidence, but simply by recalling the fact 
that Obama as born in Hawaii. The (partial) explanation of why this procedure 
yields knowledge is exactly the same in both cases: I reason in accord with the 
doxastic schema, which is strongly self-verifying. (Byrne 2011a, p. 208)128 
 
Since retained beliefs form the bulk of our attitudes, it makes sense that the 
standard case of doxastic self-knowledge will be a case that deals with already 
formed beliefs rather than ones one is currently forming. Beyond this suggestive 
remark, Byrne does not expand a great deal. However, intuitively, one might 
see how recalling the fact that p could begin to answer the concern outlined 
above while still meeting the desiderata: factual recall is not ordinarily seen as 
involving deliberation, and so together with some means of self-ascription we 
have the beginnings of a perfectly good way knowing the belief in place prior to 
the onset of the procedure. Believing that p is also, plausibly, a block on the 
formation of directly conflicting beliefs (e.g. the belief that not p) (see Byrne 
2011a), and, the procedure will meet the Transparency desideratum, since the 
																																																								
127 See the formulation of Privileged Access in Ch. 2 for more detail about what might count as failure in this 
case. 
128 Byrne suggests that Moran’s claim the primary case of self-knowledge is a matter of ‘making up one’s 
mind’ looks, ‘On the face of it … like a conclusion drawn from an overly restricted diet of examples’ (p. 
208) 
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subject need only consider the relevant facts, rather than some aspect of her 
psychological makeup. 
However, this does not completely answer the challenge, because the 
explanation of knowledge is meant to be exactly the same in both deliberative 
and non-deliberative cases. This suggests that whatever way one ends up 
arriving at the judgement ‘p’, one will be in an excellent position to know one’s 
beliefs if one reasons in accord with the doxastic schema. We have no reason, so 
far, to think that deliberation will not occur in cases where one has no prior 
belief or, perhaps, where one has reason, now, to doubt a prior belief. If in 
cases where S has no belief, or where something in the procedure causes doubt 
about an existing belief, she can still form a belief by putting into operation the 
doxastic schema. Thus, as a response to Gertler’s concern it is, at best, partial in 
its current form. 
This leaves us in an interesting position. The introduction of memory 
provides an initially promising response to this style of objection, but it is not 
obviously the response that Byrne has in mind. In an attempt to sketch that 
response, it is first worth noting that while Byrne suggests that the ‘explanation 
of why the procedure yields knowledge’ is same in both cases, the procedures—
at least with regards to arriving at the judgement ‘p’—are importantly different.  
 Following the Transparency procedure involves the selection of one out 
of two possible operations (i.e. means of arriving at p) depending on whether 
one is responding to a matter that has already been settled, or whether one is 
considering the matter afresh. We can tentatively reflect this difference in the 
schema. When one considers the matter for the first time: 
 
[Deliberate] p 
I believe that p 
 
And if the matter has already been settled (and there are no obvious defeaters): 	
 
[Recal] p 
I believe that p 
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The question of how one schema is initiated over the other without introducing 
some other (possibly non-transparent) bit of self-knowledge will need to be 
addressed at some point. However, assuming this can be done, the procedure 
now appears to be a reasonably promising way around the contamination 
objection. For once one has formed the belief that p, one will not re-enter the 
deliberation process when prompted again, and therefore will not risk the 
formation and self-attribution of a new belief that one may take to have been in 
place before the initiation of the procedure. What seems already clear from this 
solution is that much will depend on the ability of memory to play that kind of 
role. The epistemology of memory, in that case, will be critical to whether a 
theory of self-knowledge can explain Preserved Access (see Ch. 2). 
 Before discussing which accounts of factual memory might be a good or 
bad fit for this role, I will first try to strengthen the case for the view that there 
are important differences between the recall and deliberation versions of the 
schema.  
 
 
4. Mnemic and deliberative schemas 
 
In the last section I suggested that highlighting the difference between cases of 
recall and cases of deliberation provides an initially promising response to a 
common concern about Transparency approaches. Here, I will point to several 
important differences between the two ways of responding an inquiry into what 
one thinks. The two are different in at least three respects: (i) one is 
psychologically immediate and the other is not; (ii) one aims at resolving an 
issue and the other does not; and (iii) one is more likely to be a problem with 
regards to new belief formation—that is, of the kind that motivates the 
contamination objection. 
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4.1 Immediacy and recall 
In §2, I suggested that self-knowledge on the deliberation view of Transparency 
was not plausibly psychologically immediate, even though it may be 
espistemically immediate (i.e. assuming that inference is the only important 
kind of mediation). The inferential Transparency view, on the other hand, can 
explain psychological immediacy but not epistemic immediacy. In cases where 
one makes up one’s mind, even on the inferential view, doxastic self-knowledge 
will not plausibly be psychologically immediate. It can explain psychological 
immediacy in the standard case of doxastic self-knowledge, however, which it 
takes to be non-deliberative. But it will not automatically explain it. Whether it 
does will depend on one’s view of factual memory. (One’s view of factual 
memory will also figure into a number of other differences.)  
 
4.2 Deliberation and recall 
In order for the suggestion that the two schemas are substantively different to 
have any teeth, we will need to show in what respects arriving at p via recall is 
different to arriving at p via deliberation. A natural place to start is with the 
features of deliberation, since I have already said something about the kind of 
process this is meant to be: a conscious activity that aims at resolving an issue 
(see §2.1; Owens 2011, p. 262). We can expand these features as follows: 
deliberation is (a) an activity, (b) aimed at resolving an issue, (c) which 
manifests some recognition of a questions, and deliberative questions are (d) 
typically transparent to other considerations (e.g. to factual inquiry) (see 
Appendix 1, §9).129  
 One might think that these features look like decent candidates to 
describe factual recall, at least as it operates in the procedure outlined above. It 
meets at least a number: it is an (a) activity; (c) that manifests recognition of a 
question—at least when deployed in response to a certain kind of stimulus (e.g. 																																																								
129 In Appendix 1, I argue that ‘(d)’ is preferable to ‘conscious’. The general point, that the features of 
deliberation and factual memory come apart in an important respect, is also made in that section.  
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a request for information); and (d) it is transparent (in this case to factual 
inquiry). The matter that will be decisive is whether factual recall (b) aims at 
resolving an issue in the same sense as deliberation. If it does, there is nothing to 
the suggestion that the two are different ways of arriving at the conclusion p. 
(Ibid.) But factual recall does not aim at ‘resolving an issue’ in that sense. One 
might think it does if one subscribes to a particular view of factual memory that 
sees recall as reconstructing our stored reasons or evidence for a conclusion; a 
process that weighs and balances items of evidence until one answer wins out. 
But factual memory can’t typically be a kind of argument: ‘The witness himself 
does not argue “I recall the collision occurring just after the thunder-clap, so 
probably the collision occurred just after the thunder-clap”’ (Ryle 1949, p. 
250). 
  Our interim conclusion is that non-deliberative (mnemic) and 
deliberative versions of the doxastic schema differ in two important respects: (i) 
the mnemic version of the schema is compatible with psychological immediacy 
whereas the deliberative version is not; and (ii) the mnemic version of schema 
and the deliberative version of the schema have different features in at least one 
respect. An additional difference between the two is their aptness to form new 
beliefs. 
 
4.3 New belief formation 
Deliberation is clearly a suitable way to form a new belief. Factual recall is not 
(or at least not obviously).130 Whenever the subject engages wholly or partially 
in deliberation, there is a chance that a new belief will be formed. As long as the 
subject engages purely in a process of factual recall, the subject will either come 
up with a pre-existing belief, or come up empty handed. The ability to come up 
empty handed will be key to two features listed in our desiderata: Preserved 
Access and Agnotic Access. In short, deliberating in response to the ‘Do you 																																																								
130 It has been argued, for example, that memory is not merely the preservation of contents (Lackey 2007), 
although a discussion of that argument is beyond the scope of this work. 
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think that p?’ question does not—at least not alone—explain how one might 
explain either, whereas recalling that p in response to that question has a shot at 
explaining both.  
 
All three provisional conclusions will directly depend upon the view of memory 
to which one subscribes (see Ch. 4 for a further discussion of accounts of 
memory). However, we can draw an interim conclusion about the prospects of 
the account explaining the implication of Epistemic Security highlighted by 
Gertler and some other desiderata: (1) the ability of the account to meet these 
desiderata will depend upon the epistemology of memory intended by the 
phrase ‘recalling the fact that p’; (2) the clearest case of meeting the desiderata 
behind the concern addressed by the contamination objection, is a pure case of 
recall—that is, one that resists, or does not give way to a case of making up 
one’s mind.  
 A difficulty for the particular Transparency view being addressed (i.e. 
Byrne 2005, 2011a) is that a version of contamination objection appears to re-
emerge due to the account’s attempt to provide a Uniform (Ch. 2) account of 
first-person privilege. That is, even if one were to accept that upon the ‘right’ 
view of memory, doxastic self-knowledge can avoid the contamination 
objection—that is, given appropriate amends to the account—the problem 
appears again, in a slightly more recalcitrant form when the account attempts to 
explain bouletic self-knowledge.  
 In the next section, I outline the inferential Transparency view’s attempt 
to explain Uniformity. 
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5. Transparency and Uniformity 
 
I have mentioned a number of reasons for thinking there is something to the 
Uniformity Assumption (see Ch. 2, and above). Certainly, Evans’s (1982) 
remarks suggest he thought a Uniform Transparency account of self-knowledge 
is a possibility, and inferential view we have been discussing (e.g. Byrne 2011a) 
counts it among its explicit desiderata. (See Ch. 2, §4 for further discussion of 
this point.) We might, at least, accept on these bases that if Transparency 
procedures are ‘cognitively possible’ and have a ‘tendency to generate correct 
answers’ there is no obvious reason we would not deploy them frequently: ‘We 
might … consider: “I want X” from X is good, “I’m afraid of X” from X is 
dangerous, “I hate X” from X is horrible, etc.’ (Schwitzgebel 2011, p. 15).  
 Alex Byrne’s inferential Transparency view forms perhaps the most 
comprehensive attempt to argue for a Uniform Transparency theory. In this 
section I outline attempts to describe Transparency procedures for thoughts and 
imaginings (2011c), desire (2005), and intention (2011a) before suggesting that 
the difference between the mnemic and deliberative versions of the schemas 
may reintroduce a version of the concern addressed above.  
For illustrative purposes, Byrne’s (2011c) Transparency rule for 
thoughts and imaginings is: 
 
THINK: If the inner voice speaks about x, believe that you are thinking 
about x 
 
Byrne acknowledges that there is no actual inner voice or image, and so 
‘knowledge’ of those objects must be impossible, although he suggests that we 
do attempt to follow the rule, and ‘attempting’ in this case, may be as close as 
we get to Epistemic Security in that case of thinking. Access to thoughts and 
imaginings will be Peculiar because only the subject in question will ‘hear’ the 
voice or ‘see’ the image in question.  
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A number of burning questions arise about THINK, 131  but the 
procedures for desire and intention, and their relation to belief, are worthy of 
greater focus for the purposes of this discussion. For self-knowledge of desires, 
Byrne (see e.g. 2005, p. 100) suggests something like the following: 
 
DES: If φ-ing is a desirable option, believe you want to φ  
 
 
And for intention, he proposes the (Gallois-style) ‘bouletic’ schema (2011a, p. 
216):  
 
I will φ 
I intend to φ 
 
Besides any intuitive misgivings about the suitability of Transparency procedures 
for these states, a number of things are notable about the attempts. Firstly, they 
are not strongly self-verifying in the way that reasoning in accordance with the 
doxastic schema is (Byrne 2011a), and so Epistemic Security may still need to be 
explained for these procedures.132 Secondly, Peculiarity is questionable for the 
bouletic schema. Unlike the doxastic schema, it is not clear that following the 
third-person version of the schema is meant to be markedly less successful:133 
 
Erica will φ 
Erica intends to φ 
 
These issues aside, it is the connection between the epistemologies of belief, 
desire, and intention that are most relevant to the present discussion. The 
following section will outline this connection and its importance to the account.  
 
 
																																																								
131 For instance, the argument relies heavily on the discredited Perky Experiment (see Thomas 2013) that 
suggests a confusion between ‘images and percepts’, and the controversial Humean thesis that mental 
imaginings are merely downgraded perceptual impressions.  
132 Byrne (2011a) recognizes this, but does not address the point fully. 
133 I discuss Byrne’s general approach to explaining Peculiarity in Ch. 4. 
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5.1 Procedures for belief, desire, and intention 
The procedures for desire and intention will need further explanation: at the 
very least, in their current shape they will over-generate self-attributions for 
both states. I may, for example, always recognise the general desirability of x 
over y, while either being drawn to y or failing to be drawn to x in the way that 
could be suitably described as desire. Sometimes we do what we need to do, or 
what we ‘feel like’ in the circumstances, without judging it to be preferable, or 
better than other options. So, as things stand with the rule, one will self-
attribute desires that one does not have. To counteract the problem, Byrne 
introduces some defeating conditions:  
 
Suppose one knows that φing is a desirable option, and considers the question 
of whether one wants to φ. One will not follow DES and conclude one wants 
to φ, if one believes (a) that one intends to ψ, (b) that ψing is incompatible 
with φing, and (c) that ψing is neither desirable nor better overall than φing. 
(Byrne 2011b) 
 
These defeating conditions mean that one will not, upon considering whether 
one wants to go swimming near a warm sunny beach, believe that one wants to 
do so if, that is, one also believes (a) one intends to go to work, (b) that 
working is incompatible with swimming in such circumstances, and (c) that 
working is neither desirable nor better overall than swimming near a warm 
sunny beach. (At least if one does, it is by some means other than the rule for 
desire.) If, like the present author, a subject always seems to want the former 
but always seems to end up doing the latter, this looks like a strange result. 
Nevertheless, intuitions about desire and desirability can become confused, and 
perhaps the example does not do justice to the account. Importantly, the 
general strategy of allowing competing intentions to defeat the procedure looks 
promising when it comes to limiting the problem of over-generation, and so we 
can accept the defeating conditions as presented for the sake of argument.  
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What is clear from the defeating conditions is that ‘the complete 
epistemology of desire partly depends on the epistemology of intention’ (Byrne 
2011b). So we should briefly examine the procedure for intention.  
The schema for intention—the bouletic schema—will also over-generate 
self-attributions of intention. In part, this is because we can know the 
consequences of some of our actions without intending them: the doctrine of 
double effect. I may know, for instance, that I will wear out my training shoes by 
running long distances, but this does not mean that I intend to wear out my 
training shoes whenever I run long distances (Bratman 1984; in Byrne 2011a, p. 
217). Equally, ‘a tactical bomber … intends to destroy a factory and confidently 
expects his raid to have the side-effect of killing ten thousand civilians’. 
Although he does not intend to kill them, he knows he will (Bennett 1981; also 
in Byrne 2011a). Reasoning in accordance with the bouletic schema in this case 
looks set to result in one self-attributing intentions that one clearly does not 
have. Byrne’s response to this difficulty is to adapt Anscombe’s remarks 
regarding knowing what one is doing ‘without observation’: 
 
[One] can know what one is (or will be) doing ‘without observation’. And 
those present and future actions that can be known ‘without observation’ are 
those that one intends to perform (see Byrne 2011, p. 218)134.  
 
Byrne’s argument proceeds roughly as follows:  
 
1. One can know what one is doing (or will do) without evidence that one is 
doing (or will do) it; 
2. Those things that one knows one is doing (or will do) without evidence are the 
things that one intends to do; 
3. In considering the question of what one intends, we take into account the 
following: ‘if one’s belief that one believes one will φ rests on good evidence 
that one will φ’ one is not reasoning in accordance with the bouletic schema. 
 																																																								
134 Anscombe’s own remarks refer to present actions. The idea that they can be adapted for future actions is 
contentious. 	
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If the argument works, Byrne suggests, then Epistemic Security (E) is explained, 
because ‘if one reasons in accord with the schema … and is mindful of the 
defeating conditions … then one will arrive at a true belief about one’s 
intention’ (p. 219). Peculiarity (P) is also explained because in third-person 
attribution, the defeating condition is ‘almost invariably present’: if I believe 
that Erica will walk into a lamppost, then ‘I will think that this belief rests on 
good evidence’ and the inference from Erica will φ to the conclusion Erica intends 
to φ will ‘often be unwarranted’ (Ibid.).135 Let us grant that this deals with some 
initial concerns for the moment and apply the fix to an example.  
I believe I will drive through town on Tuesday, and I believe I will stop 
several times en route. Leaving open the issue of why I believe the former, I can 
come to believe the latter by learning about the congested traffic, traffic lights, 
junctions, frequent floods, belligerent cyclists, and drunken pedestrians. If I 
take these factors to be good evidence that I will stop several times, then I will 
not reason in accord with the schema, and will not conclude that I intend to 
stop several times en route. The outcome is roughly in line with double effect 
intuitions, in that I can believe my progress will be halted because I will be 
driving through town, but I do not intend my progress to be halted on every 
occasion I think it will be.  
 However, some cases look less clear. Assume that I believe that I will 
drive through town next Tuesday, and I believe I will stop several times. 
Assume also that I believe the latter because I know what happens every time I 
drive through town on Tuesday and I know I drive through town on Tuesdays. 
Now, knowing that I drive through town on Tuesdays can be evidence that I 
will drive through town next Tuesday (i.e. not only good evidence that I will 
stop). And yet, intuitively, I can still intend to do so. Does the evidence in this 
case mean that I do not follow the rule and do not self-attribute the intention to 
drive through town on Tuesday? Not according to Byrne (2011a). The bouletic 																																																								
135 Note that the intuition can be easily skewed by a different selection of examples: Erica will go to the pub, 
Erica will get on a train tomorrow, Erica will eat breakfast before noon, all seem perfectly compatible with 
her intending to do these things.  
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schema is defeated when I believe that I believe that p ‘because (and only 
because) I have good evidence for it’ (p. 218; my emphasis). But what does it 
mean to say that I believe that I believe that p because (but ‘not only’ because) I 
have good evidence for it?  
The answer, I think, requires a piece of self-knowledge that Byrne has 
not accounted for—that is, reliable access to (i) the decisive factors for what we 
believe, (ii) our judgements about decisive factors for what we believe, or (iii) 
some other indication of what we intend. While some of the options are more 
plausible than others, none are particularly helpful to the account. Let us 
consider the two clear-cut cases before looking at which of (i) to (iii) is most 
likely to fit with the account. The cases are:  
 
(A)  S believes that she believes that she will φ because she believes that 
she has good evidence that she will φ 
(B)  S believes that she believes that she will φ but does not believe she 
has good evidence for her belief that she will φ 
 
In both of (A) and (B), we can predict the outcome with regards to S following 
the schema and concluding that she will φ: in (A) she will not reason in accord 
with the schema and conclude that she intends to φ; in (B) she will reason in 
accord with the schema and conclude that she intends to φ. While we have not 
been told quite what the judgements in cases like (B) look like, we can hazard a 
guess: no evidence comes up whenever S considers the matter (i.e. she comes up 
empty handed when it comes to evidence for that belief) and so the schema is not 
defeated. However, that picture cannot be complete if there is possibility of the 
following scenario:  
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(C)  S believes that she believes that she will φ, and believes she has good 
evidence for her belief that she will φ, but does not believe that she 
believes that she will φ solely because of her evidence that she will φ. 
 
On (C), which matches my example above, the account predicts that S will 
reason in accord with the schema and conclude that she intends to φ. But in this 
case, it cannot be that she has drawn a blank in considering whether she believes 
that she believes she will φ on the basis of good evidence. Some evidence has 
shown up, and (on the face of it) the evidence is good. Since good evidence plus 
a gap or absence of (e.g. further) good evidence is just good evidence, what is 
missing from the picture must be one of three things: (i) S has access to the 
causes of her beliefs; (ii) S has access to her judgements about the causes of her 
beliefs; or (iii) there is a mental ‘flag’ (perhaps a bit of phenomenology or a 
judgement) that provides S with a clue about whether her beliefs about her 
beliefs that she will φ are based on any good evidence that presents itself.136  
 The prospects for (i) are not very good: there is no argument for this 
kind of self-knowledge in the account; it has come under sustained attack in 
both philosophical (Dennett 1969; Kornblith 2012; perhaps even Kant 1785);137 
and psychological literature (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Johansson et al. 2005; 
Hall et al. 2012). The prospects for (ii) are slightly better: access to our 
judgements about the causes of our beliefs is both plausible—it goes 
unquestioned in much literature that denies us genuine access of the same kind, 
and is arguably Transparent (Byrne 2011a).138 It is difficult to see how (iii) will 
avoid becoming a (non-transparent) indicator of intention that would leave the 
																																																								
136 There are other possibilities. For example, S could judge that her evidence, while good, does not explain 
why she believes she is going to drive through town. For the purposes of discussion, I have assumed that this 
could be classed a judgement, from the first-person perspective, that the evidence is not ‘good’ enough for 
the belief in question.  
137 See Ch. 2.	
138  ‘from a first-person point of view, an enquiry into one’s evidence is (near enough) extensionally 
equivalent to an inquiry into one’s beliefs’ (p. 218) 
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bouletic schema without a great deal of work to do,139 but in any case, the 
account makes no pretence of providing for such feature. The most promising 
response to the difficulty, then, is (ii), although if (i) did turn out to be 
plausible, it would do the trick.  
 Using our example above in conjunction with (ii), I now have access to 
my evidence and also to my judgements about decisive factors in favour of my 
belief that I will φ. So, plausibly, when considering whether my belief that I 
believe is based on good evidence, I sometimes gather my evidence but judge 
that it is not the evidence that caused me to believe that I will φ. Thus, I can 
proceed to reason in accord with the schema and conclude that I intend to φ. 
What is wrong with this version of the story?  
Firstly, it will need to be shown how judgements about decisive factors 
in favour of ‘my’ believing that something is the case could be cast in terms of 
Transparency. Secondly, it is prone to counterexamples—in which my evidence 
(or my judgements about its quality), or my judgements about the decisive 
factors in favour of my belief, or both are unavailable140—and it relies on a 
particular view of memory in which evidence (or judgements about its quality) 
and judgements about decisive factors in one’s beliefs are ordinarily first-
personally accessible. This latter possibility brings with it the re-emergence of 
the concern expressed by the contamination objection. 
In the final sections of the chapter, I rephrase the contamination 
objection in terms of a discussion of doxastic deliberation in Shah and Velleman 																																																								
139 Let’s say, for instance, that S gets a special headache in such instances. Unless the headaches were 
somehow reliable indicator of intention and/or some other related state, it would still not explain why the 
subject would reason in accordance with the schema in the face of ‘good evidence’ for her belief that she 
believes she will φ. But if such an indicator is available, it isn’t obvious that we need another means of 
detection.  
140 Consider a case in which I believe that my belief that I will φ is based on good evidence. However, both 
that belief, and that evidence are temporarily inaccessible. In such cases of, the subject will reason in accord 
with the schema and conclude that she intends to φ. For example: S is clumsy. He trips, stumbles and 
wonders whether he will fall, and thereby land on the floor. Ordinarily he would say that the belief is based 
on evidence (he usually ends up on the floor when he falls), but in this instance, neither belief nor evidence 
are accessible amid the panic and he concludes that he intends to land on the floor. We can also adjust the 
example for forgetfulness. Mere panic and distraction, or forgetfulness, ought not to result in the self-
attribution of intentions, even if they occasionally mean we forget intentions we do have. 
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(2005) (§6). I then offer three attempts to locate the account of memory that 
might assuage that version of the concern with regards to the bouletic schema, 
and suggest that the obvious solution—which sees us ordinarily retaining 
evidence, or metadata related to its quality—is largely a myth. This leaves the 
inferential Transparency view with a problem that, on the face of it, can only be 
resolved by supplying the details of an appropriate epistemology of memory.  
 
 
6. Transparency and doxastic deliberation  
 
 In the last section, we saw how the epistemology of intention supports the 
epistemology of desire, and how doxastic self-knowledge supports the 
epistemology of intention. Other things being equal, the account has met a 
number of our desiderata (see Ch. 2). Some of the finer detail needs may need 
further comment, however, going in its favour, there is a story about Peculiarity 
(P), Immediacy (I), and Epistemic Security (E) (I discuss these further in Ch. 4). 
The account is Economical and makes a spirited attempt at Uniformity. We have 
the beginnings of an explanation of how the account could provide Preserved 
Access for doxastic self-knowledge (albeit not the one intended by Byrne). There 
is still a concern with regard to the epistemology of bouletic self-knowledge, 
and potentially, therefore, for the account as a whole.  
 In this section, I expand upon my explanation of how inferential 
Transparency view might be able to explain Preserved Access for belief and discuss 
how it differs with Byrne’s own account. In order to do so, I will return to the 
central case of doxastic self-knowledge. This will help to bring to the surface the 
difficulty that intention creates for Byrne’s (2011a) account. 
The question ‘do you think that p’ can be taken more than one way: (i) 
as an invitation for one to consider whether p (i.e. afresh), or (ii) as a question 
about whether one already believes that p (see Shah and Velleman 2005). In order 
to be able to meet Preserved Access a self-knowledge procedure must be able to 
	 120 
yield answers to questions about what one already believes. This is precisely the 
work that I have suggested can be done by Byrne’s account as long as we take 
the mnemic version of the schema to be standard case of doxastic self-
knowledge and have an appropriate epistemology of memory. I will briefly 
compare factual recall on Byrne’s account to Shah and Velleman’s (2005) 
discussion of attending to one’s spontaneous responses to the questions of the 
kind we have been looking at:  
 
If the question is whether I already believe that p, one can assay the relevant 
state of mind by posing the question whether p and seeing what one is 
spontaneously inclined to answer. In this procedure, the question whether p 
serves as a stimulus applied to oneself. (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 506)  
 
On Shah and Velleman’s (2005) account, the spontaneity of the response plays a 
vital role in ensuring that we are able to assay what we already believe as 
opposed to entering into the deliberative process: 
 
One comes to know what one already thinks by seeing what one says—that is, 
what one says in response to the question whether p. But the procedure 
requires one to refrain from any reasoning as to whether p, since that reasoning 
might alter the state of mind that one is trying to assay. Hence, asking oneself 
whether p must be a brute stimulus in this case rather than an invitation to 
reasoning. (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 506) 
 
In responding to the question whether I believe that p—taken as an inquiry into 
my state prior to the initiation of the procedure—I must avoid any reasoning as 
to whether p in order to avoid contaminating the answer: 
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One cannot engage in reasoning aimed at answering the question whether p if 
one wants to find out what one already believes, because such reasoning would 
contaminate the result by possibly altering the state that one is trying to assay. 
(Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 507) 
 
On Shah and Velleman’s (2005) account, we know what we already believe by 
listening to what we ‘spontaneously inclined to answer’—it is a way of giving 
voice to one’s belief (fn. 29). However, this is a controversial, and at best 
partial, response to how it is that we know what we believe. ‘Simply hearing 
oneself’ utter something in response to a stimulus is not a good reason for 
thinking that one believes it ‘any more than if one were to sneeze in response to 
the stimulus’ (Moran 2011, p. 221). But while Shah and Velleman (2005) may 
have the wrong—or an incomplete—story about how we know what we 
already believe, they have highlighted an important consideration about how we 
can fail to know what we already believe.  
Just as ‘hearing one’s’ spontaneous response to a stimulus is only meant 
to be a way of knowing that one already believes that p because one has not 
engaged in reasoning as to whether p, recalling that p is only a way of knowing 
whether one believes that p as long as one does not contaminate the result by 
deliberating over whether p. The proposal here is that ‘recalling the fact that p’ 
can play the preserving role for a Byrne-style account that ‘hearing oneself’ is 
meant to play in Shah and Velleman’s (2005) account. 
 We can see how this idea fares by considering Byrne’s (2011a) 
examples, firstly in the case of belief. In responding to the appropriate question, 
‘I conclude that I believe that Obama was born in Hawaii, not after considering 
the evidence, but simply by recalling the fact that Obama was born in Hawaii’ 
(p. 208). I recall the fact. I do not consider the evidence available to me to arrive 
at my answer; considering the available evidence is in any case a good way to 
potentially contaminate the result of the inquiry; and as long as the matter is 
settled for me, considering the evidence should not even be an option. Contrast 
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this case, however, with the kind of procedure that Byrne (2011a) has in mind 
for bouletic self-knowledge.  
In the bouletic schema, the subject must be able to consider whether her 
belief that she believes she will φ is based on good evidence that she will φ. In 
order to do this, the subject must either assess or reflect on her belief that she 
will φ in light of her available evidence and the norms she accepts,141 or make 
use of a retained judgement about the quality of that evidence. In the former 
case, there is a clear risk of contamination by reasoning as to whether p.142 But, 
there is a question about whether there is a risk in the latter case too. On a 
plausible epistemology of belief, to have made up one’s mind on an issue is to 
have ‘closed the books on it’ (Owens 1999, p. 317–18). Not only does one no 
longer require one’s evidence for the ensuing belief, but plausibly neither does 
one any longer require an explicit positive assessment of that evidence. To 
suggest that we typically retain these assessments suggests two things: firstly, 
that we often form, encode, and retain beliefs about the quality of evidence for a 
decision we have already reached as well as the forming (and encoding) the 
ensuing belief itself, and secondly, that we might need to check again on our 
original assessment of our evidence (and/or the evidence itself) for the belief. 
But this would be unusual behaviour for ordinary believers. Typically, the fact 
that one believes that p is sufficient endorsement of p, and one doesn’t need to 
retain any further endorsement (see Harman 1986). When one does, it is either 
a sign that p is likely to be challenged,143 or that one hasn’t quite closed the book 
on the matter.  
The question for Byrne’s account of bouletic self-knowledge is how to 
understand ‘inquiry into one’s evidence’ (p. 218). On the view outlined above, 
it appears to suggest that the question is not settled for the subject, or could be 
re-opened by a fresh assessment of evidence. If this is correct, there are 																																																								
141 This is what I have called ‘Evaluative Access’ (Ch. 2) 
142 Assessing one’s evidence or reasons for an attitude can result in a change to that attitude whenever there 
is a change in the environment, or a change in the individual (see Appendix 1). 
143 Owens (1999) suggests that ‘deliberately retaining evidence for future consultation is a sign of doubt, an 
attitude appropriate to the scientist’ but ‘unsuited to the everyday believer (p. 317).  
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implications for the account’s ability to meet the Preserved Access desiderata, 
its claim to Uniformity, and there would be restrictions on the account of 
memory that could be employed. Since Byrne’s (2011) remarks on factual 
memory are suggestive, in the next section I consider a number of candidates 
for the kind of role that is being considered here.  
 
 
7. Memory, evidence, and beliefs about evidence 
 
In this section I briefly consider three candidate views of memory that one may 
be tempted to employ as a solution to the problem with the bouletic schema and 
its relation to do doxastic self-knowledge, above. The first is the view that 
factual memory delivers one’s evidence for believing that one believes one will 
φ (perhaps by a similarly transparent means to which it delivers the content of 
one’s first-order belief in the standard case of doxastic self-knowledge). Such 
views of memory are available. Experiential Foundationalism, for example, has 
it that propositional memory must carry with it an image or ‘memory seeming’ 
(Senor 2013)—possibly provided by episodic memory—in order to be justified. 
But Experiential Foundationalism faces the objection that it either leaves the 
majority of our beliefs unjustified—by only accounting for occurrent memory 
beliefs—or ‘epistemically unaccounted for … by only providing conditions for 
the justification of occurrent memory beliefs’ (Ibid.). Even if the evidence were 
available, considering its quality is a potential way to re-open the question of 
whether p, and is therefore unhelpful if one is trying to assay what one already 
believes (i.e. as opposed to forming a new belief). This view of memory, then, 
is unlikely to provide the kind of solution acceptable to a Transparency account 
of self-knowledge.  
A prominent understanding of the relationship between memory and 
evidence allows for the fact that we often forget our reasons for adopting many 
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of the beliefs we currently hold (see e.g. Owens 1999; see also Burge 1993; 
Dummett 1993):  
 
Suppose I remember that Hitler committed suicide. I don’t remember how I 
learnt this, nor can I lay my hands on anything that might count as (direct) 
evidence in favour of it. This is the situation we find ourselves in with the bulk 
of our factual beliefs: how do you know the boiling point of water or the dates 
of the First World War? (Owens 1999, p. 313) 
 
On this view, memory preserves the content and rationality of the belief: the 
belief that p, rather than ‘a sort of evidence for p (either prima facie or 
inductive)’ (Owens 1999 p. 317f.):  
 
Once a question is decided, we close the books on it and throw away the key: 
deliberately retaining evidence is a sign of doubt … Memory is a faculty which 
preserves the probative and motivational force of evidence beyond the point at 
which that evidence has been forgotten. (Owens 1999 p. 317–18) 
 
In order for factual memory to reliably provide the evidence for, as well as the 
content of belief, we would have to depart from this view of memory. As 
mentioned, however, the evidence itself might not be required as part of 
defeating conditions of the bouletic schema. What is required is that we take into 
consideration whether the ‘belief that one believes one will φ rests on good 
evidence that one will φ’, and this either requires either (i) the evidence that 
one will φ itself, or (ii) some retained assessment of that evidence. Initially, (ii) 
also appears to be at odds with the idea that ‘believing that p is to have finished 
enquiring into p by forming the view that p’ (Owens 1999, p. 317f.): it suggests 
that there is a matter to settle. Becoming conscious of the possibility that one’s 
belief does not rest on good evidence is, after all, something the ordinary 
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believer is unlikely to do without some risk of re-opening the question of 
whether to believe it.  
 One might, however, point to a feature of the Preservationist account 
that might fulfil the function without the risk. On at least some Preservationist 
accounts, memory preserving both the content of the belief and ‘probative and 
motivational force of the evidence’ (Owens 1999). Perhaps this feature of 
factual memory provides a simple response to the difficulty created by the 
bouletic schema, by providing a means by which a subject may gauge whether 
her evidence is good. But this will not do either. The preservation of probative 
and motivational force is not a kind of judgement about the quality of one’s 
evidence (i.e. it is not a judgement of the kind ‘and the evidence was good’ that 
one might append to any of one’s first-order belief). So, if it is an item that is 
available to introspection at all, it is an item for which our access must be 
explained, and it is difficult to see how a Transparency procedure might explain 
it.  
 As yet, we have not identified the epistemology of memory that might 
explain the defeating conditions for the bouletic schema. Retention of evidence 
in some cases is possible, but standard retention of evidence is both implausible 
and plausibly risky with regards to the possibility of forming a new belief. 
Retention of judgements about the quality of evidence is also possible, but 
again, standard retention of such judgements looks unnecessary and implausible, 
at least on the Preservationist view of memory.144 It is not obvious why ordinary 
believers would standardly form, encode, and retain beliefs about the quality of 
their evidence, nor is it clear on which view of memory the retention of such 
judgements would be standard practice.  
At least one model of memory, however, comes equipped with a self-
monitoring module that might help to explain the presence of (or access to) 
evidence-assessment data, and may get around some of the difficulties for the 																																																								
144 It also looks at least explanatorily unnecessary on Conservatism about memory, since we already have 
warrant to continue believing in the absence of defeating conditions. I will not argue that point here, 
however.  
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bouletic schema by, for example, simple and localised memory failure. This view 
suggests that the memory system comes equipped with a ‘memory-monitoring 
module’ that directly detects the presence of a target in the ‘memory store’ even 
when that target is not currently accessible (see e.g. Yaniv and Meyer 1987; 
here in Koriat 1995). Thus, a ‘feeling of knowing’ might indicate the presence 
of information that one cannot currently retrieve. The model has been thought 
to explain, among other things, the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon and the 
apparent accuracy of ‘feelings of knowing’. And although the approach may 
initially look an unlikely fit for the Transparency intuition, from the subject’s 
perspective, the process need be barely noticeable:  
 
Computer users are familiar with the concept of a directory. A directory 
contains only the names of the files stored on a computer disk; not the content 
of the files … when a computer is asked to retrieve a file from memory, the 
first step is to consult the directory … analogous to ‘monitoring’. (Koriat 1995, 
p. 100f.) 
 
Thus, information about the presence or quality of evidence could be stored 
separate to the belief itself. On the face of it, the analysis of factual memory 
above (e.g. Owens 1999) could apply, and still allow for independent 
information about the presence and quality of evidence to be stored in the 
monitoring system. We have little reason, so far, to suspect that retrieving 
‘directory-level’ information about the presence or quality of evidence with 
regard to a specific belief would create the kind of difficulties I have pointed to 
in the proposed solution above. This response would suppose a two-stage 
process in which a ‘content’ search is only initiated if directory-level 
information is available. Something like this model may provide the kind of 
information required for the bouletic schema, while insulating memory content 
from inquiries into the reliability of evidence (and thereby potential 
contamination).  
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Unfortunately, there is also little reason to suppose that a memory-
monitoring module is required to explain tip-of-the-tongue phenomena or the 
apparent accuracy of feelings of knowing. According to an alternative account 
(Koriat 1995): 
 
people have no knowledge of their memory over and above what they can 
retrieve from it. They cannot monitor directly the presence of information 
which they cannot access. (Koriat 1995, pp. 102f.) 
 
Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena, and the apparent reliability of feelings of 
knowing can be satisfactorily explained by cues that ‘reside in the products of 
the retrieval process itself’, such as ‘fragments of the target, semantic attributes, 
episodic information’ etc. (Ibid.). So even if a memory-monitoring module 
could plausibly perform the requisite functions, and operate in keeping with the 
transparency intuition, defending such a model would be difficult to square the 
motivation for an economic theory of self-knowledge (especially since such a 
model of memory is suspiciously close to contemporary versions of the inner 
sense view that Transparency is concerned to eschew).145  
This discussion of possible solutions has not aimed to exhaust all options 
for the Byrne-style account. The main purpose has been to demonstrate the 
tight connection between memory and self-knowledge on the account. The 
appeal of the Byrne-style account depends to an important degree upon the role 
of factual memory. But subsequent complications arising due to the inter-
dependence of the epistemologies of belief, desire, and intention on such an 
account suggest that the account is, at best, incomplete. Further success for this 
style of account—specifically in terms of ensuring Preserved Access, but also 
with implications for other desiderata—is likely to depend on identification of a 
model of memory able to fulfil the required role while preserving Transparency 
intuition, and adherence to economy and uniformity. However, of the three 																																																								
145 Schwitzgebel (2011) remarks on the striking similarity of contemporary inner sense style accounts and 
memory. 
	 128 
possibilities considered, none appear to be likely candidates for resolving the 
problem raised by the epistemology of intention.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the inferential Transparency view—focusing specifically on 
Byrne’s (2005, 2011a) account—of doxastic self-knowledge is initially 
promising with regard to a range of desiderata outlined in chapter two. In 
particular, it promises the resources to respond to the objection—common to a 
range of accounts—that Transparent self-knowledge procedures fail to explain 
an implication of Epistemic Security by allowing a belief to be formed or altered 
by the procedure. I outlined a way in which making recall the standard case of 
doxastic self-knowledge might be a promising response to the objection, if one 
is clear about the epistemology of memory being assumed on such an account 
(although this is not what Byrne had in mind). By replacing deliberation as the 
standard case of the Transparency procedure, factual recall offers a prima facie 
reliable means of access to pre-existing beliefs that appears to fulfil a number of 
desiderata constraining a theory of self-knowledge. If we accept one view of 
memory that I have discussed here (e.g. Owens 1999), for instance, the 
inferential Transparency view would explain Psychological Immediacy and 
Preserved Access (thereby allowing the Epistemic Security criterion to be met); 
it is both Economical, and Transparent. The explanation of success with regard 
to these desiderata would substantively be down to the role that memory plays 
in the procedure.  
 However, I have argued that the specific requirements of the bouletic 
schema reintroduce the objection to Transparency procedures by requiring a 
subject assess her evidence (or judgements about its quality). In order for 
Preserved Access to be explained by the bouletic schema, a plausible 
epistemology of memory would need to be identified. In the last section, I 
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examined three candidate views of memory and concluded that none of them 
look promising.  
 Among the main aims of the chapter has been to show that the success of 
the view will rely upon the view of factual memory assumed on the account. I 
have suggested one way in which the epistemology of memory might help such 
an account meet a number of desiderata. This explanation looks unfit for the 
account’s explanation of bouletic self-knowledge. But since none of the other 
candidate views of memory look likely to provide the appropriate detail, the 
account’s overall success with regard to the desiderata will likely be the result of 
filling out relevant detail about the view of memory being assumed.  
In the absence of that detail, we have seen how the epistemology of 
memory can contribute to the ability of a theory of self-knowledge to meet a 
number of the main and ideal desiderata. In the next chapter, I examine in 
greater depth the extent to which the epistemology of memory might explain or 
shed light upon the main desiderata for a theory of self-knowledge more 
generally. 		
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4 
 
Memory and Self-Knowledge 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter one, I argued that our thinking about introspective failure and 
memory failure converge in a both commonsense and theoretical contexts, and 
in simple and complicated cases. I concluded (i) that memory plays an important 
role in explaining a good deal of what we sometimes describe as introspective 
failure; (ii) that we might see whether that convergence extends to introspective 
success, perhaps, thereby, shedding light on some intractable problems in the 
epistemology of self-knowledge; and (iii) that such an inquiry should proceed by 
highlighting the desiderata against which the success of a theory of self-
knowledge can be measured. Chapter two laid out those desiderata. In chapter 
three, I set a promising approach to self-knowledge against these desiderata and 
argued that a specific epistemology of memory completes the explanation of 
how the account can meet a number of criteria. Specifically, I argued that a 
particular view of memory would enable the approach to meet an implication of 
the Epistemic Security condition; namely, Preserved Access. I concluded (iv) 
that the epistemology of memory plays an important role in explaining 
introspective success on such a view; and (v) that this strengthens the case for an 
inquiry into the extent to which the epistemology of memory can help to 
explain what is thought to be special or interesting about knowledge in the 
domain more generally. 
 The main task of this chapter is to take some further initial steps in that 
inquiry. Since the convergence of the two epistemologies has largely escaped the 
explicit—or at least detailed—attention of many contemporary philosophers in 
the field, the chapter will be largely exploratory: I am seeking to assess some of 
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the costs and benefits of available options rather than to propose or defend a 
specific theory. 
I consider whether memory can be understood to explain, or shed light 
upon, any of the features described in our list of desiderata by focusing initially 
on those listed as minimum criteria (see Ch. 2). If there are sufficient options 
when it comes to the main desiderata, there is a good case for constructing a test 
theory of self-knowledge in which the epistemology of memory is explanatory 
of memory in the domain (see Ch. 5). I argue that, on several independently 
plausible views, memory can explain these features at least partially. If my 
arguments are successful, we can draw one of two conclusions: either the 
purportedly distinctive features of self-knowledge are more common than 
initially thought (and thus perhaps require no special explanation);146 or, the 
epistemology of memory provides a partial explanation of why we take self-
knowledge to have that particular set of features.  
In §1, I briefly outline my use of memory terms by discussing a number 
of distinctions in the literature. This leaves me with a number of features that 
restrict the accounts of memory suitable for the purposes of the discussion. In 
§2, §3, and §4, I deal with the main business of the chapter—the question of 
whether and to what extent memory, as described, can be understood to 
explain the purportedly distinctive features of self-knowledge outlined as the 
minimum criteria for a theory: Peculiarity (P); Immediacy (I); and Epistemic 
Security (E), respectively.  
 
 
1. Kinds of memory 
 
The term ‘memory’ is used to point to a broad range of phenomena (see e.g. 
Sutton 2012; Byrne 2010; Matthen 2010), which sometimes appear in difficult 																																																								
146 Cassam (2009) reaches as similar conclusion with regards to the supposed baselessness of self-knowledge, 
suggesting that on one understanding it could not be a feature of self-knowledge at all, and on another it is 
commonplace, and thus requires no special explanation.  
	 132 
combinations: I remember her reassuring embrace; I (sometimes) remember 
why I came upstairs, where my keys are, and how to reset the boiler; I 
remember to check my emails, and that I own a copy of Sense and Sensibilia; I 
remember the feeling of warm sand between my toes; and remember thinking 
that I would prefer to be on the sand, reading Sense and Sensibilia, than checking 
my emails; and so on. Some kinds of memory barely register, in ordinary 
discourse, as memory at all:147 the positioning and movement of a proficient 
typist’s fingers is referred to as a ‘skill’, and my cognizance of the fact that 7 x 5 
= 35 simply as ‘knowledge’.148 In this section, I assess a number of distinctions 
that have arisen to cope with the range of phenomena, and settle on a distinction 
between factual memory and memory experience. In §2.1, I outline some 
features of factual memory that are relevant to the inquiry. 
 In what I will refer to as the traditional hierarchy, remembering an 
event—such as standing in the sea—is commonly referred to as episodic 
memory; whereas remembering a fact—such as ‘Sand stayed at Valldemossa’—
is commonly referred to as semantic memory. Both have success conditions that 
are, ostensibly, directly related to states of affairs:149 I only remember standing 
in the sea if I stood in the sea; I only remember that ‘Sand stayed at 
Valldemossa’ if she did. Both varieties are sometimes referred to as ‘declarative’ 
memory. Non-declarative memory—for example, remembering ‘how’ to re-
chain a bicycle—is less ostensibly bound to particular states of affairs for its 
success: it does not reflect ‘the world or the past in the same sense’ (Sutton 
2012). Cases of ‘remembering how’ also typically lack a conscious element 
present in memory of facts and events, and this points to another distinction in 
the traditional hierarchy: the term ‘implicit’ memory is used to describe skills 
and abilities that require no conscious ‘memories’; ‘explicit’ memory is broadly 
associated with conscious ‘memories’ (see e.g. Bermúdez, forthcoming).  
																																																								
147 See Appendix 1. 
148 ‘Remember in this use is often … an allowable paraphrase of the verb “to know”’ (Ryle 1949, p. 248) 
149 Sutton (2012) suggests that both episodic and semantic memory ‘aim at truth’ although I will set aside 
questions of teleology for present purposes. 
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 On the basis of these distinctions, our traditional hierarchy carves up 
memory along the following lines: declarative (explicit) memory refers to 
‘conscious recollections of facts and events’ (i.e. semantic and episodic 
memories), while non-declarative (implicit) memory refers to ‘a heterogenous 
collection of abilities whereby experience alters behavior nonconsciously 
without providing access to any memory content’ (Squire 1992, p. 233, see Fig. 
1).150  
 The traditional hierarchy has a number of problems. Some cases of 
‘remembering how’ (supposedly non-declarative, implicit memory) make use of 
conscious memories—semantic, episodic, or both—particularly for 
complicated or relatively new tasks, and may require specific (conscious) effort 
to retrieve the relevant information. And similar discomfitures are present 
elsewhere. Episodic memory is generally considered to be memory for 
‘personally experienced events’ as opposed to mere facts (see e.g. Tulving 
2001), but consider the following: 
 
Suppose I was so drunk at the party that I cannot recall dancing with a 
lampshade on my head. The next day I learn of this mortifying episode; later I 
remember what I learned, that I was dancing at the party in inappropriate 
headgear. I remember “a personally experienced event”, or “what happened 
where and when”, but it is semantic memory, not episodic. Contrariwise, 
suppose I have seen many skunks, and on that basis can recall what skunks look 
like. When I recall what skunks look like, I visualize a prototypical skunk, a 
perceptual amalgam of the various skunks I have encountered. Such a memory 
is best classified (at least initially) with the paradigmatic episodic memories—
recalling seeing a skunk in my garden this morning, for instance. Yet it is not a 
memory of a personally experienced event. (Byrne 2010) 
 
Despite the utility of some of its distinctions, the traditional hierarchy is 
insufficiently robust to accommodate a number of plausible memory scenarios. 																																																								
150 Also cited in Byrne (2010)
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 One response to such difficulties is to discard the semantic–episodic 
distinction, perhaps by viewing both as ‘part of an integrated memory system, 
grounded in the sensory, perceptual and motor systems, and distributed across 
key brain regions’ (McRae and Jones 2013). This is appealing in that it dispenses 
with the problematic distinction and, in particular, strips ‘semantic’ memory of 
its monolithic, ‘amodal’ status, but in doing so it makes sensuous content a 
necessary element of all declarative memory, and this risks leaving some 
straightforward cases of memory—for example, arithmetical knowledge—
looking mysterious. Take our memory of a word like ‘apple’ on the ‘integrated-
system’ model: 
 
the meaning of a word is grounded in the sensorimotor systems … Hence, 
when one thinks of an apple, knowledge regarding motoric grasping, chewing, 
sights, sounds, and tastes used to encode episodic experiences of an apple are 
reinstated via sensorimotor simulation. (McRae and Jones 2013) 
 
Assuming that all memory of words and objects is supposed to work this way, 
the first thing to note is the unusualness of the activity being described. 
‘Thinking of’ or about words, or objects, is a specific kind of activity, 
unrepresentative of the directed roles that memory of facts plays on a day-to-
day basis. Taking this kind of activity as the standard case of memory risks 
leaving us with an impoverished understanding of what it is to remember basic 
facts. Consider the following example:  
  
Suzie is required to sit an exam in which is must be able to state the 
capital cities of a number of countries. The list includes Benin, which is a 
new one on Suzie. Fortunately, Suzie has a reliable source of information 
on such matters. The source indicates that the capital city of Benin is 
Porto-Novo and, relying on the source, she passes the test. 
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 For the integrated-system model to be right, we must be able to answer the 
questions: What is the sensorimotor grounding for Suzie’s belief that the capital 
city of Benin is Porto-Novo that enables her to recall it? What are the ‘sights, 
sounds, and tastes’ reinstated when Suzie thinks about Porto-Novo? Assuming 
that Suzie’s source is purely testimonial, the sensorimotor grounding cannot 
easily be of the variety described in the ‘apple’ case. ‘Thinking of Porto-Novo’ 
for Suzie—unlike ‘thinking of apples’—cannot be much more than thinking of 
its relation to Benin, or her testimonial source. But information about 
testimonial sources looks like a bad fit and, in any case, is information with 
which she can lose touch. In the standard case, the focus of the testimonial 
transaction is not the vendor, but what he offers. (Memory would be woefully 
inefficient if in order to remember that I bought a newspaper last week, I had to 
remember the newsagent’s tie.) Even if sensuous source-data are always 
encoded, unless they cannot be lost, the integrated-system model fails to 
provide a sufficient explanation of an important class of judgments that would 
otherwise fall into the semantic, declarative category.151  
 What is helpful about the traditional hierarchy is that it allows us to 
distinguish between two varieties of memory: broadly, the variety best 
described as in examples of ‘remembering’ in common discourse, and the 
variety commonly associated with—and ‘an allowable paraphrase of’ (Ryle 
1949, p. 248)—the verb ‘to know’. What we need for the current purposes is a 
better way to distinguish between the two (not no distinction at all).  
  A helpful alternative contrasts ‘factual memory’, which preserves 
propositional content and is phenomenologically poor, with ‘memory 
experiences’, which are (comparatively) phenomenologically rich (Teroni 2015) 
and consist in some ‘preserved acquaintance’ (Ibid.) or ‘cognitive contact’ 
(Byrne 2010) with their subject matter. So, while my memory experiences of 
the walk to campus consist, in part, of some ‘preserved acquaintance’ with the 
																																																								
151 Arguably, that for which we do have ‘accessible’ source-data could only represent a tiny fraction of what 
we overall know or believe (cf. Owens 1999). 
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constituent sights, sounds, and objects I encounter along the way, there is not a 
great deal that it is like for me to know that the body of water I cross is, 
hydrologically speaking, a continuation of the River Ure. Recalling the latter 
might conjure up a morass of associated images and other sensory data, but these 
data are not necessary for the fact to be recalled. There are more complicated 
cases: in the absence of a specific task—or in the presence of an usual one, such 
as ‘thinking of’—memory might deliver a mixed bag of experiences and facts; 
on some occasions, memory experiences might aid in the retrieval of facts and 
vice versa; and we might make deliberate use of some associations to help with 
the encoding or retrieval of information. But none of this suggests that there are 
no clear cases on either side of the distinction, nor that one kind of memory is 
necessary for the other.152  
 
1.1 Factual memory 
With this distinction in place, we can begin to fill in some detail on the variety 
of memory that will be the main focus of discussion. If factual memory and 
memory experiences are epistemically independent, then we have all but ruled 
out some detail. ‘Evidentialism’ about memory, for instance, is the view that a 
subject is ‘rational in believing that p iff believing that p fits the evidence the 
subject has’ (McGrath 2007), but if factual memory and memory experience are 
epistemically independent, the rationality of believing that p on the basis of an 
experience that she recalls can be brought into question. What is more, since it 
is implausible that we could reliably ‘dredge up’ the evidence for more than a 
‘tiny subset of our beliefs at any one time’ (Owens 1999), Evidentialism would 
leave us unjustified in the majority of our beliefs, even if our initial grounds for 
believing were perfectly acceptable.  
 Two approaches that do not face this problem are ‘Conservatism’ and 
‘Preservationism’. On the former, one is prima facie entitled to persist in 
believing that p (just) if one already believes that p. This view has a good deal of 																																																								
152 As Ryle (1949) remarks, there is ‘no “must” about’ the connection (p. 250). 
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intuitive force, especially if one also subscribes to the (Reidian) view that we 
have ‘a prima facie entitlement to presume, of any belief, that it is well-formed 
and well-maintained and so is worthy of trust’ (see McGrath 2007). However, 
it has some unusual consequences.153 Prominent among them is the concern that 
the passage of time alone would transform the retaining of a belief from 
unreasonable to reasonable.154 
 Preservationism also absolves the subject of the requirement to retain 
her reasons and evidence for currently held beliefs, but in this case by 
preserving whatever rationality was in place when the belief was formed. 
Memory preserves ‘the probative and motivational force of evidence beyond the 
point at which that evidence has been forgotten’ (Owens 1999, p. 318). Thus, 
on the Preservationist’s view, if it was not reasonable to hold that p in the first 
place, it will not become reasonable to do so purely by virtue of the fact that I 
continue to hold that p.155 It faces the objection that memory does not appear to 
be preservation alone (see Lackey 2007).  
 For the remainder of this chapter, I will take Evidentialism to be false 
and the disputed territory to be contested by Conservatism and 
Preservationism. For the most part, there will be no need to decide between the 
two, because both views are compatible with a range of features required to 
explain factual memory. (Where there is, I will make this explicit.) These 
features are: (i) phenomenological paucity, and (ii) a prima facie epistemic 
authority, that allows us to (iii) relinquish reasons or evidence for our attitudes 
while being warranted in retaining those attitudes as long as that prima facie 
authority has not been defeated.156 With these features in place, we can set 																																																								
153 McGrath (2007) discusses what he takes to be the ‘best three’: (i) ‘that conservatism wrongly privileges 
our own beliefs over others’ beliefs’, (ii) that it ‘allows mere belief to make one rational in believing 
something when one previously wasn’t’, and (iii) that ‘it allows mere belief to provide an extra epistemic 
boost to a subject who, prior to forming the belief that p, already was rational in believing that p’ (p. 14). 
154  This is a variation on Burge’s (1997) ‘conversion’ objection (see McGrath 2007, p. 14). Space 
unfortunately prohibits lengthy discussion of the debate. (Thanks to Richard Flockemann for some helpful 
informal correspondence.) 
155 Various forms of the position have been supported by, for example, Burge (1993), Dummett (1994), and 
Owens (1999). Detractors include McGrath (2007) and Lackey (2007).  
156 In contrast, memory experiences exhibit (i) phenomenal richness (comparative to factual memory), and 
(ii) a preserved acquaintance, or cognitive contact, with some event or object encountered by the subject.  
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about comparing the features of memory with the main desiderata from chapter 
two.  
 
1.2 Distinctive features of self-knowledge 
Chief among the desiderata from chapter two were three common features. 
Explaining or eliminating some variation of these has been the pre-occupation of 
much literature:  
 
 (P) Peculiarity  
 (I) Immediacy 
 (E) Epistemic Security 
 
In chapter two, I suggested they form the minimum criteria for a theory. In this 
section, I argue that the features of factual memory can help to explain why it is 
that we take self-knowledge to be peculiar (P), immediate (I), and epistemically 
secure (E). I will address them in that order. 
 
 
2. Memory and first-person peculiarity 
 
The Peculiarity thesis suggests that S’s method of acquiring (or making 
conscious)157 a belief that she believes that p is unavailable to anyone else. I 
formulated this in explanatory terms (Ch. 2, §1), as follows:  
 
Peculiarity—a method or procedure by pointing to which it is possible, 
satisfactorily, to explain how S comes to knows S’s mental states, and 
that cannot be used satisfactorily to explain how S comes to know the 
mental states of others.  
																																																								
157 This makes room for approaches to self-knowledge that see the subject with a tacit belief that becomes 
explicit by means of reflection (see e.g. Boyle 2012).  
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In this section, I suggest that, intuitively, we have reason to think a person’s 
access to her memory is peculiar in the sense intended by the (P) thesis (§2.1). I 
then assess a number of ways in which one might attempt to defend that 
intuition. In §2.2, I contrast two varieties of recall—recall of first-order beliefs, 
and recall of second-order beliefs—and compare the degree to which they 
might be help to explain Peculiarity. In §2.3, I discuss whether supplementing 
the inferential Transparency view with the appropriate epistemology of memory 
might better explain how that approach explains Peculiarity. These are not the 
only options available, but they will serve to demonstrate that a number of 
options for a sufficient explanation of Peculiarity are available within our 
thinking about memory.  
 
2.1 The intuitive peculiarity of memory 
Intuitively, we might suggest that on any plausible view of memory, it cannot 
help but meet the Peculiarity condition, since—science fiction and fantasy 
aside—Bruce has the kind of access to his memory that no-one else has, and if 
Bruce were to explain how he knows that p by pointing to the fact that Jennifer 
recalls that p, we would proclaim his explanation had come up short of sufficient 
(i.e. to be missing some crucial step, such as Jennifer also telling him she recalls 
that p). The view has a kind of appeal it is difficult to deny, but pinpointing 
precisely what makes that view appealing is less straightforward.  
 To begin with, we can try to make the intuition that access to one’s 
memory is first-personally peculiar explicit. A first-pass description might look 
like this:  
 
(IPAM) If S can sometimes know she believes that p by recalling that she 
believes that p, S knows it in a way unavailable to anyone else.  
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This description makes it clear that at least two issues need attention: firstly, it 
merely states the first-person peculiarity of memory, and secondly it is 
ambiguous between two readings of recalling that p—one on which a first-order 
belief is recalled, and one on which a second-order belief is recalled.  
 One might choose to address the first matter by removing one obvious 
obstacle to the possibility that IPAM is a good intuition. (This can be dealt with 
briefly since the issue has been broadly addressed elsewhere, see e.g. Ch. 2.) A 
Parity theorist about self-knowledge resists the idea that there is any difference 
in kind between first-person and third-person access to the mind (e.g. Ryle 
1949; Carruthers 2011). There is little reason to suppose she would reject this 
peculiarity when talking about self-knowledge, but accept it when talking about 
some other cognitive faculty. She might, for instance, object that intuitions 
about the peculiarity of first-person access to memory are just another example 
of mistaken intuition about the mind.158  
Actual Parity theorists, on the other hand, appear to be more amenable 
than this: they are less concerned with access to some aspects of our mental lives 
than when they are tackling the subject of our introspective abilities more 
generally. Both Ryle (1949) and Carruthers (2011) rely heavily upon silent 
soliloquy and memory. Ryle (1949), for instance, suggests that when memory 
works promptly, I can ‘catch myself’ φ-ing, though not ‘in the same sense’ that I 
catch someone else φ-ing (p. 148).159 And memory, on Ryle’s view provides us 
with a ‘mass of data’ that contributes to our views of our behaviour and 
thoughts (p. 149) even if that does not amount to ‘Privileged Access’.160 In any 
case, the suggestion that Parity theorists deny any significant first-person access 
to the mind appears to be an exaggeration (see Byrne 2010), with the 																																																								
158 Mistaken, but sometimes useful: assuming that we have excellent access to our minds could allow for 
quick decision making (see Carruthers 2011).  
159 Ryle uses swearing as an example, which alone may leave the passage open to alternative interpretations, 
but he also suggests, ‘I can report the calculations I have been doing in my head’ (Ryle 1949, p. 148), which 
I take to limit the available interpretations. See also Alex Byrne (2012) in reference to what I have called the 
Parity Thesis: ‘Surely I don’t know that I feel an itch, or see a duck, in the same way I know that you feel an 
itch or see a duck!’.  
160  The point being that ‘more data’ doesn’t always make us better judges, although being in an 
espistemically advantageous position is not what is at issue here.  
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‘authentic’ (Ryle 1949, p. 148) processes of memory carrying some of 
introspection’s load for a number of such theorists (see Ryle 1949; Carruthers 
2011). The actual Parity theorist, then, does not typically pose a serious 
problem for the intuitive view expressed above. This does not address the 
problem posed by the notional Parity theorist, of course, although there is a 
sense in which she need not be concerned either. 
In a minimal sense, the thought that there is something different about 
first-person and third-person access to memory is fairly uncontroversial. Even 
philosophers who defend the thesis that we can literally perceive the mental 
states of others (see e.g. McNeill 2012) do not suggest that our perceiving that 
someone is in a state is the same as their being in that state.161 The difficulty is 
that first-person peculiarity in this minimal sense would see access to memory 
on a par with seeing, hearing, and feeling, etc., such that S being the subject 
who sees x would be sufficient to suggest her access is peculiar. In a sense, this is 
right, but it cannot be all there is to it. We can see, hear, feel and recall that p 
without knowing that we see, hear, feel and recall that p. Whatever asymmetry 
is granted to S in virtue of the fact that she is using her own faculties is not quite 
enough to explain how it is that she can know that what they come up with 
refers to her. So, more needs to be said about how pointing to S recalling that p 
sufficiently explains how she knows that she believes that p.  
The appeal of (IPAM), I take it, is at least in part due the ambiguity 
between belief contents. In the next section, I highlight the differences between 
the two contents and their relevance to our present inquiry. 
 
2.2 Recalling first-order and second-order beliefs 
For the purposes of discussion, take the following hypothesis to capture the 
relevant intuition about the peculiarity of access to memory: 
 																																																								
161 The claim is rather that by sometimes seeing ‘aspects of each others’ mental lives’, we ‘thereby come to 
have non-inferential knowledge of them’ (McNeill 2012, p. 573) 
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(PAM) One can know that one φs that p by recalling that one φs that p, 
thereby knowing that one φs that p in a way unavailable to others.  
 
One thing to note about (PAM) is that it leaves in place the ambiguity about 
precisely what is being recalled. We can situate the ambiguity in a case of self-
ascription:  
 
I ask Laura if she believes that there is anything wrong with gay men having 
consensual sexual intercourse, and she answers that she sees nothing wrong 
with it … she might partly be calling up the moral facts (or putative moral 
facts) from memory, much as a schoolchild might call up California’s capital 
from memory … Laura’s self-ascription might be partly driven by … her 
memory of having explicitly endorsed similar propositions in the past. 
(Schwitzgebel 2009, pp. 48f.)162 
 
The example contains two plausible cases of memory simpliciter: there is little 
doubt that we can enjoy both, and both are partial explanations of doxastic self-
knowledge. One involves the kind of result we might expect from a 
Transparency account of self-knowledge: the question of whether Laura thinks 
something is wrong is settled by what she takes to be the salient facts. The other 
case sees Laura considering what she has thought in the past, and this can be 
relevant to her conclusion in at least some cases. The two cases are not the same 
kind, and it is not obvious that both are cases of factual recall. But they can be 
made to look that way: 
 
Just as a stored representation of the fact that “Plato taught Aristotle” might 
influence a variety of my judgments … a stored representation of “I believe 
that Plato taught Aristotle” could do the same. It would be a strange incapacity 
																																																								
162 Schwitzgebel (2009) is arguing for a pluralist view of self-knowledge of belief (i.e. these are listed among 
numerous ways in which Laura might come to know her belief in this case). My use of the example is purely 
to indicate a particular diversity in memory based self-ascriptions. 
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if the latter were not the sort of thing I could directly remember (Schwitzgebel 
2009, pp. 51f.)   
 
So, if the two are different, we need to be quite clear about the implications of 
that difference when it comes to the reliability of memory based self-ascriptions. 
We can contrast the two cases as follows:  
 
 (Rp) S recalls the fact that p 
 (RBp) S recalls that she believes that p 
 
Characterizing (Rp) in light of what has been said about factual memory can be 
fairly straightforward: S recalls some factual content answerable only to states of 
affairs in the world or the past. When S recalls that ‘The ‘Minute’ Waltz is in D-
flat Major’, for instance, she recalls a salient fact about that waltz, not 
something about her own psychology. In that respect the operation is 
Transparent.  
 By contrast, characterizing (RBp) is less straightforward. One possibility 
is that (RBp) describes a memory experience—for example, being suddenly 
convinced of truth of p. On this understanding (RBp) is akin to cases in which 
one recalls becoming or being sad, say, at a funeral, or being in pain, say, at the 
hospital. The sadness and pain are not themselves recalled, only some mark of 
one’s past awareness of them. Likewise, belief that one believes that ‘The 
‘Minute’ Waltz is in D-flat Major’ is not what the memory provides, but just 
some mark of becoming at one time aware of that belief. While the content is 
still ostensibly factual, it better fits the profile of a memory experience because 
it relies upon preserved contact or acquaintance with an event or experience. 
An appropriate way to describe (RBp) in light of our distinction is that ‘S recalls 
believing that p’, where ‘believing’ picks out a putative episode or event in 
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which the subject took herself to be in a particular state (or to have some range 
of features that are equivalent to or evidence for that state).163  
 Eric Schwitzgebel (2009) appears to consider something like (RBp) a 
genuine means of doxastic self-knowledge. 164  It is worthwhile briefly 
considering whether how such a suggestion might be fleshed out, since it would 
be a very swift result for the present inquiry. Firstly, we can see a number of 
opportunities to fall into error, among them following: (i) S could have a ‘false 
memory’ of judging that she was in a particular state (e.g. S judges that she was 
in state F when she was not, in fact, in state F); and (ii) S could be mistaken 
about the kind of state she was in (e.g. S takes herself to have believed that p 
when in fact she hoped that p). So if this is a way of coming to know our minds 
it leaves us appropriately fallible. On the other hand, there is a variety of error 
into which the subject looks unlikely to fall into—(iii) the identity of the 
individual making such a judgement—and this is a promising candidate for 
Peculiarity, and potentially for Epistemic Security (see §4).165  
We might be tempted, then, to conclude that (RBp) judgements are 
important and interesting cases of self-knowledge: important because recalling 
an episode of believing that p is one way to allow a subject to make sense of an 
otherwise mysterious change of heart; interesting for our purposes because they 
appear to possess a number of features relevant to the current inquiry. If the 
judgements possess the kind of immunity suggested in (iii), not only are they 
first-personally peculiar, and potentially more secure, they also require no 
further self-ascription. On the downside, it is difficult to see how such 
judgements could be Transparent (see Ch. 5), and—more pressingly—the 
																																																								
163 She may recall, for instance, feelings of endorsement, etc. See Cassam (forthcoming) for a discussion of 
psychological evidence for our beliefs. 
164 Schwitzgebel’s pluralism (2009) and scepticism (2008) do not leave him with a difficult set of strict 
criteria to meet with regards to introspective success. However, his remarks here do appear to be a genuine 
attempt to point to a procedure for doxastic self-knowledge. He also takes memory to be a good candidate 
for self-scanning mechanisms (2009).  
165 I refer here to the property of immunity from error through misidentification (IEM) in what Bermúdez 
(2012) calls autobiographical memory. (See §4, Ch. 5). 
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epistemic distinctiveness of (RBp) alone is not a sufficient explanation of how S 
knows that she believes that p.  
As we have already seen, memory experiences that sometimes 
accompany a belief are neither necessary nor sufficient for recalling that belief 
(Teroni 2015). In many cases, the experience is lost, but the belief remains (I 
frequently forget my evidence for what I now believe). In others, the belief is 
lost even when the experience remains (I remember thinking many things that I 
now take to be foolish). This epistemic independence means that the procedure 
will only issue in knowledge when the episode of believing is ongoing, but since 
correctly recalling that I judged p to be true in no way suggests that I still judge 
it true, deploying (RBp) as a general guide to current states would be ill-
advised. 
 An additional worry arises from research that suggests autobiographical 
memory functions so as to preserve and protect a coherent picture of the self 
rather than to reflect the world or the past (Conway and Loveday 2015). Since 
these memory experiences are autobiographical in that they relate directly to 
events in one’s past, if the conclusions of the research are correct it is possible 
that (traditional) knowledge-conduciveness is out of reach.166 Thus, while (RBp) 
is a natural example of how memory might provide self-attributed mental 
states, and one that initially looks promising with regard to Peculiarity as well as 
a number of other desiderata for a theory of self-knowledge, it is a poor 
response to the Peculiarity criterion alone insofar as it is does not sufficiently 
explain how the subject might know that she believes that p, simply by recalling 
her believing that p. It does, however, point to important ways in which 
judgements might be thought to meet the Peculiarity condition—namely, by 
being automatically self-ascriptive, possessing the immunity property, and 
revealing (in some cases) information about attitudes in place prior to the 
initiation of the procedure.  
																																																								
166  Bermúdez (forthcoming) expresses a similar concern about coherence models of memory and the 
prospects for knowledge.  
	 146 
 Now compare the benefits and deficits of (RBp) judgements with our 
standard case of factual memory: S recalls the fact that p (Rp). The first thing to 
note is that, unlike (RBp), (Rp) is not automatically self-ascriptive: one can 
recall of a subject that p without realizing that one is the subject. So this kind of 
memory judgement does not possess the immunity property potentially 
possessed by (RBp). One might conclude if (Rp) is to be a part of a procedure 
for doxastic self-knowledge, it will need an additional self-ascriptive step (as 
with the Transparency views discussed in Ch. 3). Chapter three addressed a 
number of options in this respect: one is a process of ‘reflection’ (see Boyle 
2011), by which a subject comes to judge explicitly that which she already 
tacitly knows; and another is an inference from world-to-mind (e.g. Byrne 
2011a). In chapter three, I took the inferential approach to be more promising 
in light of our desiderata, so I will continue with that model for the purposes of 
discussion here. Here is an adapted version of Alex Byrne’s Gallois-style 
doxastic schema with recall made explicit as the operation that leads to the 
judgement ‘p’.167  
 
Rp 
I believe that p 
 
As a way of knowing, it avoids two problems associated with (RBp) because (i) 
it does not rely upon cognitive contact with some past event, and (ii) it delivers 
a current, first-order belief rather than the mark of a past self-attribution of 
some state. (Concerns about the distorting affects of autobiographical memories 
are also avoided because, plausibly, we are not dealing with memory 
experience.) Since the procedure does not face these obstacles, we can assume 
for the moment that it is a credible way of knowing one’s mind. The question is 
whether it is a peculiar way. Answering this question (§2.3) requires that I 
briefly re-open a discussion briefly addressed in chapter three. 																																																								
167 The addition of ‘R’ to represent recall merely highlights the means by which the judgement p is reached, 
rather than indicating, for instance, that the subject recognizes that she is ‘recalling’.  
	 147 
 In this section, I examined a potential ambiguity that may be the source 
of the intuition behind (PAM). The ambiguity lay in the belief content that the 
procedure delivers: (RBp) has a number of features that make it a promising 
explanation of (PAM). Alone, however, it does not look like a sufficiently 
robust explanation of Peculiarity because recalling an episode of believing that p 
is a poor overall guide to one’s current beliefs. Contrariwise, (Rp) is an 
excellent guide to what one currently believes, but does not look like a 
sufficient explanation of Peculiarity because it does not, alone, provide a means 
of self-ascription. In the next section, I explore whether (Rp) can help to 
explain Peculiarity by contributing to the inferential Transparency view 
mentioned above.  
 
2.3 Peculiarity and the doxastic schema 
In chapter three, I agreed with Byrne (2011a) that following the doxastic 
schema explains his Peculiar Access condition, ‘because, the method only works 
in one’s own case: inferring that Andre beliefs that p from the premiss that p 
will often lead one astray’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 207). This was an 
oversimplification. In this section, I argue that making the role of memory in a 
doxastic schema explicit helps to explain Peculiarity on that account. 
 According to Byrne’s (2011a) view, a way of knowing one’s mind fits 
the bill if it is available to S and no-one else. However, the difference between 
first-person and third-person deployment of the procedure, as Byrne (2011a)168 
has it, is a matter of comparative reliability. Inferring that Andre believes that p 
from the premiss that p is, of course, an option for Alex, even if it is far less 
reliable than reasoning in accord with the schema with regard to one’s own 
beliefs. The worst that can be said of the third-person use of the schema is that 
we wouldn’t normally recommend it.169 But things that work aren’t always 																																																								
168 Alex Byrne has reiterated the position, for example, at Varieties of Self-Knowledge Workshop: Harvard 
University, March 2016.  
169 I raised this issue with Alex Byrne in private correspondence following the Varieties of Self-Knowledge 
workshop (2016) mentioned above. At the time, I took the position iterated at the workshop to be a 
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things we’d recommend. Cleaning oil spills happens to be a surprisingly 
effective method of discovering new marine life,170 but since enthusiasm for the 
conditions that make it possible is understandably thin on the ground we are not 
likely to try to bring them about purely for the purposes of research. Byrne’s 
(2011a) Peculiar Access is cast in terms of availability, but since it is available for 
third-person use, his attempt to explain Peculiar Access is, by his own lights, 
incomplete.  
However, because it is the utility of the method for the third-person that 
Byrne clearly has in mind, we might try to make sense of it in those terms. But 
that does not look wholly promising either. While it seems obvious that the 
third-person use of the method would be less fruitful than the first-person 
method in this case, calculating how deficient the third-person method is would 
be difficult. In any case, the third-person use looks attractive as a quick, easy, 
and somewhat successful method of predicting the behaviour of others, and one 
that we plausibly make use of with some frequency. Both humans and the 
objects of their experience are highly predictable. In general, humans need only 
to negotiate (i.e. form true beliefs about) a strictly limited environment in order 
to survive; and do manage to negotiate that environment quite successfully for a 
number of years without mastering the notion of belief (see e.g. Gopnik and 
Astington 1988). In order to interpret others we need to attribute to them 
largely true beliefs (Davidson 1973), and it is unlikely that we ever quite 
manage to shake the childhood practice of thinking that people know, pretty 
much, what we know. (We are surprised, after all, when people make foolish 
decisions with what we take to be highly predictable outcomes.) The third-
person use of the doxastic schema, supplemented with appropriate defeating 
conditions, is unlikely to be all that bad.  
																																																																																																																																																						
departure from the position as it can be found in print. However, it is clear that this is a faithful 
interpretation of his position as it stands at the time of writing. Professor Byrne responded to say that he 
ought to have said that it was a ‘isn’t a good idea’ to follow the schema in the third person case.  
170 A Woods Hole Marine Biological Laboratory study found that, in fact, the large majority of ‘new marine 
life’ was discovered that way over a period of fifty years leading up to the survey (Shultz 2016) 
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Fortunately, we need not pursue the exercise in comparative reliability. 
Unlike Byrne’s original formulation of Peculiar Access, the revised formulation 
in Peculiarity (P) does not face the same problem of explaining why reasoning in 
accordance with such a schema can be considered peculiar. Whatever can be 
said for the third-person use of the doxastic schema, it cannot be pointed to 
alone if one wishes to sufficiently explain why S knows what she knows. While 
it might be good enough to ‘get us through the day’ (Dunning 2014),171 the fact 
that we can get away with using (almost certainly very many) deviant cognitive 
practices (see Ch. 1) does not sufficiently explain how we know the contents of 
others’ minds. In short, on my formulation (P), Byrne’s (2011a) procedure for 
doxastic self-knowledge is more plausibly peculiar than on his own view. 
But here we run into an awkward problem, because it is also 
questionable whether the first-person use of the doxastic schema is a sufficient 
explanation of how we know our own minds, and this is also required upon (P). 
As we have seen (see Ch. 3), the world-to-mind inference is at best shaky, and 
at worst mad: it is a highly efficient source of true beliefs but, other than that, it 
looks nearly as bad as the third-person use. Byrne (2005) sketches a solution in 
terms of ‘safety’—the beliefs yielded by the schema could not easily have been 
false—but stops short of endorsing it as a demonstration that reasoning in 
accord with the schema is knowledge conducive (Byrne 2011a, pp. 206f.). Such 
attempts to complete the explanation may turn out well, but I would like to 
offer an alternative way to explain how reasoning in accordance with (the recall 
version of) the schema can explain why the procedure is a peculiar way to 
know. 
In chapter three, I compared two ways of responding to an inquiry about 
what one thinks: a deliberative procedure and a non-deliberative (or mnemic) 
procedure (also §2.2 above). Both are activities that manifest a recognition of a 
question, and are transparent to factual inquiry. Unlike deliberation, however, 																																																								
171 David Dunning (2014) artfully makes a similar point about a range of deficient cognitive practices. All we 
really need from our pattern recognition and theorizing abilities is that they they get us to ‘an age when we 
can procreate’. If they are good enough to do that, we have little reason to jettison them. 
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the mnemic procedure does not aim at resolving an issue (see Appendix 1). In 
deliberation, recognition of the question provides direction or purpose during 
the period of cogitation (see Shah 2003, p. 466) on the matter to be resolved. 
The mnemic procedure, however, requires no such directed period of 
cogitation because the matter is already resolved: one may try to rehearse one’s 
reasons or evidence for thinking what one does, but doing so will at best risk re-
opening the inquiry, thus potentially contaminating the results of one’s attempt 
to self-know (Shah and Velleman 2005); at worst one will confabulate (see 
Appendix 1). In typical cases of factual recall one has no access to one’s original 
reasons or evidence for a belief (see e.g. Owens 1999). What is delivered by the 
mnemic procedure is the encoded attitude content. This is where the role of 
memory can help to complete the explanation of Peculiarity, and thereby resist 
one style of objection (see Ch. 3).  
It has been argued that some Transparency accounts leave a bit of self-
knowledge unaccounted for (e.g. Moran 2011; Cassam, forthcoming). For 
example, Shah and Velleman (2005) suggest that self-knowledge is a matter of 
attending to our spontaneous responses to brute stimuli. But, as seen in earlier 
chapters, unless we are willing to accept just about anything that we happen to 
do,172 that is, at the time a response might naturally occur, as giving voice to an 
underlying state, this is not a complete explanation of self-knowledge. A similar 
objection has been leveled against Byrne’s (2005, 2011a) account (see Ch. 5; 
Casssam, forthcoming). The missing detail can be found, at least partially, in the 
epistemology of factual memory already outlined.  
On either of the two approaches discussed, recalling that p is more than 
simply overhearing oneself (using either one’s inner or outer voice) say ‘p’. Our 
recall of p is retrieved with a kind of force in each case: on Preservationist 
accounts, memory preserves the ‘probative and motivational force of evidence 
beyond the point at which that evidence has been forgotten’ through a ‘belief-
fixing influence’ (Owens 1999, p. 318); on Conservatism, this force is provided 																																																								
172 Moran (2011) uses the example of sneezing.  
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by a warrant to continue to believe what we already believe. Judging that p 
following the initiation of the self-knowledge procedure is not like eavesdropping. 
At the point that one recalls that p one is both committed to p and—all being 
well—entitled to retain the belief that p.  
 This is not a full response to the problem, but it does highlight an 
important difference between self-knowledge procedures—recalling that p is 
not the same as deliberation, nor is it the same as eavesdropping—and it goes 
further than some accounts in explaining why we might think non-deliberative 
Transparency procedures are legitimate ways of knowing. Two issues await 
discussion elsewhere. The first is how to make sense of the ‘probative and 
motivational’ force of Preservationism; the second is how to make sense of the 
idea that positive epistemic status can be gleaned simply by believing over time. 
With regards to the first, the relevant metaphysics of memory is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The second will be discussed in the section on Epistemic 
Security below. 
In this section, I suggested that first-person nature of access to one’s 
memory is highly intuitive. However, we may need something to support that 
intuition if we are to take seriously the suggestion that memory can, at least 
partially, explain Peculiarity in a theory of self-knowledge. The intuition is best 
supported by cases such as (RBp)—that is, when understood as involving the 
recall of some episode of believing rather than as factual recall. However, 
Peculiarity is not fully explained by such cases. (I return to this issue in §4, and 
Ch. 5.) Less intuitively, cases of (Rp) can also shed light on how other accounts 
might explain Peculiarity, but more modestly—that is, by supplementing the 
explanation of how the Transparency procedure can be regarded a way of 
knowing. In the next section I move on to Immediacy (I). 
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3. The Immediacy thesis 
 
In chapter two, I concluded that there are two plausible readings of the 
Immediacy thesis. The first is a purely psychological thesis; the second an 
epistemic thesis. Explaining psychological immediacy was retained as a 
minimum criterion—the commonsense case for psychological immediacy is 
strong. Epistemic immediacy was retained as an ideal desideratum. The purpose 
of this section is to show that Psychological Immediacy is explained by the 
epistemology of memory with which we have been concerned. Although I will 
not argue directly for the epistemic version of the thesis, I will also outline a 
way in which we might see self-knowledge in that light. 
 The central claim of the Psychological Immediacy is that, sometimes, 
when a subject inquires as to her current state, the result appears without any 
introspectively detectable train of thought. While the relation between 
psychology and epistemology is complicated,173 most plausibly this leaves open 
the question of whether epistemic inference features in any cognitive transaction 
between inquiry and result.  
Examples of psychologically immediate thought processes are not 
difficult to find, and many now accept that much of our thinking is unconscious, 
or fast, or direct (see e.g. Kahneman 2011) in contrast with typical cases of 
deliberation discussed in this work. In some cases, simply ‘sufficiently 
internalizing’ (Wikforss 2004) the most complicated thought processes or 
theories can grant the appearance of directness or immediacy. All that is required 
for these terms to be true in the psychological sense is that whatever cognitive 
processes that are deployed can be deployed very quickly, or sufficiently 
beneath the level of conscious accessibility, that their stages are not apparent to 
the subject. Plausibly this can be true of both a simple pain response or 
something as complicated as the physicist’s ‘perception’ of sub-atomic particles 
(see Wikforss 2004).  																																																								
173 Like Cassam (forthcoming), I will demure from be drawn into discussing that relation in any depth here 
on the grounds that a sufficiently treatment of the issue would require more space than can be afforded here.  
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Meeting this condition is something that a theory of self-knowledge can 
clearly fail to do (see Ch. 3; Cassam 2014), but once we have rejected the 
epistemic link between factual memory and memory experiences, it is clear 
how cases of recall (i.e. as employed in Byrne’s account) can begin to meet the 
condition: in standard cases of factual memory, retaining and recalling belief 
content does not require that evidence or reasons are retained or recalled (in 
standard cases one relinquishes them). We might take standard factual recall, 
then, as a paradigm case of a psychologically immediate operation.  
That cannot be all there is to it, of course, because straightforward recall 
cases—such as proposed in Byrne (2011a)—unlike some cases involving 
memory experience—need an adjunctive step for self-ascription (see §2). The 
options most commonly referred to so far in this work are reflection and 
inference. We can take a closer look at inference by pointing to a ‘customary 
distinction’ within ‘the sphere of theoretical reasoning’ (Boghossian 2014) 
between two distinct systems: 
 
System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and 
no sense of voluntary control. 
System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand 
it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are 
often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and 
concentration.  
(Kahneman 2011, pp. 20–21)174  
 
The features of System 2 are broadly comparable with cases of deliberation. To 
use Evans’s example, when considering whether one thinks there will be a third 
world war—and thereby considers facts that are salient to the question of 
whether there will be one—one is, at least usually, engaged in an activity that 
																																																								
174 See also Boghossian (2014). Boghossian points out that a lot of reasoning seems to fall ‘between these two 
extremes’, although since the distinction is purely illustrative, here, rigorous treatment will prove a 
distraction.  
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consumes a portion of one’s conscious attention, 175 and that, at least usually, is 
accompanied by a sense of agency (that some take to be epistemically 
significant). Recalling the fact that p, by contrast, is standardly a better fit for 
System 1 thinking: it is either effortless—as with personal details, dates, and 
common knowledge—or largely involuntary.  
Since the involuntariness of memory may not strike everyone one as 
intuitive it is worth saying a little more. One might fancy that one can initiate a 
probe the recesses of one’s memory, and in a sense this is true—one can initiate 
the process. However, that is likely where voluntary control ends. When a fact 
seems temporarily beyond one’s grasp, probing is done largely in the spirit of 
hope. One can probe at related or partial facts in the hope that the misplaced 
information will spring to mind, but if it does, it does so spontaneously. The 
most plausible way to explain the phenomenon is ‘chaining’. In memory tasks, 
‘the contents of an involuntary memory sometimes trigger additional 
involuntary memories’ (Mace 2006). Plausibly, one can present oneself with a 
stimulus for a retrieval attempt by posing myself a question that is either self-
directed (Do I think that p?) or world-directed (Is it the case that p?). But one’s 
control beyond that point is questionable.  
So, in standard cases, the first step in the doxastic schema is 
psychologically immediate, at least insofar as it is broadly aligned with System 1 
thinking. (We have good reason to think that it is epistemically immediate too, 
since recalling that p is not a case of inferring that p.)176 The adjunctive step in 
the procedure—the step that takes a subject from de re cogitation to de se 
cogitation—is less straightforward. If the step is inferential, it will not be 
epistemically immediate. But, on some conceptions of inference, it will not be 
psychologically immediate either, and so even the non-deliberative 
Transparency view will not meet a minimum criterion (i.e. the psychological 
variant of Immediacy). 
																																																								
175 I argue elsewhere (see Appendix 1) that this does not mean that such thought need always be conscious. 
176 See e.g. Ryle (1949, p. 250) 
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On some views, inference is a ‘person-level, conscious and voluntary, 
not sub-personal, sub-conscious and automatic’ (Boghossian 2014, p. 3), such as 
in the following example (p. 2):  
 
(1) It rained last night 
I combine this with my knowledge that 
(2) If it rained last night then the streets are wet.  
To conclude: 
So,  
(3) The streets are wet.  
 
This example sees inference resembling, or sitting between, System 1 thinking 
and System 2 thinking. While it is ‘quick, relatively automatic and not 
particularly demanding on the resources of attention’ like System 1, it is 
apparently a ‘conscious, voluntary mental action’, like System 2 (p. 2).177 If this 
is, broadly speaking, the correct view of inference, then the presence of 
inference not only rules out epistemic immediacy, but psychological immediacy 
too. In the next section, I argue that this result is down to some indiscriminate 
handling of the term inference, and propose a distinction between single-
component and dual-component inference as a way to settle the matter with 
regard to our current inquiry. 
 
3.1 Psychological immediacy and inference 
Both ‘immediacy’ and ‘inference’ are terms philosophers have felt entitled to 
use without satisfactorily defining (Boghossian 2014), 178  or at least without 
garnering a great deal of consensus. With regard to our present inquiry, this 
leaves us with an unfortunately broad range of views. The views include: (a) 
inference does not require a conscious element;179 (b) inference can be quick 																																																								
177 It is worth noting that the term ‘conscious’ has been introduced by Boghossian (2014) here (perhaps as a 
gloss for ‘subjective experience of agency’) and does not explicitly feature in Kahneman’s (2011) description 
of the two Systems.  
178 Boghossian’s (2014) point refers to inference.  
179 This may be the minority view, but it is not uncommon, and has found apparent adherents in Mill 
(1882/2009); Byrne (e.g. 2011a); Carruthers (2011), among others. It is the view I am drawn to, although 
I need not argue for it directly here. 
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and automatic, even if there is some minimal degree of conscious activity; (c) 
‘epistemic’ inferences (e.g. McNeill 2014) have a conscious element, but 
inferences in a broader sense need not.180 The whole self-knowledge procedure 
(i.e. two steps) can be psychologically immediate on (a) and (b), but will be 
epistemically mediate. On (c) the procedure can be both psychologically 
immediate and epistemically immediate.  
  In its most basic form, inference appears to have a single component. 
This can be characterized either as (i) a transition that proceeds from a premiss 
to a conclusion (e.g. Cassam 2007b; McNeill 2014), or (i*) a ‘non-accidental 
transition between belief contents’ (Boyle 2011, p. 4). Since the latter would 
appear to neglect the valid, if uninteresting, inference, ‘if p, then p’, I will take 
the former to be the basic form. We can call this ‘single-component’ inference. 
Single-component inference does not capture everything that is intended by 
‘inference’ in some of its uses. One appealing addition might be that the 
transition occurs because the subject is ‘cognizant of other truths as providing 
justification’ for that conclusion (Frege 1979; in Boghossian 2014), or she 
recognizes the link between the two. Since (i) is still necessary for inference on 
this picture, we might call the more exacting kind of inference the dual-
component view. Single-component inferences are easy to come by: ‘classical 
computers’ perform inferences in that sense (McNeill 2014). But since classical 
computers are not cognizant of ‘other truths providing justification for the 
conclusion’ any putative consciousness requirement must lie within the second 
component (ii). 
 We should grant that single-component inferences are not restricted to 
one or more varieties of computer. If we do, then the concern that an 
inferential approach to self-knowledge is not psychologically immediate rests on 
the assumption that the kind of inference being performed is of the dual-
component kind. But this is neither necessary for the kind of schema being 
																																																								
180 McNeill (2014) seems to have such a distinction in mind in claiming that computers perform inferences 
that result in ‘non-inferential warrant’ although he does not expand.  
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discussed, nor does it appear to be what proponents inferential Transparency 
views have in mind (see e.g. Byrne 2011a). Indeed, since the pattern of 
inference is self-verifying but quite bad, it likely to be important for the success 
of the procedure that the workings of the transition are beyond the subject’s 
conscious reach: 181  if the subject were to recognize the questionable link 
between the two, she might also recognize that the truth of p doesn’t even make 
it likely that she believes that p (see Byrne 2005, 2011a). 
 Provisionally, we can conclude that in the standard (i.e. non-
deliberative) case, both one’s means of arriving at the judgement p, and the 
transition from that judgement to the self-ascription, can be—and on the basis 
of what we have said probably are—psychologically immediate. For those 
drawn to dual-component accounts of inference, it might be remarked that the 
kind of inference proponents of this view have in mind is not ‘epistemic’ in their 
sense. However, this will mean that the method is arguably both inferential (in 
the single-component sense) and epistemically immediate. In the next section, I 
address this possibility, and argue that we should resist the conclusion. 
 
3.2 Epistemic immediacy and inference 
The more substantive version of the Immediacy thesis is epistemological. 
Accounts that refer to this feature suggest that self-knowledge is distinctive 
because it is epistemically immediate or non-inferential (see Moran 200;1Ch. 
2;). The main claim of this section is that, in the standard non-deliberative case, 
the first component in the inferential self-knowledge procedure (arguably unlike 
the deliberative case) is epistemically immediate, and that this is likely to be 
enough to explain why we take self-knowledge to immediate in that sense. 
However, this is not enough to suggest that the procedure is epistemically 
																																																								
181 Byrne (2011a) is mindful that the pattern of inference in question is ‘neither deductively valid nor 
inductively strong’ (p. 204); and, in response to questions (at Varieties of Self-Knowledge Workshop, Harvard 
2016) has indicated that the transition is not one of which the subject is likely to be conscious. Yet, he 
suggested, there is no question whether it is inference, only whether it is knowledge-conducive.	
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immediate: we must acknowledge the presence of inference on either view 
presented in the last section.  
 Evidentialism about memory and some dual-factor accounts of inference 
share a common flaw. Both portray their respective transactions as involving a 
subject with substantive and continued access to decisive factors in the adoption 
of her attitudes. Both recalling and reasoning by inference are seen as involving 
fully (or substantively) introspectable trains of thought allowing the subject 
ongoing access to premiss, conclusion, and—on the view of epistemic inference 
above—some recognition of how the two are linked. This view is optimistic 
given the breadth of psychological research on subjects’ access to their cognitive 
processes (see Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Appendix 1) and is epistemically 
implausible at least in the memory case (see e.g. Owens 1999), and probably 
both: even Descartes and Kant had their doubts about this kind of access to our 
minds (see Ch. 2).  
 Rejecting Evidentialism eliminates a mistaken view of factual memory. 
One does not ordinarily recall one’s evidence and arrive (afresh) at a 
conclusion, nor does one ordinarily recall one’s conclusion along with one’s 
evidence, on the chance, for instance, that one is asked to back up one’s 
claim.182 We can do neither of those things reliably, because we are unlikely to 
be able to ‘dredge up’ the evidence more than a ‘tiny subset of our beliefs at any 
one time’, and because, usually, we have little reason to retain those reasons. 
 
Once a question is decided, we close the books on it and throw away the 
evidence: deliberately retaining evidence for future consultation is a sign of 
doubt, an attitude appropriate to the scientist who is interested in the 
likelihood of various things and has a professional obligation to suspend 
judgement but quite unsuited to the everyday believer. (Owens 1999) 
 
If this view of memory is correct, there is already a good case for saying that the 																																																								
182 Although this may be appropriate thing for e.g. a scientist to do (Owens 1999). 
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primary component of the non-deliberative (mnemic) self-knowledge 
procedure is immediate in the epistemic sense: when recalling the fact that p in 
response to an appropriate inquiry, we do not infer that p on the basis of our 
reason or evidence, or from anything more ‘epistemically basic’. Were it not 
for the adjunctive self-ascriptive step in the procedure, we could happily take 
this as a sufficient explanation of epistemic immediacy.  
The options with regard to self-ascription from the discussion above are: 
(i) a jugdement is automatically self-acriptive, as in the case of self-ascriptive 
memory (i.e. no additional transition is required); (ii) the transition is 
inferential but not in the weighty sense implied by the two-component view; 
and (iii) the transition is non-inferential (e.g. it is ‘reflective’).  
  Automatic self-ascription (i) in factual memory would require the 
support of an additional thesis that guaranteed a connection between memory 
experience and factual memory. A form of (non-doxastic) Evidentialism, for 
instance, might fulfil that function, but we have ruled it out as implausible. A 
strong natural correlation between instances of factual memories and their 
corroborative memory experiences might also fulfil the function, but given what 
we have said about factual memory, the correlation is unlikely to be strong 
enough to explain epistemic immediacy.  
The second suggestion (ii) trades on differences between notions of 
inference, and was discussed in the previous section. If epistemic immediacy is 
simply matter of whether the subject’s transition is an inference under one 
description, then explaining the subject’s transition under a different description 
of inference will be a quick response to the problem. If the critic’s concern is 
that inference is of the two-component variety, then one can suggest that one-
component (classical computer) variety of inference does not threaten epistemic 
immediacy. However, the difference between one-component and two-
component views of inference was intended to help us settle the matter of 
whether a procedure can be both inferential and psychologically immediate. It 
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was not intended to support the idea that some inferences are epistemic and 
some are not.183  
An example of non-inferential transition (iii) can be seen in Boyle’s 
(2011) suggestion that instead of moving (non-accidentally) between belief 
contents, the subject moves:  
 
from believing P to reflectively judging (i.e., consciously thinking to himself): I 
believe P. The step … will not be an inferential transition between contents, but 
a coming to explicit acknowledgement a condition of which one is already 
aware. (Boyle 2011, p. 5) 
 
Boyle’s response to the problem grants a version of the one-component view of 
inference, and so prevents the second option being exploited, unless one is 
willing to argue that one can infer p from p.184 However, if Boyle’s reflective 
transition is conscious, or perhaps voluntary—that is, a natural reading of 
reflection—then it fails to meet the Psychological Immediacy condition.185 And 
while Boyle’s suggestion is an ingenious way around some difficulties faced by 
inferential view, there is no disguising the fact that the subject performs an 
‘epistemic’ transition of some kind (see §3.3).  
It has, in fact, been argued that Transparency accounts are not a good fit 
for any form of immediacy. The concern, broadly speaking, is that the subject 
needs to reason her way from the judgement that she ought rationally to believe 
that p to the conclusion that she believes that p (Cassam 2014, p. 6). To varying 
degrees, even if the objection is effective against some Transparency views (e.g. 
Moran 2001)186, it misses its mark for both Byrne’s (e.g. 2005, 2011a) and 
																																																								
183 Even though this sometimes appears to be the suggestion in some literature (e.g. McNeill 2014). 
184 Inferring p from p is both possible and valid as noted above. The assumption that we cannot is another 
indication that our notion of inference still needs some development. 
185 There are a number of objections to the general position are not immediately relevant here. 
186 It is not entirely clear that it is, although this appears to be the kind of approach Cassam (2014) has in 
mind.  
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Boyle’s (2011) accounts. 187  (Byrne’s account, in particular, has a promising 
explanation of psychological immediacy.) Construed more broadly, however, 
Cassam’s concern can be understood as follows: no matter which way it is 
dressed, some epistemic transition is required that makes claims to epistemic 
immediacy difficult to maintain on Transparency approaches. This should be 
conceded in all of the cases discussed except for self-ascriptive memories. 
However, there is to my knowledge no Transparency approach that has made 
use of this explanation.  
 We can conclude from this section that, of the three options, only one—
(i) Automatic self-ascription—is a promising candidate for both psychological 
and epistemic variants of Immediacy, although there is no suggestion of this 
possibility in the literature under discussion.188 Of the remaining two options, 
(ii) is plausibly psychologically immediate, that is, given a specific view of 
factual recall, but not epistemically immediate; and although (iii) strictly 
speaking meets epistemic immediacy by eschewing inference, it is not 
psychologically immediate (and is potentially neither). The discussion of 
memory here has left us in no worse a position than before in general, and in a 
better position with regard to the inferential Transparency view: we now have a 
more complete explanation of how the account can explain psychological 
immediacy. 
At this point it is noteworthy that something in the structure of the 
Transparency approach appears to preclude supporting both forms of 
immediacy at the same time. I return to this issue in Ch. 5. In the next section, I 
turn to the Epistemic Security condition (E). 
 
 
 																																																								
187 Cassam (2014) chooses not interact in detail with either account, although he does respond to Byrne’s 
account elsewhere (forthcoming). His main concerns with the position, however, do not focus on the 
question of immediacy. 
188 Evans’s brief remarks about the subject being ‘ipso facto’ in a position to assert that she believes that p 
suggest he has something in mind, although this is not fleshed out. 
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4. Epistemic Security 
 
In this final section of the chapter, I consider whether the epistemology of 
factual memory might help to explain the Epistemic Security thesis (E). After 
some brief initial remarks, I consider three ways in which one might conceive of 
the epistemic security of self-knowledge being explained, at least in part, by 
factual memory, given our formulation of the criterion in chapter two: (i) a 
marked increase in the reliability of the procedure in the first-person case; (ii) a 
marked difference or improvement in justification in the first-person case, and 
(iii) immunity from error through misidentification (IEM); and (iv) improving 
the deliberation-resistance of beliefs. I first address some potential initial 
concerns about an attempt to explain (E) via the epistemology of memory.  
 The idea of memory providing a first-person epistemic advantage may 
strike some as odd. A quick look at a list of memory biases might leave one 
feeling that memory is barely deserving of one’s trust, let alone being a plausible 
candidate for bestowing epistemic advantage. We are susceptible to false 
memory implantation (Loftus 1975); have a tendency to believe events are 
more predictable once we know about them—that we ‘knew it all along’ 
(Roese and Vohs 2012); that repeated statements are more likely to be true 
(Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino 1977); that the past was rosier than it was 
(Mitchell and Thompson 1994); and that the choices we made are better than 
those we did not make (Mather and Johnson 2000). On top of this, we 
systematically compress or expand time (e.g. Burt, Kemp, and Conway 2001), 
and rearrange the order of events (2003). The list of biases that effect our ability 
to recall the events of the past is extensive (see Ch. 1). Some take this as a sign 
that there are no accurate memories at all.189 And if memory is epistemically 
flawed in this fundamental respect, then there is little hope that it could help us 
to explain any first-person privilege.  
																																																								
189 Martin Conway argued for the claim at the Epistemic Innocence Conference, University of Birmingham 
(2013).  
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 There are a number of things to say against this worry. The first is that 
the general reliability of memory is crucial for the possibility of (memory) 
knowledge (Senor 2014).190 And even if we wanted to adopt a neutral position 
with regards to assessing the reliability of memory, an investigation into its 
reliability ‘would have to make use of beliefs about the past’:  
 
Our memory is not one more informational device which we can use or not as 
we please: it is fundamental to all cognitive transaction, including any that 
would be involved in establishing the reliability of memory … An agnostic 
about memory could not even begin to determine which of his memories he 
should accept and which he should suspect. (Owens 1999, p. 313f.) 
 
Empirical investigations of the variety that provide fascinating and useful 
information about our ability (or otherwise) to recall accurate information in 
certain contexts will not inform us on the question of the memory’s general 
reliability (Senor 2014).  
 Secondly, imbalances in retention and recall, such as those listed above, 
are not all of the same kind, and do not all go against the subject in terms of 
reliability. From the sample list above, the knew-it-all-along effect (hindsight 
bias) looks plainly confabulatory, whereas the tendency to think the choices we 
make are better than rejected choices (choice-supportive bias) looks, 
potentially, to have an important epistemic role on top of its pragmatic benefits: 
it is difficult to see how one could stand in the right kind of relation to one’s 
decisions if one thought from the outset that the matter of whether they were 
correct had not already been settled. Some memory effects appear to place the 
subject in a position where information encoded as relevant to that subject is 
more readily available. This kind of memory effect is worthy of attention when 
considering whether memory has anything to contribute when it comes to 
																																																								
190 The term ‘memory knowledge’ (used here in Senor 2014), like ‘memory belief’ is misleading. Memory 
is not a ‘source of learning, discovering, establishing’ (Ryle 1949, p. 249). 
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explaining perceived asymmetries between first-person and third-person 
judgements.  
 Finally, throughout the preceding chapters we have come across a 
number of ways in which the epistemology of memory contributes to an 
explanation of an epistemic feature of self-knowledge: it helped to complete the 
explanation of how a non-deliberative Transparency procedure can fulfill an 
implication of Epistemic Security (Ch. 3); it explains how a non-deliberative 
Transparency procedure might be in part epistemically immediate (Ch. 3, and 
above); and on some views, memory appears to bestow a kind of warrant (see 
above). In short, there are a number of options worthy of consideration. In the 
next section, I consider whether epistemically beneficial memory effects might 
be among them. 
 
 
4.1 Epistemically beneficial memory effects 
One way of thinking about improving epistemic security is in terms of whether 
some aspect or function of memory makes first-person judgements more 
reliable. In this section I explore two candidate memory effects that appear to 
improve reliability in recall for memory content that has been encoded as 
relevant to the subject (although a number of effects appear to be relevant to 
questions in this area).191 These are the self-referencing effect (SRE) and the self-
generation effect (SGE).  
The self-referencing effect’ (SRE)—or family of related effects (Klein 
2012)—suggests that ‘relating information to oneself is a successful encoding 
strategy’ (Gutchess et al. 2007). Judgements that we judge to be related to 
ourselves see ‘increased levels of memory compared to making semantic 
judgements or relating the information to another person such as one’s mother 
or Johnny Carson’ (p. 822). Researchers dispute over which model best 
explains the effect, the degree to which the effect is robust, and whether it is a 																																																								
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unitary phenomenon. However, although findings across the literature vary, a 
meta-analysis (Symons and Johnson 1997) concluded that ‘the SRE does occur 
with highly significant reliability’, and that ‘SR was superior to semantic and OR 
[i.e. other referencing] encoding in facilitating memory’ (p. 386).192 
The generation effect, or self-generation effect (SGE), suggests that 
memory of self-generated content is better than externally generated content 
(Slamecka and Graf 1978), so that, for instance, words that are generated by a 
subject are ‘better remembered’ (p. 592) than the same words when the 
subjects read them. The effect is a robust over a variety of conditions and is 
related to research concluding that memory of problems that are solved by a 
subject is better than when a subject merely remembers the solution (Jacoby 
1978).  
 The upshot of the two effects is that subjects, as a rule, are (a) better at 
retaining and recalling information that is relevant to themselves than either 
information that is relevant to others, or that is person-neutral, and (b) are 
better at retaining and recalling information that they have generated themselves 
over information that they have come across (e.g. read). One might be inclined 
to say on the basis of these results that subjects have a clear advantage when it 
comes to the retention and retrieval of information deemed to be about, or 
produced by themselves. And this looks like an initially promising response to 
the epistemic security thesis in two respects: (i) it can plausibly account for why 
judgements about ourselves are more reliable; and (ii) it can plausibly account 
for why we favour cases in which we have made up our minds (see Ch. 3). 
 Two related concerns are (1) that there may be just as many imbalances 
that negatively affect a subject’s ability to acquire knowledge about her mental 
states, and (2) given this possibility how can we demonstrate to the Parity 
theorist that knowledge is easier to come by in the first-person case without 
entering into an empirical dispute. One may respond to the first worry by a 
producing a taxonomy of retention and recall imbalances that would allow for 																																																								
192 That is, in the literature reviewed for the analysis. 
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an analysis of which positively or negatively affect memory that relates to the 
self. However, it would be open to competing conceptual analyses, and since 
some cognitive biases are explicitly memory related while others are implicitly 
memory related, it would be a complicated undertaking, and certainly cannot 
be attempted here. It is also, rightly or wrongly, unlikely to satisfy many 
philosophers (in particularly the notional Parity theorist). While such an 
exercise is promising, then, we should see if there is anything in the 
philosophical treatment of memory that allows for an understanding of how 
self-knowledge could be epistemically privileged.193 In the next section, I will 
consider whether the positive epistemic status bestowed on some the 
epistemologies of memory with which we have been concerned, might be used 
to explain the feature.  
 
4.2 Epistemic security and positive epistemic status 
One way to conceive of what is epistemically distinctive about self-knowledge, 
concerns the strength and/or source of justification (see Ch. 2). Jordi Fernández 
(2013) suggests that both ‘the source of my justification for my beliefs about … 
[mental] states’ and ‘its strengths or robustness’ need explaining (Fernández 
2013, p. 4): in Special Access, first-personal justification ‘relies on neither 
reasoning nor behavioural evidence’ (p. 5); and in Strong Access, first-personal 
justification is ‘stronger’ (p. 6). This is not the correct way to characterize 
Epistemic Security (see Ch. 2). However, focus in epistemology has turned to 
epistemic warrants and entitlements, rather than only justification, and the view 
is not incommensurate with the suggestion that a subject’s beliefs about her own 
mental states are more likely to result in knowledge than her beliefs about the 
mental states of others (see Ch. 2), as long as the notion of justification is taken 
broadly, for instance, to mean something like ‘positive epistemic status’.  
																																																								
193 We have, of course, covered in some depth an attempt to explain (E) in terms of reliability—namely in 
Byrne’s (2005. 2011a) account. However, the mechanism responsible for increased reliability is the self-
verifying nature of the schema. 
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 The main aim of this section is to show that—on the assumption that one 
(or both) views of memory that meet the features outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter is correct—the epistemology of memory can explain how first-
person justification is both ‘stronger’ and arises from a different source. The 
view of factual memory most likely to fulfill this condition is Conservatism. 
While it is a plausible view, some of its consequences are considered unusual, 
and so its merits require emphasis. One way to do that is to show that moderate 
Preservationism and moderate Conservatism are closer than some literature 
suggests.  
One might see belief as an ‘epistemic commitment’ (like a promise or 
contract) in that once the commitment has been made it provides a reason to do 
what has been promised ‘over and above any which might have led [one] to take 
on that commitment in the first place’ (Owens 1999). However, the analogous 
view of practical decision-making looks false when it comes to ‘Auto-promising’ 
(pp. 320f.). If one decides to do something that one later realizes is a silly idea, 
one’s having decided to do it gives one no special reason to persist (p. 321). 
And so it is with belief. Because warrant bestowed by memory on the 
conservative’s view is a prima facie warrant, the objection does not quite hold. 
If information comes to light that throws a subject’s belief into doubt, that 
prima facie warrant is defeated. Even if the objection did work, one need not 
view Conservatism that way.  
One might try to understand it, for instance, by appeal to the ‘Reidian 
principle that we are prima facie entitled to presume, of any belief, that it is 
well-formed and well-maintained and so is worthy of trust’ (McGrath 2007, p. 
16). On this view, Conservatism offers a plausible response to a question that 
Preservationists (and Evidentialists)194 find difficult to answer: Is it rational for 
me to retain a belief when it was poorly formed, but my reasons for believing it 
is poorly formed are no longer available? 
																																																								
194 Both doxastic and non-doxastic forms of Evidentialism. For a detailed discussion see Owens (1999) and 
McGrath (2007) 
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On the Preservationist view, memory preserves belief content along 
with the ‘probative and motivational’ force of the evidence (see Owens 1999), 
thus allowing the evidence itself to be relinquished. This means that one is 
rational to believe that in the absence of defeating conditions (such as evidence 
against p) just as long as one was rational to acquire the belief that p in the first 
place. The difficulty is that once we are entitled to relinquish the reasons for our 
beliefs, the evidence that would usually allow one to weed out one’s past errors 
is no longer available.  
Thus, even in cases where one’s ‘present self’ is particularly careful, one 
will often have no basis on which to doubt one’s retained beliefs. On the face of 
it, the Preservationist answers ‘no’ to our question, since memory only 
preserves one’s past rationality. However, since one has no (subjectively 
available) grounds on which to abandon the belief, this is an unintuitive 
response: either one is somehow rational to retain the belief in spite of its 
questionable provenance, or one must be willing to abandon great swathes of 
historical ‘knowledge’ (see McGrath 2007).  
One response on behalf of Preservationism is to deny that retaining the 
belief in this case is rational but admit that it must be, blameless. However, 
because this blamelessness is epistemic, 195  the response still amounts to the 
conferral of positive epistemic status upon a belief that one ought not rationally 
to have adopted (see McGrath 2007, pp. 5f.). The result is surprising but 
plausible in the face of alternatives, and some versions of Preservationism 
concede the result, at least in a restricted class of cases (see Owens 1999, p. 
322).196 
If this is correct, as I have suggested, then we have a potential, and 
independently plausible, way in which memory can confer positive epistemic 
																																																								
195 It is ‘not moral or prudential’ (McGrath 2007, p. 6). 
196 ‘if it is reasonable for me not to reconsider my belief in Hitler’s suicide, I can’t be irrational in continuing 
to believe it, though the belief itself may be quite irrational’ (p. 322). Owens’s suggests the result is not 
peculiar to memory, but the general point that ‘a subject may be entitled to think that a belief can be 
justified when, in fact, it cannot’ (p. 325), although the Reidian principle (above) provides a more complete 
explanation for the ‘epistemic luck’ and makes memory the standard case (Ibid.). 
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status, and with it a possible response to a Special Access view: the source of 
epistemic status is a different source, for example, to the original evidence. 
Such positive status need not be conferred in all cases of belief, and the defeating 
conditions can ensure that it is not (see McGrath 2007, p. 17–19). But if we are 
willing to accept Conservatism, then a kind of positive epistemic status can be 
conferred, in appropriate cases, that is, provided in cases where beliefs are 
retained. In other words, it is a reply to the Special Access that is plausible in 
the absence of a negating argument. (How one might fit this into a specific 
theory, or theories, of self-knowledge is a matter for elsewhere.)  
Conservatism holds that believing—sans defeating conditions—confers 
rationality. So we might ask how the positive epistemic status conferred by 
believing interacts with any residual positive epistemic status bestowed by 
retained evidence. One concern is that the former combines with the latter 
(McGrath 2007, p. 20) effectively awarding retained beliefs ‘an extra point’ 
(Owens 1999, p. 321). This concern is the ‘extra boost’ objection to 
Conservatism. One response to the objections is to suggest that defeating 
conditions for the ‘bonus’ epistemic status include, roughly, 197  that the 
conditions that bring about the conferral of a positive epistemic boost include a 
‘lack of special information about her past evidence’, and since in ‘ordinary 
mature adults, long-stored memory beliefs comprise the bulk of beliefs’, and 
would appear to meet this condition, we might take Conservatism to be a good 
epistemology of memory (McGrath 2007, p. 21f.).  
There are, however, reasons to reject this response to the epistemic 
boost objection if one takes seriously the dynamics of memory and the 
importance of the first-person perspective in rationality (McGrath 2007). For at 
times one forgets and later recalls the evidence for one’s beliefs, and there are 
no strict limits on how many times one can oscillate between the two. Far from 
making the Conservatism more plausible, having memory confer and withdraw 
an epistemic status as bespoke to the demands of individual absent-mindedness, 																																																								
197 McGrath offers this as an incomplete suggestion (2007, p. 21). 
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would make memory an odd thing indeed. There is another way. In other cases, 
such as testimony (on some views), one may obtain prima facie epistemic 
entitlement for believing that p just because one is provided with that 
information in the absence of defeating conditions. If, in addition, one is 
provided with a subject’s evidence in support of p, plausibly one has an 
additional warrant: firstly (i) testimony; secondly (ii) reasons that directly 
favour p (see McGrath 2007, p. 19). We can continue to add sources of 
warrant—perhaps one now happens upon (iii) perceptual evidence in addition 
to (i) and (ii)—such that the rationality of the belief is multiply-determined.198 
Multiple-determination is not abnormal. As long as the reasons in favour or 
believing that p (regardless of their source) are not incompatible, the 
justification-strengthening property prima facie warrant in the memory case is no 
more concerning than if one were to both hear second-hand and see first-hand 
that something is the case. Neither way offers a complete and robust defence of 
Conservatism, but they do show that a number of options are available to 
diminish concerns about its apparent consequences. If we are looking for a 
modest epistemic contribution, then Conservatism arguably provides plausible 
answers to both Special Access and Strong Access. 
 
4.3 Immunity from error 
A third route has been touched upon with regards to memory experiences 
(above). Some memories appear to be ‘self-specifying’ and are thus arguably 
‘immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun’ 
(IEM). Judgements that are IEM are meant to exhibit the following 
‘property’—they do not: ‘involve a identifying a particular person as oneself 
because the sources of information on which they are based are such that they 
can only provide information about oneself’ (Bermúdez, forthcoming). 
Possession of the property is one way that first-personal can be epistemically 																																																								
198 McGrath (2007) suggests that over-determination might solve the problem in another way—namely, that 
additional sources of warrant do not provide an epistemic boost. Either way, it can be agreed that ‘the 
mathematics of rational entitlement is not … simple’ (p. 20). 
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privileged or distinct, and is therefore one way in which we might consider 
attempting to explain Epistemic Security. The IEM property is usually 
associated with ‘introspection and somatic proprioception’ (Bermúdez 2013, p. 
212), since the information from these sources typically ‘could not but be about 
the thinker’ and hence such judgements are identification-free’ (Ibid.) However, 
it has been argued that past-tense judgements based on autobiographical 
memory possess (IEM) (Bermúdez 2012), or at least some of them (2013, 
forthcoming). The obvious cases of memory judgements that possess the 
property IEM are those that are ‘explicitly’ self-specifying cases (Bermúdez, 
forthcoming), such as ‘I remember skiing’. These are of interest, but of limited 
use to the current inquiry: (i) we don’t often retain the evidence for a belief (in 
this case acquaintance with an event), and (ii) such judgements will not meet the 
Transparency desideratum. Things can be improved with regards to (ii) if non-
explicitly self-specifying can possess the IEM property. It has been argued 
(Bermúdez 2013, forthcoming) that that they can. If things can be improved 
with regard to the first concern (i), then the IEM property offers a substantive 
explanation of Epistemic Security, as well as a potential solution to some of the 
difficulties posed by other Transparency methods with regards to Immediacy. (I 
return to this issue in the next chapter.) 
 
4.4 Deliberation-resistant attitudes 
As we saw in chapter three, one of the main concerns about the inferential 
transparency view is that the procedure is only a good indicator of one’s mental 
states at the moment one completes one’s attempt to reason in accord with the 
doxastic schema (see Ch. 3; Gertler 2011a). While I argued that the 
epistemology of memory is crucial to the success of that approach, I did not 
show how the correct epistemology might make a distinctly positive 
contribution to our epistemic situation. I will now describe how this is possible.  
 The plausible solution to Gertler’s (2011a) concern has two parts: 
firstly, that the standard way to deploy the doxastic schema is in its non-
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deliberative (mnemic) form; and secondly, that a retained beliefs act as a block 
on further deliberation. These two factors offer an explanation of how the 
procedure can be a reliable way to assay one’s beliefs at a time other than the 
completion of the procedure. This explains how the self-knowledge procedure 
can be a reliable. It does not, however, explain how ensuring that one has the 
right epistemology of memory in place might positively contribute to one’s 
epistemic situation (i.e. over and above completing an explanation of the how 
procedure could work).  
One way of reframing the issue is this. Assume that the doxastic schema 
is, descriptively, our main method of knowing our minds. Since its self-verifying 
nature leaves the subject almost infallible with regards to her beliefs, how could 
two subjects relying upon this method differ? 199  This is where one 
Preservationist approach to memory can help.  
Firstly, for any retained belief (Bp) the degree to which a subject is 
rational in holding that belief can vary. On Preservationism, memory preserves 
both the content of that belief and its rational force, such that if a subject S 
believes that p on the basis of evidence F, the force of F, but not F itself is carried 
with the belief. If the evidence is poor, then the force of F will be weak, and 
vice versa. David Owens describes the feature in terms of ‘cognitive inertia’: 
  
The cognitive inertia of belief is a corollary of the rationality-preserving nature 
of memory. Where belief is rational, the inertial force of the belief is 
determined by the strength of the reasons which supported its adoption. 
(Owens 1999, p. 323) 
 
Since belief is a block to further deliberation, in order for deliberation to pose a 
challenge to the reliability of a procedure, there must be grounds for doubt. 
And, plausibly, the relation between cognitive inertia and grounds for doubt is 
proportionate—that is, the greater the cognitive inertia, the greater the grounds 																																																								
199 Thanks to Tom Stoneham and Keith Allen for pressing me on this issue.  
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for doubt required to re-open the inquiry into truth. And so, one way to 
improve the reliability of the method with regards to assaying one’s state prior 
to the initiation of the procedure is to ensure that the grounds for one’s beliefs 
are strong. Thus, the more careful one is when initially making up one’s mind, 
the more reliable the doxastic schema will be as a procedure for detecting one’s 
mental states prior to the onset of the self-knowledge procedure.  
 One might object that cognitive inertia does not always originate from 
careful reasoning.200 A subject might be prone to quick, confident decisions, or 
slow and thorough, but in both cases one’s processes could be badly affected by 
unconscious bias. In such cases, even attempting to double check one’s steps 
may not help improve one’s first-order belief formation (see Kornblith 2011). 
However, such processes are still likely to improve the belief-detecting capacity 
of the procedure, by making it more likely that the belief in place prior to the 
initiation of the self-knowledge procedure has sufficient inertia to resist 
deliberative contamination.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have addressed the question of whether any light can be shed 
upon the purportedly distinctive features of self-knowledge by three common 
models of factual memory. The peculiarity of first-person access to memory is 
highly intuitive upon any of these three models, and particularly plausible upon 
views that allow a subject to rationally retain a belief without evidence. 
Immediacy is also plausible on such views. Perhaps most surprisingly, on all 
three models of memory, there are options to be explored with regards to 
improving one’s position, epistemically speaking. If one is willing to accept 
Evidentialism, then it is possible that one could be substantially immune to a 
certain kind of error; if one is a Conservative (and on some forms of 																																																								
200 ‘where a belief is irrational [cognitive inertia] is determined by some other factor. Either way, a belief, 
once acquired, constitutes a psychological obstacle to its own revision’ (Owens 1999, p. 323) 
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Preservationism), memory is the source of a distinctive positive epistemic 
status; and on Preservationism, one can improve the reliability of the doxastic 
schema with regards to one’s ability to assay beliefs one has in place prior to the 
initiation of the self-knowledge procedure.  
 The result of the inquiry into whether the epistemology of factual 
memory can be thought to explain what we take to be special about self-
knowledge has revealed a surprisingly broad range of options even in the most 
difficult cases. Although I have illustrated how some of these features may fit 
into theories of self-knowledge, I have not argued specifically for a theory based 
upon a model of memory. In the next chapter I make use of some of these 
features discussed in this chapter to demonstrate that a fairly standard case of 
doxastic self-knowledge can suitably be described as kind of recollection. I then 
outline a theory of doxastic self-knowledge based on this case, which can be set 
against the desiderata from chapter two.  
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5 
 
Doxastic Recollection 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter one, I argued that our thinking about introspective failure and 
memory failure converges both in non-theoretical and theoretical contexts. 
This, I suggested, was good reason to consider whether our thinking about 
introspective success and memory success also converge. I suggested that a 
positive answer to that question would likely require a positive response to a 
question of whether memory can help to explain what we take to be special 
about self-knowledge, and accordingly in chapter two I examined the plausible 
desiderata for any theory of self-knowledge. In chapter three I argued that the 
success of a prominent approach to explaining self-knowledge—the 
Transparency approach—is, in part, dependent upon a specific epistemology of 
memory. Since the epistemology of memory was found to be part of the 
explanation of why the Transparency approach—or a specific version of it—
fulfils some of main desiderata for a theory of self-knowledge, I explored, in 
chapter four, the extent to which the epistemology memory might be taken to 
explain the main desiderata for a theory of self-knowledge more generally. The 
result of this inquiry was a surprisingly broad range of options. Even in the most 
intuitively difficult cases, such as Epistemic Security, the options are 
considerable. What remains of the investigation is to see whether some of these 
findings can be brought together in a theory that might be set against the 
desiderata outlined in chapter two.  
 The discussion so far has been heavily weighted towards the 
Transparency approach to self-knowledge. While there is much in this approach 
that is valuable, its use as an example can mute the potential contribution of 
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memory in the following respect: there are at least partial explanations for a 
number of our stated desiderata already available within the structures of 
individual Transparency accounts. So, for example, Epistemic Security and 
Peculiarity are meant to be explained by the world-to-mind inference on (a 
version of) what I have called the inferential Transparency view; and Epistemic 
Immediacy is intended to be explained by ‘reflection’ on (a version of) what I 
have called the deliberative Transparency view. While there may be a good case 
for the contributory role for memory in some of these accounts (see e.g. Chs. 
3–4), merely filling out some missing detail in other accounts diminishes the 
potential to highlight how explanatorily apt the epistemology of memory can be 
for our thinking in this domain.  
 In this final chapter, I consider the degree to which it is plausible to see 
self-knowledge, in the case of belief, as a kind of recollection. Key to this will be 
presenting a standard case of doxastic self-knowledge that is plausibly 
describable in terms of recollection. Once I have presented this case, I argue 
that a theory of doxastic self-knowledge with the main explanatory work being 
done by an appropriate epistemology of memory can fulfil not only the main 
criteria, as discussed in chapter four, but a good range of secondary criteria (i.e. 
ideal and additional desiderata).  
I first highlight a problem of self-ascription in literature on the 
Transparency approach that has been a motivating force behind a number of 
Transparency accounts (§1). I frame this in terms of an assumption that ought to 
be questioned. While it ought to be questioned, doing so here will also serve the 
additional purpose of bringing into sharp relief the explanatory aptness of 
memory in this domain. In §2, I argue for weaker characterisation of the self-
ascriptive requirement of Transparency accounts of self-knowledge. In §3, I 
offer a sketch of a theory that can be placed against the explanatory desiderata 
discussed in chapter two. In §4, I measure the success of the theory against a 
range of desiderata. Finally, in §5, I consider some possible objections to the 
proposal and outline some the limits of the approach. 
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1. The Transparency–Transition problem 
 
It has become orthodox in literature on the Transparency approach to suppose 
that something important is missing from Evans’s (1982) brief remarks about 
self-knowledge (see e.g. Byrne 2005, 2011a; Boyle 2011; Cassam, 
forthcoming). In chapter one, I suggested that, at base, the ingredients of any 
account of introspection must include something like the capacity for correct, 
usually time-sensitive, attribution of some fact of the matter about oneself, to 
oneself. Evans’s remarks suggest that all there is to trying to assay whether one 
believes that p, is to consider whether p is the case (p. 225). And so, what is 
sometimes thought to be missing in Evans’s remarks is a means of getting from 
one conclusion—namely a conclusion about the ‘world at large’ (Boyle 
2009)—to a conclusion about oneself. In other words, an independent act of 
self-attribution.  
The worry, I take it, stems from a legitimate puzzle about Transparency, 
here expressed by Richard Moran (2003):  
 
how can a question referring to a matter of empirical psychological fact about a 
particular person be legitimately answered without appeal to the evidence 
about that person, but rather by appeal to a quite independent body of 
evidence? (Moran 2003, p. 413).  
 
But this puzzle and the recent orthodoxy come apart in several important 
respects. In order to see how, it will be helpful to rehearse some of Evans’s 
(1982) remarks on the matter:  
 
If someone askes me ‘Do you think there will be a third world war?,’ I must 
attend in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would 
attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ 
(Evans 1982, p. 225) 
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Let us say that, following Evans’s guidance, one is asked what one thinks, and 
attends to the appropriate outward phenomenon. On the basis of a series of 
unsettling events around the globe, one concludes that there will indeed be a 
third world war. Since the conclusion that there will be a third world war is not 
a conclusion about oneself, it might be tempting to think that it is no longer 
obvious, after all, that this is procedure ‘automatically’ places one in a position 
to make an assertion about one’s belief. One may be further tempted to 
speculate about what the missing step might be that takes a subject from the 
former conclusion to the latter (cf. Byrne 2011a, p. 203). At this point one has, 
to a greater degree, restricted the kinds of answers that are available.  
The problem, I think, must be based on hyperbole. For the picture 
suggests that the subject can attend to the relevant task competently, and still 
find herself in a position in which her conclusion has no obvious—that is, 
conscious first-person—connection to what she thinks. The transition that 
occurs after the conclusion about the world, then, can be described as an 
additional inferential step, a non-inferential step, or left a mystery. Since we are 
unlikely to accept a mystery, we are left with two approaches to rescuing the 
stranded subject. It is worth outlining some of the outstanding issues with both 
of these approaches.201  
 
1.1 Inference and reflection 
One response to this Transparency puzzle is to suggest that the missing step is a 
non-accidental shift between the belief contents, ‘p’ and ‘I believe that p’ (Boyle 
2011, p. 4). That is, it is an ‘inference from world to mind’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 
203) on an minimal view of inference (see Ch. 4).202  If one takes such an 
inference to present a ‘serious problem’ (Byrne 2011a), to be ‘mad’ (Boyle 																																																								
201 There are varieties of both, so I will stick to the examples that have formed the basis of the discussion in 
previous chapters. 
202 ‘I infer that I believe that there will be a third world war from the single premiss that there will be one’ 
(Byrne 2011, p. 208) 
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2011), or to be ‘patently invalid’ (Cassam, forthcoming), one might either seek 
to refine the inferential process, or look for a step that is non-inferential. One 
way to refine the process is to have the inference mediated by psychological 
evidence (e.g. Cassam, forthcoming), and one approach to the non-inferential 
solution is to suggest that the subject engages in ‘reflection’—that is, she does 
not ‘transition between contents’ but comes ‘to explicit acknowledgement of a 
condition of which’ she is ‘already tacitly aware’ (Boyle 2011, p. 5).203 But it 
looks like both of these solutions leave us with ways in which we either already 
know what we believe rather than ‘detect’ what we believe, or they fail to 
complete the explanation of what is missing. 
 Among a number of concerns about the world-to-mind inference is 
whether this kind of inferential approach could yield knowledge. Broadly, the 
concern is whether the procedure is conducive to knowledge (cf. Byrne 2011a; 
see also Ch. 3). Knowledge-conduciveness on the view is, nonetheless, sketched 
as arising from two features of the procedure: (i) ‘inference from a premiss 
entails belief in that premiss’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 206) and (ii) the procedure 
typically ‘yields beliefs that are safe in the sense that they could not easily have 
been false’ (p. 206).204 However, one might still object to (i) in the following 
way:  
  
Logic teachers run thousands of sample inferences from premises that neither 
they nor anyone else in their right mind actually believes. In reductio 
arguments, one supposes that p, infers q from p, and then infers the falsity of p 
from the falsity or absurdity of q. There is obviously no question here of 
inference from a premiss entailing belief in that premiss (Cassam, 
forthcoming, p. 7).  
 
																																																								
203 In Ch. 4 I say that Boyle’s (2011) description of the minimal view of inference is not quite right. 
204 Byrne (2011a) acknowledges that the two features do not amount to a ‘demonstration that reasoning in 
accord with the doxastic is knowledge conducive’ (p. 207). 
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This kind of objection sees Byrne’s (2005, 2011a) inferential approach facing a 
difficulty similar to that already addressed with regard to Shah and Velleman’s 
(2005) Neo-Expressivism (e.g. Ch. 3). The objection in that case was that many 
things that occur following a stimulus, including a variety of spontaneous vocal 
emanations, are not good indicators of what one thinks, and so merely attending 
to these cannot be all there is to knowing one’s mind (see Moran 2011; also Chs 
1, 3). The corresponding difficulty for the Byrne’s inferential account is meant 
to be that thinking ‘p’ is not a good reason to believe that one believes p either; 
that is, unless one ‘already knows’ that ‘p’ ‘expresses’ one’s belief (Cassam, 
forthcoming); there may be many times when simply thinking ‘p’ is not a good 
indicator of what one believes. 
The objection has limited force, because reasoning in reductio cases sees 
‘p’ as hypothetical, and reasoning hypothetically from ‘p’ is not a standard case 
of concluding that p: the epistemic context provides one with a reason not to 
believe that that p.205 Thus, the proponent of the (non-mediated) inferential 
view is able to respond that reasoning hypothetically about ‘p’ is not a case of 
reasoning in accord with the self-knowledge procedure (in this case, the 
doxastic schema).206 However, we might take the spirit of the objection to be 
this: if one is meant to go directly from reasoning about ‘p’, to concluding that 
one believes that p, then, the explanation of knowledge looks incomplete. A 
different way to flesh out this concern is to ask—that is, at least in the 
deliberation case but plausibly in the non-deliberative case too—how it can be 
that one is able to detect when and/or whether one has reached the relevant 
conclusion, to thereby enable an inference to the second-order belief to take 
place.  
																																																								
205 Cf. Gertler’s (2011a) summary of the Transparency procedure in Ch. 2. 
206 Markos Valaris (2011) argues that Byrne’s account does not allow for hypothetical reasoning, although it 
is not clear why in reasoning hypothetically one would attempt to follow the same pattern of inference that 
one would follow in self-knowledge case. A recognition of the kind of task at hand appears to be a pre-
requisite of either both deliberative and non-deliberative versions of the schema, and there is no obvious risk 
of forming the belief that p when one has deliberately set ‘p’ out to be the kind of thing one is not supposed 
to believe in the present case. (Thanks to Professor Stoneham for a helpful discussion about these cases.)  
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If one is persuaded by the a line of thought, one might try completing 
the explanation by making the inference ‘mediated’ (Casssam, forthcoming) by 
conscious ‘mental occurrences’ such as, ‘judgements, feelings of conviction and 
experiences of agreeing’.207 These occurrences are meant to act as evidence that 
one believes that p.  
There are a number of things to note about this way of addressing the 
issue. Firstly, unlike Byrne’s (2011a) inferential model, the evidence-mediated 
inference is not self-verifying: feelings of conviction (etc.) about p do not entail 
that one believes that p, and so the procedure will not be guaranteed to produce 
true second-order beliefs. Secondly, because the doxastic schema explains 
Epistemic Security in terms of the strongly self-verifying nature of the 
procedure, the evidence-mediated view of inference will leave us without an 
explanation of that feature.208  Thirdly, it is not clear how such an adapted 
account would account for the Transparency of first-person thinking, since the 
source of the inference is no longer a judgement about the world, as such, but 
ultimately a judgment about one’s ‘feelings’. 209  Fourthly, our access to the 
relevant mental occurrences—and especially judgements—is assumed rather 
than explained.210  
On this fourth point, the options available for explanation include: (i) 
that knowledge of one’s own judgements is ‘unmediated, direct knowledge’, 
and (ii) that ‘knowledge of one’s own judgements is also inferential’, perhaps 
based on a ‘sense of cognitive ease or settledness’ (p. 11). But neither of these 
options immediately answers the question of how such an account would qualify 
as a way of knowing, since adding ‘direct’ to ‘knowledge’ alone contributes 
nothing to an explanation of how S knows that p; and it is not clear how a sense 																																																								
207 This is what Cassam (forthcoming) calls the ‘mediated inference model’ (MIM). 
208 This is fine as long as one adheres to the relevant arm of the Parity Thesis, although this has its own 
challenges (see Ch. 2).  
209 Cassam (e.g. 2014) has argued extensively against the Transparency approach to self-knowledge, but a 
number of the arguments are not affective against developments of the approach such as Byrne (2011a) and 
Boyle (2011), and do not directly tackle the phenomenon of Transparency that I have retained here as a 
desideratum. 
210 Cassam (forthcoming) recognises that the plausibility of the account will rely upon the account of 
knowledge of judgements.  
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of cognitive ease can be regarded as the grounds for an inference to the 
conclusion that one believes211 (especially, if concluding that p cannot do that 
work). The mediated-inference model, then, also faces the familiar objection—
namely, that listening to one’s thoughts and feelings—that is, without already 
knowing that they express one’s views—is a questionable, rather than sufficient, 
explanation of knowledge.  
 At this point we might begin to notice a pattern. Once one accepts that 
Evans’s (1982) routine leaves the subject stranded with a first-personally 
irrelevant belief or judgement ‘p’, and accepts that the self-ascriptive act is an 
inferential one, then one faces a choice: either one must accept that arriving at 
the conclusion involves a kind of self-knowledge for which one has not 
accounted,212 or one must prevent a regress by reference to direct knowledge or 
a psychological state. Neither response looks wholly convincing.  
One might instead turn to the reflective approach. But this approach 
faces a similar difficulty. On this view, the relevant state is ‘knowingly 
believing’, and the self-knowledge procedure is not a detection mechanism for 
one’s belief, but a way to make one’s tacit knowledge explicit (see Boyle 2011). 
Because the reflective procedure is not intended to reveal anything to the 
subject she does not already know, it can be objected there is a ‘sense in which 
subjects are omniscient about their own beliefs’ (Casssam, forthcoming, p. 14). 
Since explaining how one finds out what one believes (etc.) was meant to be the 
business of a theory, Boyle’s elegant (2011) proposal seems to miss the point. 
And since pointing to omniscience (alone) is an insufficient explanation of 
knowledge, this approach too leaves knowledge less-than-fully explained. As 																																																								
211 Cassam’s (forthcoming) point is that judgement is conceptually linked to belief. However, it is difficult to 
see how a cognitive sense of ease could play the same role, that is, if it is to be the basis of judgement. There 
is no obvious conceptual link between ‘ease’ and ‘judgement’. One may have a sense of cognitive ease when 
it comes to simple explanations that one knows to be false, for example. One may have been taught the 
Rutherforf-Bohr model of the atom, in one’s formative years, and find it ‘easy’ think about atoms in that 
way, while all the while knowing that it violates the Uncertainty Principle, and therefore cannot be the 
correct model. Having this latter information does not prevent one from feeling the ease and familiarity of 
representing atoms as tiny solar systems. Contrariwise, believing that Utilitarianism is the correct moral 
stance may well leave one feeling ‘uneasy’ in many day-to-day situations. Knowing that one believes is more 
than feeling easy or settled.  
212 Both Cassam (2014) and Stoneham (private correspondence) have raised similar points.  
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Ryle (1949) notes: ‘becoming conscious’ of something is not obviously the kind 
of thing one can use as a ‘final appeal’ when answering questions about how one 
knows (p. 143). 
The two options, then, have a somewhat limited explanatory appeal 
(since we have adopted an explanatory view of knowledge, this is a problem). 
Either one accepts that the subject is already in possession of some relevant 
knowledge, and awaits an explanation of that knowledge, or one accepts that 
one has not yet quite explained the subject’s knowledge. Neither option is 
terribly satisfying, and I do not aim, here, to offer a new defence of either 
approach.213 In the next section, instead, I make an effort to clarify the problem 
by pointing to some unusual features of what we might now call the 
Transparency–Transition assumption.  
 
1.2 The Transparency–Transition assumption 
In the last section I highlighted common obstacle in Transparency accounts of 
self-knowledge. I mentioned two attempts to respond to a Transparency puzzle 
that run into the similar difficulties. Part of the explanation for this difficulty is 
that both approaches appear to subscribe to the same assumption. On both 
accounts, the Transparency procedure involves two steps—first coming to a 
conclusion about the world and then activating a mechanism that allows one to 
move from that thought, to a subsequent thought about oneself. The unusual 
conceit is that without this latter step the subject has no way of being aware that 
the thought she has arrived says something about her. While this way of thinking 
about Transparent self-knowledge has clearly been seductive, it is in a number 
of cases misleading, and should not go unchallenged. Let us try to capture the 
assumption: 
  
																																																								
213 Works are forthcoming from the main proponents of both positions that will no doubt contain helpful 
clarification on these issues. 
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(TT) A subject engaged in Transparent cogitation cannot correctly 
attribute the output of that cogitation (t1), without a subsequent 
ascriptive transaction (t2) 
 
In self-knowledge cases, of course, the subsequent attribution is self-directed. 
So the (TT) assumption sees the subject engaged in a two-step procedure that 
always proceeds in the same manner.  
The assumption is unusual in a number of respects. It casts the subject as 
engaged with and responding to a query about herself, and coming up with an 
answer that she cannot recognise as an answer that refers to herself without the 
additional step. On the assumption that the notions of reflection and inference 
are more or less standard,214 it should be relatively unremarkable when the two 
elements of the procedure come apart, such that for instance the procedure is 
harmlessly curtailed. Unless the combination of the two elements in this case is 
irresistible—a matter that would need further explanation—there is no reason 
to suppose that a curtailment of the process would come across as especially 
odd.215 Here we can make use of an example:  
 
Petra asks Preeti whether she wants a slice of cake. Preeti considers whether 
cake is a desirable thing, and makes a call (t1). At this point Preeti’s thought 
process is curtailed, that is, prior to the completion of stage two (t2).216  
 
What is the best way to describe Preeti’s state of mind now? How will she 
respond to Petra’s question? On Byrne’s account, Preeti will think some 
thought along these lines: ‘Cake [or that slice of cake] is desirable’, but cannot 
																																																								
214 Although, please see note my earlier concerns on these matters (Chs 2,4). 
215 That is, unless the combination in the first-person case is irresistible, in which case this is another feature 
of self-knowledge in need of explanation. 
216 It has been noted that the desire case is unusual in that one can end up in Preeti’s predicament without 
any particular curtailment of the thought process (i.e. one sees the desirability of the cake, but the matter of 
whether on wants it is left open). I sympathise with the point, which I take to demonstrate a possible limit of 
the Transparency approach. Instead, we can have Petra ask something like ‘Do you think the desk is 
brown?’, and adjust the responses accordingly.  
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answer in a way that makes it directly clear to Petra that the conclusion she 
reached is in response to the specific question posed.217 On Boyle’s account, 
Preeti will already know whether or not she wants the cake, but will have 
nothing to say in response to the question anyway, because the belief that she 
desires cake has not been made conscious. Intuitively there is something wrong 
with both of these scenarios. The intuition the scenarios rub against, I take it, is 
that these are simple and ordinary cases of neglecting to infer or reflect; the 
kind of cases that would be explicable if one were to say: ‘I guess I didn’t think 
about it (enough, properly, or fully, etc.)’. If self-knowledge is really just 
putting into place a kind of reasoning supplemented by inference or reflection, 
as is the case these accounts, then there ought to be nothing more to these 
examples than there is to any other case of failing to think things through.218 The 
task now is to consider why it might intuitively be wrong in these cases to think 
otherwise.  
To attempt to clarify the intuition, we can first take some partly analogous 
scenarios that we might expect to occur on this model of thinking: 
 
(1) There is an exchange in which Jesse gives James a festive gift, which 
James accepts in good faith. However, James’s thought process is 
curtailed, and he doesn’t know for whom the present is intended.  
(2) Sam and Arjun are talking about what Bob thinks. Arjun poses this to 
Sam in the following way: ‘What does Bob think?’. Sam considers the 
relevant factors and concludes ‘p’. However, Sam’s thought process is 
curtailed, and Sam cannot attribute ‘p’ to Bob.  
 
Intuitively, at least, it does not seem that (TT) is true in case (1) because James 
has already accepted the gift and does not need an additional reason to recognise 
it as his. And it does not seem that (TT) is true in case (2) because Sam has 
																																																								
217 Of course, conversationally, Petra may take ‘cake is good’ to mean ‘yes please’. 
218 For example, a simple arithmetical equation.  
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already accepted the task as being a one about what Bob thinks. Any question of 
to whom the thought applies has already been settled. On the basis of these 
examples, one might venture to conclude that (TT) looks implausible as a 
general rule. So we might take it to be a feature of self-knowledge cases only. 
 Why should we accept that? The natural response may be to suggest that 
numbered examples above miss something important about a feature of first-
person thought, namely, that the thinking related to the questions whether p, and 
whether I think that p naturally elide. However, this would present a potentially 
unwelcome asymmetry between first-person and third-person thought: 
assuming that the examples above are roughly on target but are intuitively odd, 
accepting that they would be fine in first-person cases would now leave the first-
person with an apparent disadvantage.  
For those concerned that bare intuitions can be misleading, there are 
further reasons to suspect that there is something wrong with the pictures as 
presented. Firstly, the picture does not fit well with the activities that it is 
commonly assumed the subject is engaged in. Secondly, the pictures appear to 
presuppose a specific view of Transparency that is not obviously the right one. I 
will briefly outline both of objections.  
 
1.3 Deliberation and the TT assumption 
On both Byrne’s (2011a) and Boyle’s (2011) views, deliberation is a bone fide 
way of arriving at a conclusion that comprises the first step in our Transparency 
procedures. Philosophers are not always clear about what they mean when using 
bits of jargon, but on some fairly standard accounts of deliberation, it is the kind 
of thing that requires either conscious or tacit recognition of the task that has 
been set.  
 David Owens, for instance, suggests that deliberation is a conscious 
activity that aims at resolving an issue (2011, p. 262), and so it has the following 
features: (a) it is conscious in the respect that it ‘occupies the deliberator’s 
attention’; (b) it is an activity in so far as the deliberator is ‘trying to do 
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something … [such as] make a decision’; (c) it is directed at the resolution of an 
issue or question; and (d) typically it does this by focusing on the salient features 
of the world rather than psychological concepts (i.e. it is Transparent). (See 
Owens 2011, p. 262; Appendix 1, §8.) If this is broadly correct, then the 
subject—in directing her attention to the resolution of an issue or question—
must be consciously aware of that issue or question. If we take that issue or 
question to be ‘Do you think that p’, where the subject understands the referent 
of ‘you’, then subject’s predicament at the end of step one of the process is 
quite curious. She has been conscious all the while that she is attending to a 
question that refers to what she herself thinks, but is left with a conclusion, 
ostensibly about an altogether different matter, and is suddenly unable to view 
the answer as one that refers to her (i.e. unless she completes the second step). 
This would be a fairly specific, and quite unusual incapacity (self-knowledge 
failure or a type of acute amnesia, if one is so inclined). Had one not already 
bought into a particular assumption about transparency procedures, it would be 
natural to reject the possibility that this could reasonably describe the standard 
case of Transparent self-knowledge. Since the subject’s thought process is 
directed towards resolving an issue, she should ceteris paribus219 clearly already 
be in a position to resolve the matter to its proper conclusion—namely, a 
conclusion that respects the phrasing of the question, or pays due regard to the 
task at hand.  
Perhaps, however, it is wrong to accept that deliberation is a conscious 
process in the way implied by my comments above. After all, it is beginning to 
look as though models that suggest reasoning is best described as a fully 
conscious train of thought have missed something important: much of our 
thinking seems to fall beneath that level, and much reasoning that can be 
																																																								
219 There are a number of ways in which a subject can go wrong in such cases. She might for instance, reach 
no conclusion on the basis of the evidence, reach a conclusion on the basis of perverse reasoning, get 
distracted and not complete the task, etc. The point here is whether having completed one stage of a specific 
kind of task consciously directed at resolving a question about herself, an ordinary reasoned might fail to 
recognise the subject to which the conclusion refers.  
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described that way—at least in many day-to-day cases—is inefficacious220 (see 
e.g. Kahneman 2011). One might at least accept that if deliberation is a fully 
conscious train of thought, then it is much more rare than might once have been 
thought. If one does, then one might reject the idea that deliberation in ordinary 
self-knowledge procedures is likely to be of the fully conscious variety. (See 
Appendix 1 for further discussion.) In this case we need an alternative notion of 
deliberation. An alternative would not have the question always at the forefront 
of a subject’s mind or being ‘explicitly’ posed (Shah 2003, p. 466) by herself or 
another. However, even on this view of deliberation, the subject’s thinking 
cannot simply be a ‘stretch of directionless cogitation’. In order to be a case of 
deliberation—that is, the kind of activity that aims at settling an issue—the 
subject’s thinking must ‘manifest some recognition that this is the question that 
he is striving to answer’ (Ibid.).  
So, even without a notion of deliberation on which it is a fully conscious 
activity, it is difficult to see how a subject could end up in a situation in which—
that is, following a period of cogitation that manifests recognition of a question 
that refers to herself—not being able to recognise that the outcome of that 
cogitation as an outcome that refers to herself without some additional stage or 
step in her reasoning. 
 I do not mean to suggest here that such a sequence of cognitive 
transactions is not possible, or that it is not one method by which one could 
plausibly come about—other things being equal—knowledge of one’s mind. It 
is unlikely, however, unless one has already accepted the (TT) assumption, one 
will be inclined to think that the subject—in standard cases such as Evans’s 
example above—could get herself into a mess, from which she can only be 
extracted by putting into place some additional bit of reasoning.221 Why then, 
might one be tempted to think that this is the case? Perhaps the reason is that 
one has a particular view of Transparency. In the next section, I briefly outline a 																																																								
220 That is, the decisive elements in human reasoning are not always consciously available (Appendix 1; §9). 
221 It is also difficult to see how it would be possible, since she would (ostensibly) have little reason to engage 
in the second bit of reasoning if the original epistemic project has been lost.  
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small number of views of transparency to see if a motivation for the (TT) 
assumption can be garnered from them. 
 
1.4 Transparency and the TT assumption 
The general observation behind the Transparency of first-person thought, at 
least in the doxastic self-knowledge case,222 is that one can and typically does 
approach questions of what one believes without ‘essential reference’ to oneself 
or one’s belief (see Edgley 1969, p. 90; in Moran 2001; Appendix 1, §12). This 
in itself is no motivation for the (TT) assumption. So perhaps it can be located in 
more specific notions of Transparency. Below are outlines of three fairly 
standard notions of Transparency:  
 
(1) The questions ‘Do I think that p?’ and ‘Is p the case?’ are first-
personally indistinguishable (Edgley 1969, p. 90; in Moran 2001).  
(2) ‘I can know various aspects of … my own mental states by attending 
in the right way, not to anything “inner” or psychological, but to aspects 
of the world at large … there is in the normal case no other way to 
attend to them’ (Boyle 2011, p. 3). 
(3) ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe 
that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering 
the question whether p … whenever you are in a position to assert that 
p, you are ipso facto in a position to assert ‘I believe that p’ (Evans 1982, 
pp. 225f.) 
 
Nowhere in (1) to (3) is it stated or implied that one ought to adopt something 
along the lines of the (TT) assumption; a natural reading of (2) would suppose 
no further action would be required for knowledge of one’s mental states, and 
(3) explicitly states that by the very act of putting into operation the procedure 																																																								
222 Deliberative Transparency can come in a number of contrasting forms. One can, for instance, deliberate 
on ‘what I should believe’ or ‘what I do believe’ (cf. Shah and Velleman 2005).  
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for answering the question whether p, one is in a position to answer the 
question whether I believe that p. The conclusion that one might tentatively draw 
from this is that the requirement of (TT) must be extraneous to general 
characterisations of Transparency (at least those articulations here).  
 What the characterisations above suggest is a that thoughts about whether 
I believe that p and whether p elide in a way that sees the former give way, or to be 
settled by the latter, or that the decisive elements in one’s cogitations about the 
former are nothing more or less than the matters that settle the latter. But none 
of that rules out the fact that the subject can remain mindful of the original task, 
and none of it implies that there is a tendency to conclude one’s cogitations with 
a judgement that detaches the subject from her conclusion in a way that requires 
reunification at a later point.  
 The assumption (TT), then, is neither required or implied by fairly 
standard characterisations of Transparency; it is counter-intuitive to suppose 
that an ordinary subject would be prone to a kind of failure that (TT) implies 
given the kinds of activity she is undertaking and has ostensibly accepted; and on 
standard conceptions of one accepted route to responding to that task the 
subject engaging in the task must at least be sufficiently cognisant of the question 
she is striving to answer for the question to give direction to her thoughts. Why, 
then, ought we think that there is reason to accept the (TT) assumption? The 
answer, I suspect, is that it is evident that one can have a belief with the content 
‘p’, without realising that one believes that p. What this amounts to is that there 
must be some act or element of self-attribution for a subject’s beliefs to be 
recognised as her own. However, this neither requires nor implies that in 
standard cases of self-knowledge by Transparency procedure, the subject will 
typically find herself with a cognition that is not acknowledged as her own. In 
the next section, I will outline a way of fulfilling this condition that does not 
require that one accept the (TT) assumption.  
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2. Transparency and self-attribution 
 
In chapter one, I suggested that self-ascription is one of the few basic ingredients 
of introspection. If that is right, plausible self-ascription must be a part of any 
theory that aims to do the explanatory work of introspection. In §1 of this 
chapter, I argued against an assumed pattern of self-ascription that has been the 
cause of a number of disputes in the literature. Now I turn to what I take to be a 
more plausible way to characterise the requirement for self-ascription. In this 
section I argue that the correct way to characterise the general requirement of a 
theory to explain self-ascription is to dispense with the temporally ordered 
components implied by (TT). And, because I have accepted Transparency as a 
desideratum for a theory (see Ch. 2), I will need to provide a plausible case in 
which the output of a Transparency procedure leaves one in the same eventual 
position implied by (TT). I do this by describing a form of judgement that is a 
plausible product of a Transparency procedure and yet does not require an 
independent act of self-attribution.  
Not all thoughts or judgements require an independent act of attribution 
to be recognised as one’s own, but then not all thoughts are Transparent in the 
relevant sense. Cogito-like judgements, which are noted for their ‘contextually 
self-verifying’ properties, are notable also for their structurally self-ascriptive 
properties. Take an example from Burge (1996, p. 92): ‘I am thinking that 
there are physical entities’ (IT). Judgements like IT are infallible in the following 
sense: ‘One cannot err if one does not think it, and if one does think it one 
cannot err’. The combination of understanding the thought and engaging in it, 
make it true (p. 92). Because the judgement is also structurally self-ascribing, 
when one understands the thought, and engages with it, there is no question 
about to whom the thought refers. Such thoughts contrast significantly with 
what is assumed to be the case with thoughts resulting from the first stage of 
Transparency procedures. Those thoughts—conceived of as matters 
independent of the subject—require an additional step clearly not required in 
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cogito cases. However, since they are implausible candidates for Transparency 
judgements, and so they do not count against the (TT) pattern.  
Cogito-like thoughts are not the only variety not to require a second, 
ascriptive step. At least some thoughts arising from autobiographical memory, 
for instance, are argued to possess the same or a similar property: immunity 
from error through misidentification (IEM). It is doubtful that ‘logical’ 
immunity from error—that is, ‘strong IEM’—is a property of autobiographical 
memories.223 However, it is doubtful that any judgements possess that property 
(Bermúdez, forthcoming), and a weaker version of the property is still possesses 
the features relevant here. 
To avoid confusion with strong IEM, I will generally refer to ‘Auto-
identification’.224 Good examples of auto-identification come in the form of 
‘explicitly recollective’ autobiographical memories (Ibid.).225 However, these 
too can be poor candidates for judgements that might arise from a Transparency 
procedure, since they contain the first-person pronoun. (Judgements explicitly 
containing the first-person pronoun are unlikely to be accepted as 
‘transparency’ judgements.)226 Not all autobiographical memory judgements are 
‘explicitly recollective’, but at least some that are not ‘explicitly recollective’ 
still auto-identify.227 They auto-identify when they are past-tense judgements 
that have both an ‘experiential basis’—what I have discussed as acquaintance 
with an event, or cognitive contact (Ch. 4)—and their ‘present tense analog has 
the immunity property’ (Bermúdez, forthcoming).228 This is relevant because 
																																																								
223 The worry is this: ‘quasi-memories’ of someone else’s experience are a possibility. If they are a possibility 
‘then so are errors of misidentification’: so those judgements cannot be ‘logically immune’ (Bermudez, 
forthcoming).  
224  Following Bermudez (forthcoming) and Evans (1982) dichotomy: ‘identification-dependent’ and 
‘identification-free’. 
225 For example, ‘I recall falling over’. 
226 The matter is not so clear-cut given variation in notions of Transparency. It is notable, for instance, that 
Byrne’s (2011a) schema for intention starts from the premiss ‘I will Φ’.  
227 Bermúdez (2012) argued that autobiographical judgements all possess IEM, but considers this a mistake in 
Bermúdez (forthcoming). 
228 ‘They possess it [the relevant property] when, and only when, the recalled experiences are such that they 
would have warranted a present-tense judgment that would itself have had the immunity property … In this 
way, therefore, the immunity status of past-tense memory judgements is inherited from the epistemic 
features of the original experience’ (Bermúdez, forthcoming). 
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some autobiographical memory judgements that do not contain the first-person 
pronoun—and are thereby are plausible candidates for the kind of judgements 
that can be produced by the first stage of a Transparency procedure—will not 
require an independent act of self-ascription.  
This finding may have its own implications for the connection between 
memory and self-knowledge.229 However, because the main focus here is not 
autobiographical memory, I point to it in order to emphasise the fact that the 
pattern of cognitions implied by (TT) should not be adopted as a general 
characterisation of the self-ascription requirement, even in Transparency cases. 
Nevertheless, because we must build some means of self-ascription into our 
theory, here is an alternative to (TT) that captures the more general 
Transparency requirement for introspection: 
 
(TAC) A self-knowledge procedure that meets the Transparency 
condition must explain how ascription occurs.  
 
The main difference between (TT) and the Transparency ascription condition 
(TAC) is that the temporal ordering of cognitions suggested by (TT) has been 
removed. Even if the (TT) pattern occurs in some Transparency judgements, it 
is not the correct way to characterise the entire class of judgements in question. 
A certain class of judgements that can be produced by engaging a Transparency 
procedure do not require the second stage implied by (TT). We can conclude 
for the moment, then, that (TT) is a questionable assumption when measured 
against commonsense cases, when considering the kind of activity that a subject 
is engaging in, is neither required nor implied by characterisation of doxastic 
(and intentional) Transparency, nor does it correctly portray the full range of 
judgements that can issue from Transparent cognition.  
																																																								
229 Bermúdez discusses what he calls and ‘interdependence between memory and self-consciousness’.  
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 With (TAC) in place, we are now able to move on to outline the 
remaining part of a simple mnemic theory of self-knowledge, and to set it 
against the desiderata laid discussed in chapter two.  
 
 
3. Doxastic self-knowledge as recollection 
 
In chapter three we saw how, given an appropriate epistemology of memory, 
standard case of self-knowledge sees the subject recalling the fact that p (see also 
Byrne 2011a, p. 208). In the theory under discussion at that point, recalling that 
p was always the first of two steps. I have suggested above that this is wrong. In 
fact, there appear to be a number of cases in which the self-ascription is 
explained by other means.  
In §1, I suggest that—barring an unusual kind of amnesia or 
introspective failure—if the subject is mindful of the question to which she is 
attending, she will generally already be aware that the answer relates to her. 
This suggestion found support in common notions of how the appropriate 
shaping of a subject’s thinking in response to a question must at least involve 
some recognition that she is responding to that question (§1.2). In §2, I suggest 
that Transparent reasoning can issue in judgements that are auto-ascriptive 
without containing the first-person pronoun, thus bypassing the need for further 
attribution while still respecting the Transparency intuition. We can describe 
these cases as follows: 
 
(A) Task-identified cognitions 
(B) Auto-identified cognitions 
 
Both (A) and (B) are initially plausible cases of judgements that avoid the need 
for an independent act of self-ascription while meeting the self-ascription 
condition (TAC).  
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We might be tempted, therefore, to suggest that mnemic self-
knowledge is a kind of abbreviated Transparency procedure; one that sees the 
subject responding to an inquiry (from herself or another) while mindful of that 
inquiry (A) or responding to the question autobiographically (B). In both cases, 
the responses can be seen as responding to an (Evans-style) inquiry. Let us 
consider the example: ‘Do you think that the ball crossed the line?’ In the first 
case, the subject responds by considering whatever relevant facts she has at her 
disposal (e.g. what the experts say) and is mindful of the question. In the second 
case, the subject recalls something from her past that relates to the question, for 
example, an image of the ball and the line and their relative positions.  
 At least two problems become immediately apparent if one wishes to 
suggest that (A) and (B) are sufficient to explain standard cases of doxastic self-
knowledge. The first is that suggesting a subject is ‘mindful’—while no doubt 
the case—does not add a great deal to the explanation. The second—
highlighted in chapters three and four—is that factual memory and memory 
experiences are epistemically independent and, in the majority of cases, our 
reasons for believing are relinquished (see also e.g. Owens 1999) and therefore 
unavailable. Cases of (A) then are under-explained, and cases of (B) are relevant 
only in a tiny subset of cases. Where do we go from here? 
 The answer, I think, is that both cases say something important about 
how a subject might be seen to engage with this kind of inquiry successfully. 
While it is right to think that responding to the inquiry successfully ought not to 
be seen as avoiding a special kind of otherwise impending failure, it is not quite 
enough to suggest that the task alone guarantees a particular kind of success; or 
that our general competence in the face of such queries eliminates the need for a 
story about attribution. One way of completing the story—though not the only 
way—borrows from the structure of (B) cases while avoiding some of their 
deficiencies.  
 Thoughts of the (B) variety are auto-identifying due, in part, to their 
cognitive contact with some event in the subject’s history. This cognitive 
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contact can help to explain why subjects are able to competently respond to 
queries that are ostensibly a muddle of two subject matters: one about the 
world, and one about themselves. Following the Evans-style case: Subject S, 
when faced with and accepting a question like ‘Do you think that p?’, initiates 
whatever procedure she has at her disposal for answering the question, whether 
p. Doing so standardly requires that subject recognise the task with which she is 
faced. And that task, of course, is the former question rather than the latter. 
(One reason why Transparency is interesting is that one can and does answer 
the first question by considering elements decisive in answering the second 
question; not that one does not answer the first question, but answers the 
second question instead). The posing of the question—either by herself or 
another—is an event experienced by the subject, and one with which she has 
cognitive contact. Ordinarily, we have seen, cognitive contact is fickle. 
However, the nature of the task with which the subject is engaged requires that 
she be cognisant of that task: it is that recognition alone which prevents her 
response being ‘stretch of directionless cogitation’ (see above). In other words, 
the cognitive contact with the question–event is artificially maintained by the 
nature of the inquiry.  
 We can now introduce the relevant elements of (B) into (A) to provide a 
more complete explanation of task-identified cognitions (TIC):  
 
(TIC) Whenever a subject has cognitive contact with the experience 
prompting the task in which she is engaged, and that cognitive contact 
issues in the property of auto-ascription, the ensuing judgement requires 
no additional independent act of ascription. 
 
It is important to note that the presence of (TICs) does not suggest that there is 
no possibility of error at all. We can and do forget some activities in which we 
are engaged. In chapter one I mentioned the dangers of forgetting what one 
intends to do. If one can forget why one is minded to go upstairs, then one can 
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plausibly forget the kind of task one is engaged in when responding to Evans-
style queries. Most plausibly, one will be more likely to forget it if the task is 
prolonged, difficult, or if one is somehow distracted. Such failures do not entail 
a loss of cognitive contact with the relevant experience, but if there is such a 
loss, the result is not catastrophic: even in the absence of another method of 
keeping her task in mind230 such that she does not need to follow the pattern 
suggested by (TT) (there are options to be explored in that regard) the subject 
will merely need some additional method of attributing the result of the 
activity. So a subject can still know her mind in the absence of (TICs), although 
when she knows her mind via (TICs), the process has a number of advantages 
that (TT) processes do not have. A range of these advantages are outlined in the 
next section, however, (TICs) explain the theoretically supported intuition that 
once one consciously engages in—or manifests some recognition that one is—
responding to a particular question or issue, one is unlikely to have to ‘re-
attribute’ the issuing judgement.  
Since (TICs) apply to both deliberative and non-deliberative cases of 
doxastic self-knowledge, it will be helpful to briefly rehearse the suggestion 
(from Ch. 3) that the standard case of doxastic self-knowledge is non-
deliberative.  
  
3.1 Non-deliberative doxastic self-knowledge 
In chapter three we saw that the standard case of doxastic self-knowledge is 
non-deliberative. I mentioned a number of factors in favour of that conclusion. 
A fairly simple and straightforward objection to the alternative is that one 
clearly does not have to make up one’s mind each time one wishes to know 
what one believes.231 In many cases my mind is already made up and there is no 																																																								
230 The ordinary notion of attention looks like a promising alternative explanation. If a subject is paying 
attention to the task at hand, an explanation of the kind of potential failure implied by (TT) would be the 
burden of the opponent. Though, I will not attempt to flesh out this idea here. 
231 We should admit that, alone, this is not a good objection. The claim in favour of deliberation can be 
appropriated stated with deliberation as the most important case rather than the most frequent (see e.g. Boyle 
2011). (Whether we have good reason to accept this version of the claim is a different matter). 
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deliberation prior to self-ascription of a belief that p. In such cases, I simply 
recall the fact that p rather than consider the evidence (see Byrne 2011a, p. 208; 
Ch. 3, §3.1).  
 A more pressing difficulty with the alternative is that a Transparency 
procedure that allows for deliberation will ‘contaminate the result by possibly 
altering the state that one is trying to assay’ (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 507). 
The risk of contamination by deliberation means that affected Transparency 
procedures are only reliable guides to what one thinks at the end of the 
procedure, as opposed to what one thinks prior to its initiation (see Gertler 
2011a) and this leaves a feature of Epistemic Security unexplained: ‘If I have no 
belief that p (at t1) but consider whether I have a belief that p (at t2) I will not 
self-attribute a belief that p without creating a new belief’ (Ibid.). Thus, there is 
good reason to think that the standard case of doxastic self-knowledge is non-
deliberative, and that if it is factual recollection (in the broad sense), then it 
must be recollection that is uncontaminated by reasoning as to whether p. The 
non-deliberative, that is, recollection case of doxastic self-knowledge better 
explains a number of desiderata outlined in chapter two. Our best candidate for 
a standard case of doxastic self-knowledge for our theory is a recollective case of 
(TIC): when S responds to an inquiry of the variety, ‘Do you think p?’ she 
recalls whether p is the case, as it were, auto-ascriptively. The auto-ascription is 
explained by means of the artificially extended cognitive contact with the 
stimulus event provided by the engaging with the task initiated by that event. In 
such cases there is no need, or indeed room, for the kind of second step found 
in Byrne-style and Boyle-style Transparency procedures. (Evans’s remark that 
the subject is ipso facto in a position to assert ‘I believe that p’ looks plausible on 
this picture.) 
 The explanation is incomplete in two respects: (i) it lacks a full 
description of how the auto-ascriptive judgement concerning the inquiry 
combines with the result of that inquiry; and (ii) whether or not the IEM 
property survives the process. To some degree, these aspects of the account will 
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have to remain partially incomplete. However, with regards to (i) it is 
important to note that the Transparency views expressed above (§1.4) do not 
preclude the possibility that a subject can explicitly acknowledge what doxastic 
Transparency means: that the decisive elements in her treatment of the question 
‘Do I think that p’ are precisely those that will be decisive for the question 
whether p. There appears to be no contradiction, or even tension, in the single 
thought: ‘I will answer232 the question of “Do I think that p” by reference to 
what is decisive for answering the question “is p is the case?”’. If it is possible for 
a subject to think such a single thought, then she can replace the variables ‘p’ 
and ‘what is decisive’ with the specifics of each question or issue. How the 
individual components of such a thought are bound together might be open to 
dispute, but the results of that dispute are unlikely to lead us back to the pattern 
implied by (TT).  
For the purposes of discussion, I will call the general view mnemic self-
knowledge (MSK). The remainder of this chapter will highlight the benefits of 
the view by examining the extent to which the view meets the desiderata laid 
out in chapter two (§4), and by considering a range of possible objections (§5). 
 
 
4. Meeting self-knowledge desiderata  
 
In the last section, I outlined what I take to be, and what I have presented as, the 
standard case of doxastic self-knowledge, a core case of (MSK). In this section, I 
argue that the view can fare well against the desiderata discussed in chapter two.  
 
4.1 Peculiarity, Immediacy, and Epistemic Security 
In this sub-section I suggest that (MSK) can meet all three of the minimum 
criteria laid out in chapter two. I called these the PIE theses: Peculiarity (P); 
Immediacy (I); and Epistemic Security (E).  																																																								
232 Adjusting for tense: ‘I have answered … ’ or ‘I am answering … ’.  
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4.1.1 Peculiarity  
Peculiarity was formulated as: ‘a method or procedure by pointing to which it is 
possible, satisfactorily, to explain how S comes to know her mental states, and 
that cannot be used satisfactorily to explain how one S comes to know the 
mental states of others’ (Ch. 2).  
 The doxastic version of (MSK) is an explanation of how S comes to 
know her belief, just as long as the relevant forms of memory are explanations 
of knowing. As far as I can tell there is no coherent challenge to the notion that 
factual memory—as described in chapter four—is a way of knowing, and it has 
good pedigree as an ‘accredited’ way of knowing.233 Because (MSK) makes use 
of autobiographical memory—more properly memory experience (Ch. 4)—the 
following objection might be raised: the function of autobiographical memory is 
to preserve and protect a coherent picture of the self (Conway and Loveday 
2015), not to accurately reflect the world or the past (Ch. 4, §2).234 Because 
memory experiences are autobiographical in the sense that they relate to a 
subject’s past, it may be that the use of memory experience undermines the 
reliability of the procedure. While there is support for what we might call the 
coherence view of autobiographical memory, and for the unreliability of 
autobiographical memory in general, there is little reason to suppose that it is 
pervasively unreliable in a way that would substantively threaten short-term 
question–answer tasks. Because memory experiences can be declarative, we 
have a way of assessing whether judgements about the past are accurate and 
false, and the general reliability of memory counts against the possibility of 
pervasive error (see Senor 2014).  
The procedure cannot be used satisfactorily to explain how S comes to 
know the mental states of others, because firstly S does not have access to 																																																								
233 Memory tends to appear in standard lists of ways of knowing, for example, Ayer’s (1956) list of 
accredited ways of knowing: ‘Claims to know empirical statements may be upheld by reference to 
perception, or to memory, or to testimony, or to historical records, or to scientific laws’ (p. 31). 
Questioning this conclusion is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
234 Bermúdez discusses with a similar point (forthcoming).  
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others’ memory in the relevant sense, and auto-ascription is a first-person 
phenomenon. It is clear then, that (MSK) for belief meets the Peculiarity 
condition.  
 
4.1.2 Immediacy 
In chapter two, I concluded that there were two variants of Immediacy that are 
worthy of consideration. Explaining psychological immediacy—according to 
which ‘subject (S) can be knowledgeable about her current mental state (C) 
without being able to provide her reasons or evidence for self-ascribing mental 
state (C)’ (see Ch. 2, §2)—is a minimal criterion for a theory. Explaining 
epistemic immediacy was retained as an ideal desideratum. I described the 
epistemic variant as: ‘subject (S) can be knowledgeable about her current 
mental state (C) without inferring that she is in (C) from reasons or evidence 
that she is in (C)’ (Ibid.).  
 The doxastic version of (MSK) explains psychological immediacy 
because for the majority of retained beliefs, a subject will not have access to her 
reasons and evidence for her belief (see e.g. Owens 1999). We can see now, 
also, how it might explain the epistemic version of the thesis: recalling that p is 
not rehearsing an argument for p—recall is a ‘got it’ verb (Ryle 1949, p. 
254). 235  So there is no inference involved in the recollection part of the 
procedure (p. 250). There is also plausibly no inference (or indeed reflection)236 
required for the attributive ‘part’ of the procedure, since the judgements are 
pre-ascribed via cognitive contact with the inquiry-event.  
 
4.1.3 Epistemic Security 
The Epistemic Security thesis (E) requires that: ‘beliefs about one’s mental 
states are more likely to amount to knowledge than one’s corresponding beliefs 
about others’ mental states’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 202). There were a number of 																																																								
235Ryle (1949), for example, makes this clear a number of times (see also e.g. p. 250). 
236 That is, at least no reflection of the variety implied by Boyle (2011). 
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options with regards to this criterion, and most were modest (Ch. 4). 
Nevertheless, modest advantage is all that is required by the condition. Broadly 
conceived, on the doxastic version of (MSK), (E) can arise from (i) the positive 
epistemic status bestowed by the retention of belief; and (ii) can be achieved by 
inducing cognitive inertia (that is, for instance, taking greater care when 
adopting beliefs). To this, we can now add (iii) a weak form of immunity from 
error through misidentification (IEM). IEM plausibly provides a greater degree 
of security than the others, however, even if there is reason to doubt IEM is 
available via (MSK), then the modest forms of security are arguably enough for 
the asymmetry implied by (E).  
 
4.2 Uniformity, Economy, and Transparency 
Having, arguably, fulfilled the main requirements of a theory of self-knowledge, 
we can now move on to the ideal desiderata. In chapter two, I suggested that, 
ceteris paribus, a satisfactory account of self-knowledge should be 
fundamentally uniform, explaining all cases of “first-person authority” … in the 
same basic way’ (see Boyle 2009, p. 141), although I also suggested that there 
might be good reason to reject the ‘uniformity assumption’, along principled 
lines in the taxonomy of states under review. Chapter one listed six varieties of 
self-knowledge failure and corresponding success, and although there are 
reasons for optimism on in a number of cases, a full review of each cannot be 
undertaken here. Of the six varieties, the main focus of the discussion has been 
on the fifth: intentional states. If (MSK) is plausible for belief, then there are 
good reasons to think it will be plausible for intention and desire since the 
standard cases of both are mnemic—that is, one does not make up one’s mind 
each time one wishes to know whether one intends to Φ and deliberating on the 
matter will—to follow Shah and Velleman’s (2005) concern—‘risk 
contaminating the response’. And there is reason for more general optimism: ‘If 
retrospection can give us the data we need for our knowledge of some states of 
mind, there is no reason why it should not do so for all’ (Ryle 1949, p. 148). 
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However, for the moment, we can afford to be cautious. The interim 
conclusion should be that for any state about which deliberation is a plausible 
option, (MSK) will be a plausible self-knowledge procedure. Beyond that, each 
variety of self-knowledge will require further consideration. It is worthy of 
note, however, that while this does not leave us with a theory of self-knowledge 
that explains self-knowledge for all relevant states, it does leave us with a theory 
that covers the same ground as Boyle’s (2011) view. There is modest success, so 
far, with regards to uniformity. 
The Economy desideratum suggests that, ceteris paribus, ‘a theory that 
explains the distinctive features of self-knowledge without recourse to capacities 
not employed in other domains of Knowledge’ (see also Byrne e.g. 2011a). 
Since (MSK) makes use only of general epistemic and rational capacities 
required for knowledge in other domains, (MSK) meets the Economy 
desideratum.  
It also meets the Transparency desideratum, because one can come to 
know one’s mental state without considering anything ‘inner’ or 
‘psychological’. Factual recall does not require the additional belief that one is 
recalling—‘explicit recollection’—and while many obvious cases of IEM in 
memory do contain the first-person pronoun, these are not the only memory 
cases of IEM.  
We can conclude, that with the exception of currently limited success in 
Uniformity, (MSK) meets the ideal desiderata. Since there are good reasons to 
question the uniformity assumption, this does not constitute a particular worry 
for the account, even if success is limited to a particular variety of self-
knowledge.  
 
4.3 Additional desiderata 
Up to now, (MSK) appears is a promising way to explain what is thought to be 
special or distinctive about self-knowledge—with the exception of only modest 
success in Uniformity (a feature that requires further inquiry)—both the 
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minimal criteria, and ideal desiderata can be comfortably met by the view. In 
chapter two, I outlined a number of other plausible demands upon a theory. For 
the remainder of this section I will briefly outline how (MSK) meets each of 
these.  
 Agnotic Access is the requirement that a theory explain not only self-
knowledge of belief, but also self-knowledge of its absence. Some 
commentators have seen the latter as a particular challenge for Transparency 
accounts, ostensibly because one is meant to be considering the world, and it is 
difficult to see how the world can come up empty handed (see e.g. Fernández 
2013). The concern might rest upon an overly exacting notion of Transparency. 
(Compare, for instance, those outlined above.) Nevertheless, doxastic (MSK) 
meets the desideratum because, to put it bluntly, one does not recall a belief 
that that one has not adopted. This, of course, is not an explanation of the 
subject’s awareness that she does not believe. However, an explanation of that 
awareness will, in part, be available due to a key difference between recollective 
and deliberative thinking. Recalling that p, for the most part will be immediate. 
Deliberating over whether p will not. In one case one is accessing the content of a 
retained belief. In the other one is settling the matter, or making up one’s mind 
by considering factors that go in favour of one conclusion over another. Some 
forms of recollection can be confused with deliberation. And this confusion can 
give rise to a common form of self-knowledge failure (discussed at length in 
Appendix 1). This form of self-knowledge failure generally occurs when one is 
asked to recall decisive factors in the formation of one’s attitudes—which, as 
we have seen is not ordinarily something that we are apt to do. Straightforward 
recollection of first-order belief content, on the other hand, is markedly 
different psychologically speaking: it is psychologically immediate, whereas the 
former is not. There is, of course, room for error, but no reason to think error 
is more likely than success. The analogous case for abilities (Ch. 2) highlights 
the difference: there is a reason we think it is funny to suggest that someone 
would try to speak Spanish to find out whether they could speak Spanish.  
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 Preserved Access is explained because recalling that p is a case of detecting 
the belief in place prior to the initiation of the self-knowledge procedure. The 
inferential Transparency view left open the possibility a subject would self-
ascribe a belief formed during the procedure itself. On that view such a self-
ascription would count as success. On (MSK), however, the standard case is 
recall, which is not conducive to the production of new beliefs, at least not in 
the troublesome way possible on the inferential Transparency view.  
 I have suggested that Evaluative Access is enabled by Preserved Access (Ch. 
2). Without Preserved Access, it is difficult to see how a subject could successfully 
‘assess or reflect upon her current (i.e. pre-existing) attitudes in light of her 
available evidence and the norms she accepts’ (Ibid.). A full explanation of how 
(MSK) explains (if it does) Evaluative Access is a matter for elsewhere. 
However, by explaining how Preserved Access is possible, I have left the door 
open for that feature. In that respect it is an improvement on both inferential 
and reflective Transparency approaches to self-knowledge. 
 Finally, (MSK) will not leave the subject Self-Blind. The subject is not 
left with third-person only access to her mental states, and can acquire 
knowledge of her mental states without treating them as independent objects of 
observation.  
 
 
5. Queries and objections 
 
In the last section of this final chapter I would like to pre-empt a number of 
initial concerns about an account of self-knowledge that explains what is special 
about knowledge in the domain via features of memory.  
Is all self-knowledge question-led? Self-knowledge on this account is seen as 
a response to an inquiry, but one might object that not all cases of self-
knowledge follow this pattern. A number of things must be said response to this 
point. The first is to point out that, generally speaking, one could not be 
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mindful of the full set of one’s attitudes, or even a significant proportion of 
them. For most varieties of self-knowledge discussed here, the relevant data 
must be ‘detected’ by some means. The formation of attitudes is an interesting 
but independent matter. The majority of our attitudes at any one time will be 
retained attitudes (or what some misleadingly call memory attitudes).237 What 
are detected in standard cases of self-knowledge are those attitudes (cf. Byrne 
2011a).  
Cassam (forthcoming) calls these ‘“in question” (IQ)’ cases and suggests 
that some important forms of self-knowledge are not IQ. Certainly there are 
cases where such a question has not been made explicit and one still finds 
oneself suddenly in agreement with something that one reads or hears (Ibid.). 
These are interesting phenomena, and deserve more attention than can be 
afforded here. Many cases are likely to involve implicit questions (one wonders 
whether one agrees), or questions that are the product of silent soliloquy (‘Do I 
believe that?’). Neither will pose a problem (the question is posed by oneself in 
either case), but if there are genuine cases of attitude detection that do not 
contain either of these elements, then this might be thought a limitation of the 
theory. A plausible explanation of these phenomena may be found in 
involuntary memories and ‘chaining’, wherein ‘the contents of an involuntary 
memory sometimes trigger additional involuntary memories’ (Mace 2006; also 
Ch. 4). This will not be a straightforward case of (MSK). However, the project 
here is to describe the standard case of attitude detection, and Cassam himself 
notes that it is not clear whether they are cases of detection, formation, or 
something in between (Ibid.). For the moment, at least, they do not present a 
substantive problem for the account.238  
																																																								
237 See Ryle (1949): ‘Theorists speak sometimes of memory-knowledge, memory-belief … This is a mistake 
… Reminiscence and not-forgetting are neither ‘sources’ of knowledge, nor, if this is anything different, 
ways of getting to know. The former entails having learned and not forgotten; the latter is having learned 
and not forgotten. Neither of them is a source of learning, discovering or establishing.’ (p. 249) 	
238 If one hopes for a memory effect that matches the phenomenon, then a plausible explanation can be 
found in involuntary memories and ‘chaining’: ‘the contents of an involuntary memory sometimes trigger 
additional involuntary memories’ (Mace 2006). 
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Can the account explain self-knowledge of what one remembers? This is another 
genuine phenomenon that the approach has not attempted to explain, although 
this ought not suggest that it cannot provide an explanation. The sense of the 
term ‘remember’ in use will be crucial in the explanation. One way of making 
sense of the issue is to see it as a ‘how’ question—such as, ‘How do you know 
that Cimetière du Père-Lachaise is in Paris?’—that has a number of distinct 
kinds of response: (i) ‘I remember going there while in Paris’ (memory 
experience); and (ii) a standard case of recalling that p where p is ‘Cimetière du 
Père-Lachaise is in Paris’. Cases of (i) have not been treated in depth here, 
although a solution is suggested above: if the judgement has the correct 
properties, then it is a fairly standard case of self-ascriptive memory. Cases of 
(ii) are somewhat more complicated. Factual memory as presented here, is—in 
Ryle’s (1949) terms—‘allowable paraphrase of the verb “to know”’ (p. 248). In 
the absence of associated memory experiences, knowing that one remembers in 
this sense will likely require an inference (one believes that p, but is not 
currently perceiving that p and has no memory of acquiring the belief that p). 
However, this does not substantively change the nature of procedure.  
  Are inference or reflection not still required in (MSK)? I have presented (MSK) 
has a non-inferential and non-reflective procedure, although there are a number 
of places where one might be tempted to insert a requirement for either. One 
reason for presenting (MSK) as non-inferential and non-reflective was to bring 
into sharp relief the potential explanatory value of memory in this domain, 
rather than argue for that value by using it to supplement an existing model of 
self-knowledge such as the inferential Transparency view (see Ch. 3). On this 
latter view, for instance, the strongly self-verifying procedure leaves the subject 
nearly infallible (Carruthers 2011) in any case, and so any epistemic 
contribution by memory would pale by comparison (and possibly over-
determine the result). If it turned out that (MSK) was a partially inferential or 
reflective process, then the conclusions about Immediacy would need revisiting. 
However, unlike the inferential and reflective views, knowledge in the domain 
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would still not be substantively explained by those cogitations. Pace proponents 
of those views, and to paraphrase Ryle once more,239 on my view, a good self-
knower is not someone who is good at inferring and reflecting, it is someone 
who is good at a recollecting.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have argued that a standard case of doxastic self-knowledge can 
be described purely in terms of memory. I first challenged an assumption about 
self-ascription in the literature on the Transparency approach (§1); and argued 
for weaker characterisation of a self-ascription requirement in Transparency 
accounts of self-knowledge (§2). With this weaker condition in place, I outlined 
a case of doxastic self-knowledge that can be appropriately explained as a kind 
of recollection. In §3, I outlined a theory with memory in the main explanatory 
role of doxastic self-knowledge; and in §4, I set the theory against the desiderata 
for a theory of self-knowledge in chapter two. Finally, in §5, I pre-empted a 
number of questions and objections. The overall conclusion for this chapter is 
that a mnemic theory of self-knowledge fares well against all three varieties of 
desiderata for a theory of self-knowledge. The focus on memory has shed light 
on at least one intractable problem in the domain that arises from a well-known 
puzzle of Transparency approaches. The main findings are in line with the aims 
of the inquiry stated in chapter one: (i) it looks possible to construct a theory of 
self-knowledge in which the distinctive features of knowledge in the domain are 
sufficiently explained in memory terms; (ii) that the inquiry has shed light on 
some intractable problems in the self-knowledge literature.  
 																																																									
239 Ryle (1949) says: ‘There is no such inference; and even if there were, the good witness is one who is 
good at recollecting, not one who is good at inferring’ (p. 250). 	
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Conclusion and Further Work 
 
 
In this thesis, I set out to consider an often-neglected option in the attempts to 
explain what is special about knowledge of our own minds. I argued that our 
lexicon of introspection terms has become confused, and unhelpful in explaining 
knowledge in its domain. Given an interesting and broad-ranging convergence 
in our thinking about introspective failure and memory failure, I suggested that 
we might see the degree to which it is possible to think of knowledge of our 
own minds as a kind of remembering. I proposed that success would likely mean 
a positive answer to the question of whether memory can explain what is 
thought to be special about knowledge in the domain.  
 In chapter one I concluded (i) that memory can play an important role in 
explaining a good deal of what we describe as introspective failure, (ii) that it is 
worthwhile investigating whether that convergence extends to introspective 
success. I argued (iii) that such an inquiry should proceed by outlining the 
desiderata against which the success of any theory of self-knowledge can be 
measured. In chapter two, I considered a range of features we take to be special 
or distinctive about self-knowledge and produced a list of desiderata—minimal 
criteria, ideal desiderata, and additional criteria—against which the success of a 
theory of self-knowledge might be measured. 
 In chapter three, I set a prominent approach to self-knowledge—the 
Transparency approach—against those criteria and argued that a particular view 
of memory would enable the approach to meet an implication of the Epistemic 
Security condition; namely, Preserved Access. I concluded (iv) that the 
epistemology of memory plays an important role in explaining introspective 
success on such a view, and (v) that this strengthened the case for an inquiry into 
the extent to which the epistemology of memory might be explanatory of 
knowledge in that domain.  
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 In chapter four, I explored the question of whether memory might 
explain, or contribute to the explanation, of the three minimal criteria from the 
list of desiderata (Peculiarity, Immediacy, and Epistemic Security). I concluded 
(vi) that a surprising number of options are available for each of the three 
desiderata, and (vii) that this merited the construction of a theory that might be 
tested against the full list of desiderata.  
 In chapter five, I highlighted a problem arising from the Transparency 
approach concerning self-ascription that has affected the ability of a number of 
accounts to meet come important criteria (e.g. Byrne 2011a; Boyle 2011). I 
argued that this problem is due to an assumption based on too strong a 
conception of the requirement that a Transparency account must explain self-
ascription. I conclude that a weaker conception (a) better captures the range of 
data, and (b) better fits standard conceptions of the important features of 
Transparency in the literature. With this in place I highlighted a straightforward 
case of doxastic self-knowledge that can be appropriately described in memory 
terms. I constructed the outline of a theory around this case and set it against 
the full range of desiderata from chapter two. I concluded that the theory fares 
well against desiderata of all three varieties. 
By focusing on the explanatory contribution of memory, it has also been 
possible to shed light on at least one of the intractable problems in the self-
knowledge literature: an assumption related to the puzzle of Transparency that 
has resulted in too strict a conception of the self-ascription requirement for 
Transparency accounts. At the end of chapter five, I address a number of 
potential questions and objections, some of which will form the basis of further 
work. The overall conclusion is two-fold: (viii) a theory of self-knowledge with 
the epistemology of memory playing the main explanatory role can be 
surprisingly successful when set against desiderata that are common in the self-
knowledge literature; (ix) an inquiry into the prospects of memory to explain 
features thought to be distinctive of self knowledge has the potential to shed 
light on some intractable problems in the literature.  
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One last issue remains to be resolved in this work. I have suggested, 
broadly, that once the correct epistemology of memory is in place, explaining 
what is special about self-knowledge becomes a lot more straightforward than 
many attempts would have us believe. Once the requisite detail has been filled 
out, and when faced with the prospect that it is possible to explain what is 
special or distinctive about self-knowledge in terms of memory, one may be 
faced with questions about the terms in which it is appropriate to explain certain 
putative facts about memory. There are two things to say, initially, in response. 
Firstly, our memory lexicon is comparatively rich and focused. Secondly, if all 
that can be achieved by an inquiry into the explanatory potential of memory in 
the domain of self-knowledge is to reduce two questions into one, then this is 
progress.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Choice Blindness and Introspective Competence 
 
 
1. Varieties of introspective failure 
 
The focus of this paper is a variety of introspective failure: I make a choice, but 
when providing reasons, I offer reasons that could not be my reasons for that 
choice. There are other varieties of introspective failure, but this variety has 
long enjoyed attention in the literature on self-knowledge, and examples of its 
kind are sometimes taken to be evidence of introspective unreliability more 
generally. It is important to keep the difficulties presented by this variety of 
failure apart from more general concerns about our introspective competence.  
In a review of two decades of prior research, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
provide an enormously well-cited240 record of this failure which is taken to have 
implications for how we think about everyday responses to inquiries into our 
reasons for actions, preferences, and our trains of thought (Ibid.). They 
concluded that there ‘may be little or no direct introspective access to higher 
order cognitive processes’ (p. 231; my emphasis), but make no negative claims 
about our access to our own minds more generally, and are quite optimistic 
about our knowledge of mental content: we have ‘a great deal accurate 
knowledge and much additional “knowledge” that is at least superior to that of 
any observer’ (p. 255).241 Indeed, they suggest, the ‘fact’ that we have such 
knowledge may help explain why we believe we have, in addition to knowledge 
of content, knowledge of our own cognitive processes (p. 255).  
																																																								
240 See e.g. Cassam (2014); Carruthers (2011); Gertler (2011); Kornblith (2011); Schwitzgebel (2008); 
Johansson et al. (2006). 
241 See Schwitzgebel (2006) for a helpful discussion of myths surrounding this paper.	
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In a famous example from Nisbett and Wilson (1977), participants 
heavily over-selected the right-most article in an array of identical nylon 
stockings. When asked for their reasons, no subject spontaneously mentioned an 
article’s position in the array, and ‘virtually all’ denied the possibility that 
position might affect the choice (pp. 243–4). Nisbett and Wilson’s own 
explanation of these findings left correct self-attribution of reasons aleatory. 
Rather than direct internal access to our reasons, we self-attribute reasons based 
on implicit theories of ‘how minds work’ (Lopes 2014, pp. 27f.): if one believes 
a reason to be a good one for a certain attitude, that is the reason we attribute to 
ourselves when questioned about why we have that attitude (see Nisbett and 
Wilson 1977, pp. 248–9; Lopes 2014, pp. 27–8). 
The research died out in the eighties, perhaps partly due to its 
association with this model, and a more general concern that attempts to study 
introspection empirically will always be subject ‘to wildly differing conceptual 
analyses’ (Johansson et al. 2006, p. 675). Whatever the reason, the demise of 
the research left us without a settled way of understanding the phenomenon.  
Undeterred by the halt in progress, and assuming improvements in 
experimental design over the hiatus (Johansson et al. 2006, p. 675), Petter 
Johansson, Lars Hall, and colleagues have recently (2005–) achieved ‘striking’ 
results over a range of attitudes and environments ‘without making any 
assumptions about the mechanisms of introspective misattribution’ (Lopes 
2014, p. 28). They have found that a surprising number of participants ‘fail to 
notice mismatches between intention and outcome’ when faced with a covertly 
manipulated choice’ (Johansson et al. 2006, p. 673).  
They call the effect Choice Blindness following the literature on Change 
Blindness—an effect in which participants ‘fail to detect changes in a scene when 
the change is accompanied by some other visual disturbance’ (Johansson et al. 
2008, p. 142). Change Blindness research is taken to have serious implications for 
	 214 
how we think about our visual experience.242 Choice Blindness research is taken to 
show something interesting about the ‘relationship between intention, choice, 
and introspection’ by ‘surreptitiously … [manipulating] the relationship 
between the choice and [the] outcome that … participants experience’ 
(Johansson et al. 2008, p. 143). It is taken to show a high degree of willingness, 
in non-clinical participants, to offer confabulatory explanations for manipulated 
choices. If the results are reliable, then the variety of introspective failure at 
issue is surprisingly prevalent, and this is thought to have implications for our 
conception of ourselves as rational creatures, and some deeply ingrained 
intuitions about our access to our own minds. In considering the variety of 
introspective failure in question, I will look primarily at the Choice Blindness 
research.  
 Some of our supposed intuitions about introspective reliability enjoy less 
plausibility than others in the face of everyday observation, let alone rigorous 
empirical research. ‘Strongly Cartesian’ conceptions of the mental suggest that 
‘nothing in our mental life is hidden from us’, but no one thinks that nowadays, 
and it is not clear they ever did (Greenough 2010).243 Most, at least now, are 
willing to accept that we can go wrong—perhaps badly and frequently wrong—
when it comes to some aspects of our mental lives: we are not always in the best 
position to judge our emotional states (see e.g. Schwitzgebel 2008a), character 
traits, or deep motives (see e.g. Burge 1998). 244  Nevertheless, there is an 
important difference between accepting the kind of challenges associated with 
coming to know whether we are courageous or loyal, for instance, and 
widespread failure with regard to awareness of our own reasons and a 
corresponding willingness to confabulate on such matters. We can accept 
																																																								
242 Some take the Change Blindness research to show that we have a ‘drastically false conception of own 
visual experiences’ (see Blackmore 2002, in Johansson, Hall, and Sikström 2008, p. 143) and others, more 
modestly, that we ‘represent the world in much less detail than what was previously thought’ (Johansson, 
Hall, and Sikström 2008, p. 143)	
243 Several of his own passages, for instance, appear to suggest that Descartes did not hold a strongly Cartesian 
view (see e.g. Discourse on Method, AT VI 23). 	
244 These too are less recent discoveries than some might expect (see e.g. Aristotle on the importance of 
friendship for self-knowledge in Nichomachean Ethics 1170b5–7). 	
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occasional error, or even frequent error for a given range of states, processes, 
and characteristics, but we tend to balk at the suggestion that introspection is 
‘massively and pervasively’ misleading, as some have argued (see e.g. 
Schwitzgebel 2008a).  
Part of the reason is this. We take ourselves to be rational creatures. We 
think that we act, believe, desire, and intend, off the bat of our reasons and 
sometimes our reasoning. Not only do we think we have access to our own 
reasons, we think we can weigh them up as reasons, and to self-regulate when we 
find something amiss. We think we ‘engage explicitly in reason-induced changes 
of mind’—a feat that requires knowledge of those reasons (Burge 1998, p. 
248)—and we expect the same of others. We are thus rationally criticisable, or 
open to ‘critical challenge’ (see Lopes 2014) from ourselves and from others.  
Widespread confabulation seems at odds with all of this, and so our 
understanding of effects such as Choice Blindness—and the variety of 
introspective failure it exemplifies—will have important implications for our 
conception of ourselves as rational, and perhaps for the claim that we must have 
some knowledge of our reasons. What appears to be at stake, then, is our status 
as introspectively competent and rational decision makers (Davies 2015). 
In this paper, I briefly outline examples of Choice Blindness research that 
is taken to show a high degree of willingness, in non-clinical participants, to 
offer confabulatory explanations for manipulated choices. I evaluate several 
attempts to make sense of the Choice Blindness effect and its implications for 
our knowledge of our own minds, and reject them as sufficient explanations of 
the effect. I then present an alternative explanation and consider its strengths 
and weaknesses, addressing two likely objections. One of the strengths is that it 
allows us to acknowledge our susceptibility to a certain kind of introspective 
failure without accepting catastrophic implications for our status as 
introspectively competent and rational decision-makers.  
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2. ‘Classic’ Choice Blindness and Choice Blindness across modalities 
 
In Classic Choice Blindness, participants were ‘shown pairs of pictures of female 
faces’ and instructed to ‘point to the face they found most attractive’ (Johansson 
et al. 2008, p. 143). After the choice was indicated, the selected picture was 
given to the participants. They were asked to ‘explain why they preferred the 
picture they now held in their hand’ (p. 143). In some instances, and 
unbeknown to the participants, a ‘double-card ploy was used to covertly 
exchange one face for the other’. Thus, in such cases, the ‘outcome’ of the 
choice was the opposite of what the participant ‘intended’ (p. 144). A 
surprisingly low number of participants detected the manipulation even when 
no time constraints were placed on the response. Even with unlimited time to 
explain their preference ‘no more than 30% of all manipulated trials were 
detected’ (Ibid.). Interestingly, a large majority of the reported explanations of 
preference (72%) were ‘clearly confabulatory since they reported features of the 
non-chosen face not possessed by the initially chosen face’ (Lopes 2014; my 
emphasis).  
Here are some common concerns: perhaps the faces were too similar 
with regards to level of attractiveness; or the stakes too low to show anything of 
wider interest (since we are not going to enter into a long-term relationship 
with the selected individual); there may be some important difference in the 
kind of reports offered in manipulated and non-manipulated trials; the 
laboratory conditions may affect the behaviour of the participants; reporting of 
detection may be dis-incentivized; and so on. But further studies refined the 
methodology to address many of these concerns: responses were compared over 
a number of dimensions including emotionality, specificity, certainty expressed, 
deceit, and complexity (Johansson et al. 2006); the effect has been shown in a 
more ‘natural’ environment (see e.g. Hall et al. 2010); varieties of detection 
were identified (‘conscious’, ‘unconscious’, and ‘retrospective’) and accounted 
for in the results (2010, p. 56f.); and research was expanded to test for Choice 
	 217 
Blindness in other modalities (e.g. taste and smell).  
The effect was still present in sufficiently high numbers to support the 
initial findings. The research appears to show that in aesthetic visual, gustatory, 
and olfactory choices, participants often ‘fail to notice mismatches between 
what they prefer and what they actually get … while nevertheless being 
prepared to offer … [qualitatively similar] reasons for why they chose the way 
they did’ (Hall et al. 2012, p.1).  
What are we to make of these findings? The researchers claim interesting 
implications for a fundamental assumption in theories of decision-making: we 
‘detect mismatches between intention and outcome, adjust our behavior in the 
face of error, and adapt to changing circumstances’ (Johansson et al. 2005). And 
the results should be of interest to market researchers: ‘in what sense can 
attitudes be real if people moments later fail to notice they have been reversed?’ 
(Hall et al. 2012; my emphasis).245 The implications for introspective reliability, 
especially in general, are less easily discerned.  
Some preferences can be transient, subject to shifting attention or mood, 
and easily overturned without it being thought that this says something 
important about our status as rational creatures. Caprice is only rationally 
criticisable in certain cases. Anyone who has struggled with a dessert menu can 
attest to the virtues of more than one selection: the tarte aux fraises sounds 
enticing, but it’s been a while since I’ve had cheesecake; I spy the chocolate 
gateaux, but I’m more worried about calorie intake these days. None of these 
considerations is in genuine conflict, so there is little mystery how it is that I can 
come to list the reasons counting in favour of one choice when requested, even 
a choice I didn’t make. (Although there remains a mystery in these cases: why 
having made one choice, I will apparently fail to notice I receive something 
else.)  
At least some aesthetic preferences will pose more interesting questions, 
but it is plausible—at least in very low-stakes cases—that analogous, and 																																																								245	More cynical applications to marketing, and other domains, are not beyond the imagination.	
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equally capricious, considerations are in play in many cases. There is nothing 
incompatible about liking both blonde and red hair; or in feeling attracted now 
to one, and now to the other; only in preferring both at the same time. Since 
liking and preferring are different, but related, attitudes it is understandable that 
we might borrow some considerations from former when answering questions 
about the latter, especially where a preference is marginal, a choice is forced, or 
we are unexpectedly asked to articulate the deciding factors in our selection 
process. There is no reason to suggest that such preferences are always shallow 
and easily overturned—explaining the Choice Blindness data only requires that 
they often can be. 
Some of our attitudes are taken to be less generally casual. Moral and 
political attitudes, for instance, are serious matters. We regularly dispute over 
them, taking them to be more obviously open to critical challenge. Our reasons 
for having such attitudes should not be capricious; the attitudes should not be 
subject to shifting attention or mood, and not so easily overturned. (I do not 
suddenly think that deceiving in order to obtain ready cash is a good thing 
because I feel like a change.) But there is evidence that Choice Blindness occurs 
for this kind of attitude too.  
 
 
3. Choice Blindness and moral attitudes 
 
Hall et al. (2012) used a ‘self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions’ and 
asked participants to ‘rate on a 9-point bidirectional scale to what extent they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement’ (Hall et al. 2012, p. 1). Participants 
were asked to read some of their answers aloud and to explain their ratings, but 
unbeknown to the participants, two of these responses were ‘the reverse of the 
statements they had actually rated’. So, for example (Hall et al. 2012, p. 1; my 
emphasis):  
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Large-scale governmental surveillance of email and Internet traffic ought to be 
forbidden as a means to combat international crime and terrorism 
 
Becomes:  
 
Large-scale governmental surveillance of email and Internet traffic ought to be 
permitted as a means to combat international crime and terrorism 
 
In the debriefing—which was constructed to promote the over-reporting of 
detection—participants were given multiple opportunities, with increasingly 
stronger cues to report any suspicions (p. 3). The survey covered both 
‘foundational issues and real world issues’ (p. 5) often debated in the media (p. 
1); participants were assured that there were no time limits for answering; that 
researchers had ‘no moral or political agenda’; and that the researchers would 
not ‘judge or argue’ with the participants’ opinions (p. 3). The ratings on the 
nine-point scale suggested that these were issues the participants ‘cared about’ 
(p. 3). Nevertheless, 69% of participants (roughly in line with the effect 
elsewhere) accepted at last one of the two ‘statement–rating relations’ (Ibid.) 
and 53% argued ‘unequivocally for the opposite of their original attitude’ (p. 4).  
 With addition of this version of the protocol, we have demonstrations 
that the effect can be found, to a comparable degree, in moral attitudes and for 
preferences across a range of modalities and environments. Even if one is 
inclined to think that the effect can be partially explained in the visual, 
gustatory, olfactory cases by the relative instability of the attitudes involved, this 
kind of explanation looks much less amenable to the moral attitudes case.  
 Debate continues over elements of the methodology. But, while it 
continues, corroborating evidence, suggesting that the effect is robust across a 
range of attitudes and environments, continues to come in (see Lind, A. et al. 
2014; Parnamets, P. et al. 2015), and so there is a case for exploring suitable 
explanations of the phenomenon. In the next section I evaluate three 
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prospective explanations of the data.  
 
 
4. Explanations of Choice Blindness 
 
Before I consider two explanations of the data that are broadly amenable to the 
researchers’ conclusions, it is worth briefly considering a third (debunking) 
view. On this view, participants are caused to enter into a non-ideal (quasi-
delusional) cognitive state. We know that conjuring tricks work, can produce 
false beliefs that are contrary to the evidence and, arguably, fairly resistant to 
revision. The Choice Blindness set-up takes a participant from a normal state at 
the time of her initial choice, to a non-ideal state—in which she makes provably 
false utterances—by ‘deluding’ her into thinking she chose differently. Just as it 
does not follow from the extensive clinical data on psychiatric disorders that 
‘normal human subjects never have transparent, non-interpretive, access to 
their own judgements and decisions’ (see Carruthers 2011, p. 42246), it does not 
follow from the surprisingly low detection rates and a high degree of willingness 
to confabulate in Choice Blindness experiments that ‘normal human subjects’ 
are Choice Blind. The more interesting features of the effect are, if anything, akin 
to our most startling conjuring tricks 247 —surprising only in so far as it is 
surprising that non-clinical participants can be convinced they are in the middle 
of a zombie apocalypse or willingly to conduct an armed robbery.248 On this 
view there are no consequences for the population, our introspective 
competence, or for our reasoning abilities, as a whole.  
  Whatever the merits of this view it has at least two important 
deficiencies as presented thus far. Firstly, there are important and obvious 
dissimilarities between Choice Blindness research and conjuring tricks—even 
																																																								
246 Carruthers is reporting on, rather than endorsing, the view.	
247 Thanks are due to Tom Stoneham for helpful correspondence on how such a view might be articulated.	
248 These examples are from UK illusionist Derren Brown’s Derren Brown: Apocalypse (first broadcast in two 
parts in 2012 on Channel 4) and The Heist (first broadcast 2006 on Channel 4).		
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though the former make innovative use of latter. Stage and television magicians 
can pre-select and prime their subjects, sometimes conditioning them over 
several weeks (as in the cases above); there is no scientific methodology, or at 
least no full disclosure of methodology from which, for instance, replicability 
(and a range of other theoretical standards) can be assessed; and, of course, we 
are intended to see only the very best results. None of this is true for the 
empirical research under discussion. Secondly, the idea that upon this view 
Choice Blindness has no implications for the population as a whole is suspect. 
Even if this explanation were accepted, the data can be interpreted as 
demonstrating the extent to which simple prestidigitation can cause non-clinical 
patients to enter into a non-ideal (quasi-delusional) cognitive state in which they 
utter provably false responses to questions about their choices. This equally 
alarming conclusion about the fragility of our cognitive faculties has the 
additional frustration that it leaves us in no better position with regards to 
introspective failure of the variety in question—self-knowledge failure due to 
vulnerability to delusive cognition is self-knowledge failure none the less. I will 
put this view aside for the moment (though we will see later that it has some 
explanatory value).  
In ‘Feckless Reason’ (2014), Dominic Lopes examines the implications of 
the research for the role of reasons in aesthetic responses. He suggests there are 
two hypotheses available to explain the effect (p. 29f.):  
 
(1) We do not choose for reasons; we choose and then provide reasons. The 
manipulation merely brings this out by setting up an unusual situation where the 
reasons miss their target.  
(2) Reasons offered for the choices do not ‘target [participants’] initial choice and 
preference’. The belief that they chose x ‘determines their preference’ and the so 
reasons offered accord with their eventual preference.  
 
On hypothesis (1), ‘confabulation is the norm’; ‘choices are not based on the 
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reasons we give’ (Ibid.). On hypothesis (2), participants didn’t confabulate but 
our attitudes are ‘fickle’ (p. 29f.); they can easily be overturned by the 
suggestion that we chose, preferred, or believed otherwise. Both, says Lopes, 
explain the data, and both do damage to our ‘conception of rational decision 
making’ since on either hypothesis ‘reasoning about decisions is post hoc’ (p. 
30). Both of these explanations of the data are broadly amenable to the 
researchers’ own conclusions about the degree of willingness, in non-clinical 
participants, to offer confabulatory explanations (or post hoc rationalization) for 
manipulated choices, and the suspicion that the research has implications for the 
population at large.  
 Lopes (2014) favours the second hypothesis, citing research on the 
distorting effects of reason-stating and reason-forming behaviour, but argues 
that we can square this hypothesis with our access to our own aesthetic 
attitudes. Choice Blindness research, he suggests, has only shown something 
about aesthetic appreciation—and, I assume, any appreciation and attitudes that 
are taxonomically equivalent—if it has shown that critical reasoning is 
employed in the formation of aesthetic appreciation. But it is not: 
 
We form aesthetic attitudes consistent with long-term behaviour partly 
because we do not try to explain ourselves. When we do try to explain 
ourselves, it seems that we tend to state reasons that imply an attitude and 
adopt the attitude implied by those reasons. (Lopes 2014, p. 32) 
 
Choice Blindness research insists that we explain ourselves and, in doing so, 
engage in reason-stating or reason-forming behaviour, and thus it will have a 
distorting effect on any of the aesthetic attitudes under examination. But, the 
failures that occur when one critically reasons about aesthetic attitudes will only 
lead us to question the reliability of introspective access to those attitudes, in 
general, if it can be shown that they are the kind of attitudes in which such 
reasoning is implicit. However, ‘reasoning is not implicit in such appreciation. 
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The difficulty is not that our reports of our reasons are often erroneous’ but that 
‘explicitly stated or formulated reasons are post hoc and have a systematically 
distorting effect on our attitudes’ (p. 33).  
Choice Blindness, then, tells us nothing about our awareness of aesthetic 
attitudes—and taxonomically equivalent attitudes in which reason-stating and 
reason-formulating is not implicit—it only tells us what happens when try to 
explain those attitudes. We are: 
 
in some sense aware of the features of stimuli that speak in favour of one 
choice over another. However, this awareness is not the same as the kind of 
state that is either articulated verbally in making a report or mentally in 
preparing to make a report. (Lopes 2014, p. 34) 
 
Thus Lopes (2014) provides a story about how we have reliable access to a 
certain class of attitudes that is consistent with the findings of Choice Blindness 
research, and an explanation of why we get things wrong when we try to 
formulate or report upon reasons for having those attitudes. Some of our 
attitudes are pre-critical in that our awareness of features which ‘speak in favour’ 
of one choice is pre-critical. Reason-formulating and reason-stating are 
systematically distorting (p. 33) and so in trying to formulate or state reasons 
for our pre-critical attitudes we distort them and end up reporting, instead, 
upon a different attitude to the one in place prior to questioning.  
 I do not think this is the right story to explain the Choice Blindness data 
across the range of environments and attitudes discussed above. Things aren’t 
quite as bad as the two hypotheses make out and, in some important respects, 
neither hypothesis is a good fit for the data. In the next section I discuss where 
Lopes goes right, and where I think he goes wrong. 
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5. Stability, success, and attitude distortion 
 
In the last section I discussed three potential explanations of Choice Blindness. 
The first explanation, I suggested, suffers from two important deficiencies and 
so was (at least temporarily) put aside. The second two, considered by Lopes 
(2014), are said to explain the available data, but in doing so do damage to our 
claims to rational decision-making. Lopes (2014) suggests the second 
hypothesis, combined with some notion of pre-critical awareness can explain 
the Choice Blindness data while leaving our access to our preferences relatively 
intact. In this section, I consider whether Lopes’s explanation can be adapted to 
provide us with a workable model of Choice Blindness and offer four concerns 
that count against it.  
  Firstly, while this model would appear a good fit for Classic Choice 
Blindness and perhaps for Choice blindness in gustatory and olfactory cases too, 
it is a less plausible explanation of Choice Blindness in moral attitudes (see §3). 
For the explanation to work for moral attitudes, moral attitudes must be the 
kinds of things in which reason-forming or reason-stating is not implicit.249 We 
might not normally—at least seriously—expect someone to defend their 
preference when it comes to desserts, or flavours or odours more generally. 
While there will be some constraints on what we are willing to accept as 
reasons stated with regard to any such preferences,250 flipping between such 
preferences, even relatively frequently, is unlikely to draw much criticism. But 
the constraints on, or expectations regarding, our moral attitudes, for instance, 
seem to be more exacting—we expect to offer and receive reasons when 
challenges are made, and flipping between opposing moral views on a regular 
																																																								
249 Much will depend here on what we mean by ‘implicit’. If we take it to mean ‘always to be found in’ or 
‘essentially connected with’, then there is a case for the suggestion that reason-forming and reason-stating is 
not implicit in moral attitudes (indeed there may be no variety of attitudes in which it is). However, taken 
to mean ‘suggested by, though not directly expressed’, then moral attitudes look to be precisely of this 
variety. 
250 Pure gibberish, or the stating of some consensually absent feature, for instance, would not do.  
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basis is likely to be seen as troubling.251 The use of ‘hotly debated’ moral issues, 
makes exposure to reason-stating and reason-forming seem less likely.  
 Secondly, the claim that on the first hypothesis the participant 
confabulates (Lopes 2014, p. 29), but on the second she does not (p. 30), needs 
grounding in some suitable definition of confabulation. But no such definition is 
offered. On some definitions of confabulation, participants may be seen to 
confabulate on both of these hypotheses (i.e. when taken in by the 
manipulation). 252  A workable model of Choice Blindness would require a 
working notion of confabulation with which to differentiate between 
confabulation and post-hoc rationalization. (I return to this issue in §6.) 
Thirdly, further support would be required for the claim that reason-
forming and reason-stating are systematically distorting of attitudes. To this end 
we are presented with studies that imply a sharp distinction between ‘focusing 
on’ and ‘analyzing’ an attitude (Lopes 2014, pp. 30–1). Analyzing—or 
reasoning more generally as the position appears to become—is distorting of, 
while ‘focusing on’ is preserving of attitudes. Whether or not such a sharp 
distinction can be supported, the conclusions of these studies cited are never so 
strong as to suggest any systematic distortion. (In summarizing one study, Lopes’s 
describes the conclusion as follows: ‘in certain circumstances giving reasons for 
an attitude reduces its consistency with behaviour’ (p. 31).) And we have good 
reason to think that some varieties of reasoning could not be systematically 
distorting and still successfully perform the role for which they are deployed. 
(Hypothetical reasoning looks like it may be one such variety.)  
Finally, the data does not appear to demand either of the hypotheses on 
offer. Neither is a particularly good fit. What the data might reasonably be taken 
to show is that, in the majority of cases, non-clinical participants (and so, 
perhaps, the population as a whole) willingly provide provably false statements 																																																								
251 This, of course, is not to suggest it is impossible to form an opinion on moral matters without doing a 
great deal of thinking.  
252  It is not clear how much weight rests on the distinction between confabulation and post-hoc 
rationalization for Lopes.	 Confabulation often has clinical implications, and thus may be thought to carry 
some stigma, but the distinction is far from clear. 	
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about the reasons for their choices when queried, and when failing to notice 
those choices were manipulated. But a sizable minority, in all of the cases of 
Choice Blindness considered so far, is not shown to be willing to do this. A 
significant proportion of participants detect the manipulation in some way, and 
a proportion of those utter statements that are true of their original choice, and 
not true of the ‘revealed’ and manipulated choice. In the early Choice Blindness 
experiments (see Johansson and Hall et al. 2005), for instance, some 27% of 
participants were deemed to have detected the manipulation, while 11% could 
not have been offering confabulatory explanation for the manipulated choice 
since the reasons they offered (e.g. specific features of the selection) matched 
their original choice and not the ‘revealed’ one (see also Lopes 2014, p. 29).253 
These data are not irrelevant to the construction of a model that hopes to 
satisfactorily explain the effect, but neither hypothesis on offer provides the 
resources to explain what these participants are doing. (More naturally, what 
they are doing right.) 
Together, these concerns suggest that a Lopes-style approach would 
require substantive revision if it were to be employed as a model of Choice 
Blindness. And while some features of Lopes’s account of the effect have some 
explanatory benefits, I think these features would be better employed in a 
simpler model; a model that can still acknowledge that Choice Blindness 
research shows something interesting about our targeted variety of introspective 
failure, but which is less disruptive to our conceptions of reasoning and 
reasoners; one which provides more insight into the what occurs in detected 
manipulations; and is less concessive to more dramatic interpretations of the 
data.  
 
 
 
																																																								
253 Lopes (2014) mentions these figures (see also §2 above), but either does not think them decisive in an 
analysis of the effect, or does not notice that the figures can be quite large.  
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6. Modeling Choice Blindness 
 
On the basis of the discussion so far, we can outline several factors that should 
be taken into account for the construction of a model of Choice Blindness: (i) a 
tendency for introspective failure of one variety should not be taken to indicate 
a tendency for introspective failure more generally (or other varieties) without 
further argument (see §1); (ii) on the assumption that Choice Blindness is a 
unitary phenomenon, we should expect a uniform explanation—that is, a model 
should fit all attitudes and environments for which Choice Blindness has been 
putatively shown; (iii) if Choice Blindness is thought to demonstrate 
confabulation, we should have some view of confabulation against which to 
assess competing hypotheses; (iv) In the absence of further support for the claim 
that reasoning is systematically distorting and on the assumption that some 
attitude-distorting form of reasoning is in play, a plausible candidate for the 
variety of reasoning in question should be identified; and (v) a model of Choice 
Blindness must provide (or at least allow for) a plausible account of why some 
participants do, and some participants do not, succumb to the variety of 
introspective failure in question.  
Before proposing such a model, it will be helpful to briefly discuss a 
matter at the heart of what the research is thought to show—namely, whether 
or not non-clinical participants willingly confabulate across a range of 
environments. Along the way, this discussion will allow for progress with the 
third (iii) desideratum of a model. 
 
 
7. Confabulation 
 
In the early 1970s Berlyne (1972) suggested that confabulation, somewhat like 
delusion, is a term that is ‘widely employed, poorly defined and variously 
interpreted’ (Berlyne 1972, p. 31). Some four decades later, the literature 
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sometimes steers clear of the ‘thorny issue’ of defining confabulation in favour 
of listing its common features (see e.g. Sullivan-Bissett 2015).254  
Why, then, without a canonical definition of confabulation, is it 
remarkable to suggest that ‘normal participants produce confabulatory reports’ 
(Hall et al. 2005, p. 119)? One reason is that debates about confabulation often 
involve discussion of clinical syndromes where confabulation is likely to be 
found (e.g. split-brain, hysterical blindness) (Johansson et al. 2006, p. 675). 
Perhaps confusing the definiendum with common source of data, definitions of 
confabulation have often tended to follow the clinical theme and are ‘usually 
defined as false narratives or statements about the world and/or the self that 
unintentionally arise due to some underlying pathological condition’ (McVittie 
et al. 2014). 
Accepting a definition of this variety has undesirable consequences. 
Combined with an acceptance of the Choice Blindness findings, it leaves us 
suggesting that a large majority of the population (perhaps around 70%) have 
some pathological condition. (This may be part of the motivation for an 
alternative hypothesis on which the manipulated participant is not 
confabulating.) But there is no need to see confabulation so tightly connected 
with pathology. The literature on confabulation has offered an alternative with 
roots going back at least a century (in Bonhoeffer 1901) that suggests a link 
between a failure, or a gap, in memory and a tendency to confabulate. 
Borrowing from this alternative, we might suggest that confabulations need only 
be understood as ‘statements or actions that involve unintentional but obvious 
distortions of memory’ (Moscovitch and Melo 1997, p. 1018; following Berlyne 
1972). The view, in some form, is still in currency (see McVittie 2014) and 
allows for an understanding of confabulation without an explicit commitment to 
pathology.  
																																																								
254 According to Sullivan-Bissett (2015) confabulatory explanations are: ‘(1) … false or ill-grounded; (2) are 
offered as the answer to a question; (3) have a motivational component; (4) fill a gap, and (5) are reported 
without any intention to deceive’, although these are explicitly not intended to be necessary and sufficient 
conditions (p. 4). 
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Viewing confabulation in this way looks helpful in two respects: firstly, 
the definition can still make sense of clinical cases, because the pathological 
condition can be the cause of the failure, but it also makes room for non-clinical 
cases. Secondly, it looks a better fit for the Choice Blindness data, particularly 
with regard to the data unexplained by two hypotheses on offer—the fact that a 
significant proportion are not willing to utter false statements about 
manipulated choices. If I successfully recall some salient features, for instance, 
of the face I originally preferred, I do not offer my reasons for preferring the 
face now presented to me. I either talk about some features of my original 
choice incompatible with the manipulated choice, or I otherwise ‘detect’ the 
manipulation.  
However, on this de-stigmatized view of confabulation, the successfully 
manipulated participant can be understood to be confabulating both on 
hypothesis one, and hypothesis two. For, in the latter case, the distortion of 
memory can be understood as the belief that one chose the presented, 
manipulated item rather than the original selection. If one does not form that 
belief, then one will not utter false statements about one’s choice.  
 In short, the claim that on one hypothesis the participant confabulates, 
and on the other she does not, will only be true on some understandings of 
confabulation. On one common understanding of confabulation, it does not 
appear to be true.255 On this understanding, confabulation involves a distortion 
of memory. And this helps to make sense of the neglected explanandum: the 
fact that a significant proportion of participants are not taken to utter provably 
false statements about their choices.  
 I will assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that something like this 
common, de-stigmatized, understanding of confabulation is the correct view 
(although this is not a position I will defend further here, and the understanding 
of Choice Blindness that I propose does not hang directly on that view). In the 
next section I consider two models of Choice Blindness.  																																																								
255 It appears, at least, that some further argument would be required, and this has not been offered. 	
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8. Simple and dual process models of Choice Blindness 
 
In §7 I suggested that a failure or distortion of memory helps to make sense of 
the Choice Blindness data. In proposing a model of Choice Blindness, then, we 
might proceed by first considering what I will call the Simple Model. This might 
be formulated as follows: 
 
[SM*] Choice Blindness can be explained in terms of a transition from a 
process of recall to a process that assesses the salient features of the subject’s 
current environment.  
 
While not uncontroversial, this proposal seems well founded given the 
discussion so far. Apart from the addition of the thought—both persistent in the 
literature on confabulation, and given independent plausibility by (see §7)—that 
some failure or gap in memory occurs in Choice Blindness, the proposal does 
not seem wholly incompatible with Lopes’s view. This is combined with an 
apparent feature of the empirical findings: that successfully manipulated reports 
appear to draw on salient features of the subject’s current environment rather 
than the environment as presented in the original choice.  
Unfortunately, this formulation cannot explain the phenomenon alone 
since all it requires is that we move between two cognitive processes (one of 
recall, and one as yet unnamed). This is because it allows for instances in which 
a subject is aware of moving from one process to another, and this awareness 
looks unlikely to issue regularly in the kind of self-knowledge failure under 
discussion (it may well e.g. come up before or during the post-session 
debriefings as a variety of detection). What is required is that the movement 
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from one process to another goes undetected.256  
 
[SM] Choice Blindness can be explained in terms of an undetected transition 
from a process of factual recall to a process that assesses salient features of the 
subject’s current environment.  
 
This formulation of the Simple Model is more controversial than its predecessor 
in so far as it assumes that an undetected movement between cognitive 
processes is possible and plausible. It relies on what we might call—following 
the theme of ocular pathology—the Process Blindness assumption. A fairly radical 
formulation of Process Blindness might look like this: 
 
[R-PB] We have little or no access to all (or the vast majority) of our 
cognitive processes. 
 
Something like this suggestion is familiar from Nisbett and Wilson’s conclusions 
(1977, see §1) and similar theses have enjoyed support from the likes of Daniel 
Dennett (1969), Peter Carruthers (2011), and Hilary Kornblith (2012):  
 
The control of reflexes in man is subconscious, as are the stages of perceptual 
analysis, and in fact all information processing. We are not aware of the 
processes at all (as one might with suitable incisions and mirrors, be aware of 
one’s digestive processes) … as Lashley says, ‘No activity of the mind is ever 
concious’ (Dennett 1969, p. 128) 
 
And more moderately: 
 
It is … well-known that a very large part of the cognitive processes by which 																																																								
256 Alternatively, the ‘movement’ in question may be simply neglected by the subject as unimportant. 
(Thanks to Tom Stoneham in private correspondence.) This does seem like a genuine possibility. However, 
if such a movement were to consciously available to the manipulated subject, and especially in cases of 
purportedly more stable attitudes, one suspects that its relevance to any initial failure would become 
apparent in the debriefing, likely appearing as retrospective detection. 	
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beliefs are produced is unavailable to introspection. (Kornblith 2012, p. 21) 
 
So we might think that R-PB enjoys some independent plausibility. However, 
the plausibility that the assumption enjoys often rests upon interpretations of the 
kind of empirical research in question (as with Nisbett and Wilson 1977), and 
thus caution is required when employing such an assumption when attempting 
to explain seemingly related phenomena. Fortunately, while R-PB would—
with little further argument—suffice to support the Simple Model, there is no 
need for such an extreme version of the thesis. A suitable version of the Choice 
Blindness assumption need only go so far as to say that access to cognitive 
processes is limited to the degree that a subject can, under a range of 
circumstances, fail to detect movement between two processes. And this 
assumption is modest, even when compared to some of the reservations 
expressed by those often held to have the most optimistic views of self-
knowledge.257 A moderate formulation of Process Blindness need only claim: 
 
[PB] Some cognitive processes are such that, from the first-person 
perspective, S’s transition between those processes can go undetected by S at 
the time of the transition.  
 
Because this falls within even optimistic assessments of our capacity for self-
knowledge, a moderate Process Blindness assumption does not seem 
unwarranted and is not a high price to pay if the Simple Model affords some 
explanatory progress. Assuming the Simple Model has some initial plausibility, 
then, what remains is to assess the extent to which it does afford some 
explanatory progress. The answer, I suggest, is that it does not make enough.  
 Going in its favour, it does not require (as yet) that any general 
conclusions about introspective competence are reached from data that appears 																																																								
257 For instance, even Kant’s reservations that, ‘we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, 
get entirely behind our covert incentives’ (Kant 1785/1997, §2, 4: 407, pp. 19–20) seem stronger than 
required for the purposes of the Simple Model, since it could be that under optimal conditions such 
processes (or any movement between them) is detected. 
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to make claims about a specific variety of self-knowledge failure (i); it is 
compatible with a view of confabulation that is persistent in the literature (iii); 
and (v) it offers a plausible account of why some subjects do, and some do not, 
succumb to the variety of self-knowledge failure in question—that is, it predicts 
that where a subject does not transition from one process to another, or that 
transition is detected, one should not utter provably false statements about the 
features of one’s choice.  
 However, the proposal looks less secure in two respects. Firstly, while it 
offers what could well be a unified theory (ii), it appears to predict a change of 
attitude will occur whenever one slips without detection from one process to 
another. But there is little reason to think that assessing salient features of one’s 
current environment will ordinarily ‘overturn’ one’s prior attitudes leading to 
de facto confabulation as to one’s reasons. Let us consider an example:  
 
I ϕ that p following some selection task (t1), but under questioning (due 
to some failure or distortion of memory) I enter process CP and assess 
the features of my current environment salient to the question offering 
these features (t2) as the reasons for my selection. 
 
Among the numerous possible outcomes are the following: (a) I cease to ϕ that 
p and begin to ϕ that q; (b) I continue to ϕ that p throughout; (c) I cease to ϕ 
that p but quickly ϕ that p again; (d) I cease to ϕ that p but form no new 
attitude. Outcome (a) would show up as Choice Blindness (and is broadly in line 
with Lopes’s explanation of the phenomenon, with the addition of an explicit 
role for memory). However, while (b), (c), and (d) SM, they are unlikely to 
result in Choice Blindness.258 For example, (b) and (c) may come about when 
the salient features of one’s environment are the same at t1 and t2 and process CP 
either provides no reason to cease ϕ-ing that p (b), or it potentially results in the 																																																								
258 In so far as they will not be found to be undetected manipulations potentially resulting in confabulation 
on the methodologies discussed here.  
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same attitude (c). In short, we can move between a process of recall and process 
that assesses our current environment without a change in attitude and without 
confabulation. The Simple Model then, is insufficient in that it over-predicts 
instances of Choice Blindness.  
 Another concern facing SM is that it falls short of identifying a plausible 
candidate for the variety of reasoning in question (iv) and this leaves us with 
little reason to suppose that the transition between recall and CP is a case of 
process blindness. Even though PB looks a reasonable assumption, it does not 
follow from it that one can move, without detection, between just any cognitive 
processes: for example, my ‘memory experience’ of putting my keys on the 
shelf and my thinking about where I usually leave my keys are both ways to 
respond to questions about the locations of my keys. They appear, however, at 
least as far as ‘commonsense’ psychology goes, to be first-personally 
distinguishable. It may be that factual memory is similarly distinguishable from a 
number of other processes. In the absence of a plausible candidate for the 
variety of reasoning in question, then, we may require further reason to suppose 
that SM will issue in plausible instances of PB.  
The modifications I propose will help in both of these concerns. The 
proposal is as follows: the process into which the subject transitions (following 
the failure or distortion of factual memory), assesses features or factors that are 
salient to responding to an inquiry in a specific way—that is, with a view to 
resolving the inquiry afresh rather than with a view to responding via the 
identification of the subjects presently held attitudes. The proposal amounts to 
the claim that the CP is, at least in part, a deliberative process; aiming at resolving 
an issue presented to the subject via a consideration of those factors which, by 
the subject’s own lights, settle the matter. This is as opposed to responding by 
considering any attitudes already in place. The assumption that we ought to be 
engaged in the latter rather than the former may help to explain why the results 
are thought to be striking. A modified version of the claim might look like this: 
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[DPM] Choice Blindness can be explained in terms of an undetected 
transition from a process of factual recall to a process that, is at least in 
part, deliberative. 
 
The modification to include deliberation allows for an understanding of the 
phenomenon in relation to an existing philosophical discourse regarding the 
Transparency of deliberation, and a related case of Transparency that has been the 
concern of much literature on self-knowledge in recent years (see e.g. Moran 
2001; Byrne 2005, 2011; Boyle 2009, 2012; Gertler 2011b). However, 
‘deliberation’ used in this sense is philosophical jargon and will require further 
explanation.  
 
 
9. The dual process model, deliberation, and transparency 
 
On the Dual Process model I am proposing, we can make sense of Choice 
Blindness by reference to these two components. The proposal is that Choice 
Blindness can be understood in terms of an undetected259 transition from a 
process of recall into a process of (or partially constituted by) deliberation. Before 
attempting to support the proposal, I will explain what is meant by deliberation 
in this context. 
Philosophical accounts of deliberation present it has having a range of 
features. David Owens’ (2011) account, for instance, suggests that deliberation 
is a conscious activity that aims at resolving an issue (see Owens 2011, p. 262). 
It is (a) conscious in that it ‘occupies the deliberator’s attention; it is (b) an 																																																								
259 Why undetected as opposed to detected but judged to be irrelevant? One may respond in this way: many 
of the participants were ‘utterly surprised’ when they discovered their choices had been manipulated. And 
84% suggested they ‘would have noticed if they had been presented with mismatched outcomes’ (Hall et al. 
2006, p. 699) in the debriefing. Participants who detected a move away from recalling their reasons for a 
choice into some other activity should likely to be surprised, retrospectively, since they can attribute their 
being ‘taken in’ to the to the mistaken judgement that such a shift would be irrelevant. However, I find the 
idea that we routinely distinguish between our ongoing mental processes quite fanciful, and it looks likely 
that our abilities in this respect are fairly restricted. Thank you to Tom Stoneham for pressing me on this 
point.  
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activity in that the deliberator is ‘trying to do something: prove a theorem, to 
make a decision, and so forth’ (p. 262); and it is (c) directed at the resolution of 
some issue or question. Typically, it does this by (d) focusing on features of the 
world rather than on psychological concepts (p. 262). So, when we deliberate, 
we do not typically focus on anything inner or psychological, such as previously 
or currently held attitudes. Two of these features, (a) and (d), will benefit from 
further comment.  
 
9.1 Deliberation as conscious activity 
Why might we think that deliberation is a distinctively conscious activity? One 
suggestion is that there is a finite resource, ‘conscious attention’, and that 
deliberation is the kind of activity that takes up a proportion of that resource 
(Owens 2011). But this will not directly lead to the conclusion that deliberation 
is a conscious activity, since there is little reason to suppose that non-conscious 
activity cannot effect conscious processing, and good anecdotal evidence to 
suggests it can: emotional upheaval, positive or negative (e.g. grief, loss, joy); 
fairly straightforward stress and fatigue; and complicated life events (e.g. 
trauma), appear to take their toll on our cognitive performance, yet we do not 
suppose we are always conscious of their presence whenever they do.  
It is clear that decisive elements in human reasoning are not always 
conscious or introspectively available (see e.g. Kahneman’s 2011 ‘Two Systems’ 
approach260), and it is not always better when it is (see e.g. Kornblith 2012; 
Strick et al. 2011; Ghiselin’s 1952).261 And distinguishing between conscious 																																																								
260 Daniel Kahneman’s ‘two systems’ model contrasts automatic, quick, effortless thinking with no sense of 
voluntary control (System 1) and effortful and demanding mental activities ‘associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration’ (System 2) (see Kahneman 2011, pp. 20f.) is becoming a 
standard way of referring to markedly different thought processes (see Boghossian 2014). But the approach 
is not without its problems. Paul Boghosssian (2014), in discussing how to characterize ‘inference’, suggests 
that some fairly common varieties of thought seem to lie somewhere between System 1 and System 2, and 
suggests that perhaps we are interested in reasoning that is ‘System 1.5 and up’ (pp. 2f.). 
261 Empirical research into unconscious thought effect (UTE) suggests that ‘unconscious thought leads to 
better complex decisions than conscious thought’ (Strick et al. 2011, p. 738). Brewster Ghiselin’s 
illuminating (1952) anthology of self-reports from offers accounts of philosophers, scientists, 
mathematicians, and novelists (etc.) suggests that some striking discoveries were made without conscious 
intervention. For example, Henri Poincaré recalls: ‘At the moment when I put my foot on the step the idea 
came to me without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it, that the 
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reasoning and other varieties is no simple matter (Boghossian 2014),262 with 
even ostensibly conscious decision-making processes prone to infection from 
‘relatively unconscious’ influences such as implicit bias (Brownstein 2015).  
None of these factors demonstrates conclusively that deliberation is not a 
conscious activity, but it is enough to favour a characterization that does not 
come with this explicit requirement. Here is one such characterization:  
 
Deliberation of any kind is framed by a question, whether it is what to do, 
what to believe, what to pretend, or whatever. This does not mean that an 
agent has to have the question at the forefront of his mind, explicitly posing 
the question to himself, as it were; but unless his thinking manifests some 
recognition that this is the question that he is striving to answer, his stream of 
thought would lack the direction or purpose required for it to be an instance 
of deliberation about what to do or believe rather than, for example, a stretch 
of directionless cogitation. (Shah 2003, p. 466) 
 
For the purposes of the discussion, then, we will take deliberation to be (a) an 
activity, (b) aimed at resolving an issue, (c) which manifests some recognition of 
a question requiring resolution, and that (d) deliberative question are typically 
transparent to other considerations (e.g. to factual inquiry).  
 
9.2 Transparent deliberation 
Deliberative questions are, or can be, transparent to other considerations—that 
is, engaging with the deliberative question, typically results in us doing so by 
engaging with some other consideration by which the deliberative question is 
settled. Take, for example, the deliberative question of whether to believe 
																																																																																																																																																						
transformations I had used to define the Fuschian functions were identical with those of the non-Euclidian 
geometry. I did not verify the idea … I went on with a conversation already commenced, but I felt a perfect 
certainty. On my return … for conscience’ sake I verified the result at my leisure’ (Ghiselin 1952, p. 26). 
The volume (and this example) is mentioned in Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
262 Paul Boghosssian (2014), in discussing how to characterize ‘inference’, suggests that some fairly common 
varieties of thought seem to lie somewhere between System 1 and System 2, and suggests that perhaps we 
are interested in reasoning that is ‘System 1.5 and up’ (pp. 2f.).	
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something is the case (doxastic deliberation). In doxastic deliberation, the 
deliberative question whether to believe that p—inevitably ‘gives way’ to factual 
inquiry—that is, the factual question whether p, because ‘the answer to the latter 
question will determine the answer to the former’ (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 
499). Because answering the question whether p settles the question whether to 
believe that p,263 whenever we engage with the latter question, there is a slip or 
collapse into the former into considerations that speak to the former question. 
Not all deliberative questions are transparent to factual inquiry—contrast 
whether to believe that p with whether to suppose that p or whether to imagine that p 
(see p. 499). However, it is enough for the present purposes that they typically 
are.  
On the assumption that deliberative reasoning has the characteristics 
above, it is clear why engaging in such reasoning would be potentially disruptive 
to pre-existing attitudes when deployed. Deliberative reasoning is not in the 
business of preserving attitudes in place prior to its deployment. It is in the 
business of resolving an issue (afresh) by focusing on what the subject takes to be 
the facts that bear upon the matter at hand. Since deliberation is blind to current 
attitudes, deliberative success comes at the risk of attitude distortion, most 
obviously where there is has been some change in the individual or environment 
since, in either case, decisive factors in the reasoning process may have been 
altered.  
 Before explaining how these modifications resolve the concerns above, 
I will consider two possible objections to the view that a form of deliberative 
reasoning might be in play.264 
 
																																																								
263 Just how it is meant to settle the question is open to debate. Shah and Velleman (2005) suggest the best 
explanation is that ‘the very concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, to the effect that a belief is 
correct if and only if it is true’ (pp. 499f.). For alternative explanations see, for example, Steglich-Petersen 
(2008) who suggests that transparency can be explained ‘by the aim one necessarily adopts in posing that 
question’ (p. 546), and Sullivan-Bissett (2014) who explains transparency by appealing to ‘causal facts about 
belief formation which obtain in virtue of natural selection selecting for mechanisms which produce beliefs 
with true contents’ (see Ch. 5).  
264 Thanks are due to Paul Noordhof for helpful correspondence on these issues.  
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10. Objections to the dual process model  
 
An opponent of the proposed view may object on the following two grounds: 
firstly, that deliberation is not a possible candidate for the role as described; 
secondly, on the grounds that deliberative reasoning as described is not distinct 
from the factual memory process—that is, the features as described are shared 
by both processes.  
The first objection can be expressed as follows: the formation of belief is 
the terminus of deliberative activity. One cannot at the same time believe that p 
and deliberate over whether p (see e.g. Owens 2011). Successfully manipulated 
subjects in Choice Blindness experiments falsely believe that the option 
presented to them is in fact their (original) selection, but they believe it none 
the less. Because they believe that the option presented to them is their 
(original) selection, they cannot deliberate over the features that speak in favour 
of one selection over another. The concern is founded in an understanding of 
deliberation that is already present in the literature, for example:  
 
belief and intention both act as a block on further deliberation. Suppose I am 
convinced of the honesty of my accountant. To have such a belief is not just to 
think that the evidence currently favours his honesty: that would be consistent 
with having an open mind on the question, with carefully collecting and 
assimilating further information and being thoroughly on one’s guard. 
Believing my accountant to be honest, I simply don’t consider whether a 
certain anomaly in the company’ s books should undermine my faith in him: I 
ignore it or explain it away on the assumption that he is honest. (Owens 2011, 
p. 262.) 
 
If the objection succeeds, it would clearly be damaging to the current proposal, 
and so it should not be dismissed without consideration. However, it rests upon 
two assumptions that should be treated with caution. The first, of course, is 
already made explicit: the formation of a belief that p prevents deliberation over 
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whether p. The second is that subject forms a specific variety of attitude upon 
viewing a choice presented as her own, and that attitude is belief. (Lopes 2014 
appears to make the same assumption.) With regard to the first assumption a 
response might point to clear support in the literature for idea that we can 
‘critically reason’ about our beliefs (Burge 1996); that we can reflect upon them 
(Kornblith 2011);265 and—most directly (Crane 2014)—that in some cases one 
deliberates upon what ‘one already believes’:  
 
This can occur when one is trying to work out what one believes, or 
remember some fact, or draw out some consequence of what one believes … 
this isn’t a case of forming a belief, but rather a case of revealing to oneself 
what one believes anyway. (Crane 2014, p. 277) 
 
So responding to the objection by denying (or bringing into question) the first 
assumption is one response. However, one can also remain committed to the 
view that belief blocks deliberation, and still disarm the objection by casting 
doubt upon the validity of the second assumption. We can do this by 
considering whether the experimental data suggests a belief that the presented 
choice is the subject’s own is formed at the appropriate time to prevent 
deliberation (i.e. when presented).  
What the experiments clearly show is that subjects are able (and willing) 
to cite features of the choice (presented to them as their own) upon request, 
whether or not those features belong to their original selection. But this ability 
alone requires neither that such a belief is formed initially, nor the belief that 
the choice was their own. One can, for example, list factors in favour of one 
holiday destination having eventually chosen another (cf. §2). Of course, we 
may take the data to show something more than this. The fact that some subjects 
argue ‘unequivocally’ for the presented moral proposition (see Hall et al. 2012, 
p. 4), for example, may be seen as indicating a strong pro-attitude towards that 																																																								
265 Hilary Kornblith (2012) does not think that this is a very valuable practice, but doesn’t appear to question 
whether it is possible.  
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proposition. But even this requires only that a strong pro-attitude formed at 
some relevant point during the subject–experimenter discourse—and this could 
be either at the outcome of deliberation or at its outset. So there is still no 
requirement that a belief that the presented choice is the subject’s own is 
formed upon presentation on this reading of the phenomenon, and there is still 
room for deliberation. (Indeed, in the moral case, the idea that pre-existing 
attitudes replaced by opposing attitudes purely by the suggestion that one chose 
otherwise, and without some such intervening process seems baffling. The fact 
that some deliberation occurs partially explains how a change of heart over such 
prominent issues could occur.) What seems plausible, however, is that in order 
for the subject to engage in confabulation with regard to a presented choice, she 
needs to be in some respect open to that choice being her choice, and that this 
openness may evince a (loosely) pro-attitude to the choice being her choice at 
the point of presentation. However, even if it is true that one cannot believe that p 
and deliberate over whether p, one can, for example, suspect that p and deliberate 
over whether p. More generally, it is far from obvious that some form of ‘prima 
facie view’ would be sufficient to block deliberative activity. Anne’s cognition 
*Lo, distant Indian elephant* set against the background of her knowledge that 
she is in South Africa, of zoos, and of colonial history, does not prevent her 
from investigating whether it is, in fact, an Indian elephant that she sees, or a 
rather young African elephant with small ears.  
 The first objection, then, can be disarmed by denying that belief blocks 
deliberation, by questioning the timing of the belief formation, or suggesting 
that the maximum explanatory requirement is for some ‘prima facie view’ that 
seems unlikely to prohibit deliberative activity. Since the latter two responses 
are compatible and stand independently of whether the thesis that belief 
prohibits deliberation turns out to be correct, I favour a combination of these 
two (though not much will rest on it for the purposes of the paper).  
 The second objection questions the distinction between the two 
processes on the basis of the features attributed to deliberation (see §8). If the 
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processes can be shown to have the same salient features, then the model has 
failed to deliver a cognitive process capable of explaining the apparent 
disruption of a subject’s attitudes following inquiries into the reasons for her 
choice. Section eight (§8) concluded in the suggestion that deliberation ought to 
be seen as (a) an activity, (b) aimed at resolving an issue, (c) which manifests 
some recognition of a question and that (d) deliberative question are typically 
transparent to other considerations (e.g. to factual inquiry). But, as the 
objection goes, these features look like fine candidates for the role that factual 
recall plays in the model. And clearly factual recall must meet most, if not all, 
of these criteria: it is (a) an activity; (c) that manifests some recognition of a 
question—at least when it is engaged in response to the right kind of stimulus 
(e.g. an explicit request for information) and (d) the subject need consider no 
psychological intermediary in order to respond to such stimuli—a request for 
information about the capital of Austria need to focus on nothing more than the 
salient facts about Austria. So for the objection to cause problems for the 
proposed model, the residual issue—whether (b) factual recall aims at resolving 
an issue—will be decisive. If factual recall exhibits the very same features as 
deliberation, the proposed model tells us little about why the variety of self-
knowledge failure at issue appears to be so prevalent in the Choice Blindness 
data. 
Factual recall, at least typically, does not aim at ‘resolving an issue’ in 
the sense intended here. But it will be helpful to examine one reason for 
thinking that it does. One might think it does if one subscribes to a particular 
view of factual memory. On this view, memory knowledge is possible because 
we preserve our reasons (or evidence) for thinking that something is the case. 
When challenged about the reasons for thinking that ‘Rosa Parks defied the bus 
driver’, we are able, therefore, to ‘reconstruct’ our reasons for thinking that 
she did, and our ‘memory belief’ is thereby justified. If one holds this view of 
memory, one might be tempted to see the process of factual recall—at least 
when employed in response to certain kinds of stimulus—as a process of 
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‘reconstructing’ a kind of mental argument or a balancing of available evidence, 
which terminates when one reaches a conclusion. If one did have such a view in 
mind, one would have to think that factual memory exhibits all of the features 
attributed to deliberation. However, the account of memory on which the view 
depends is largely discredited (as we will see in §10).  
 What the second objection successfully does is to highlight both the need 
for more clarity on what is meant by factual memory and an apparent similarity 
between the relevant features of deliberation and factual memory. In the next 
section I defend a view of factual memory that resists the second objection. I 
also discuss how the respective features of deliberation and factual memory go 
some way to explaining how the transition between the two processes can go 
undetected in certain circumstances, thus contributing to the likelihood of self-
knowledge failure.  
 
 
11. Preservationism and deliberation 
 
The term ‘memory’ is used to label a heterogeneous variety of phenomena 
(Sutton 2012; see also Byrne 2010) especially when referred to obliquely, in 
ordinary language, via the notion of ‘remembering’:  
 
I remember how to play chess and how to drive a car; I remember the date of 
Descartes’ death; I remember playing in the snow as a child; I remember the 
taste and the pleasure of this morning’s coffee; I remember to feed the cat 
every night. (Sutton 2012) 
 
All of the uses above carry an implication of success, but for some that success is 
directly related to truths about states of affairs. These are sometimes divided 
into episodic and semantic memory: I only remember walking along the beach if I 
walked along the beach (episodic), and I only remember that ‘the sand was wet’ 
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if the sand was wet (semantic). But both the monolithic status (see e.g. Byrne 
2010), and the ‘truth-directedness’ of these forms of memory have been the 
subject of some scrutiny: some putative instances of episodic memory—
instances of ‘observer perspective’—involve a subject seeing herself ‘in the 
remembered scene’ rather than from her ‘original point of view’ (Sutton 2010, 
p. 27), and so there is a mismatch between the original and remembered 
experience. It has been suggested more generally that episodic memory 
functions to preserve or protect a coherent picture of the self (Conway 2005) 
rather that than to correspond with any actual events; and even that there are no 
strictly accurate autobiographical memories (e.g. Conway and Loveday 
2015).266  
 For the present purposes I will use another distinction to highlight some 
important differences between what I have called ‘factual memory’—the variety 
of memory whose success conditions are directly related to states of affairs—
and ‘memory experiences’. Memory experiences are phenomenologically rich 
and include objects or events with which one has some past acquaintance 
(Teroni 2015): my memory experience of Ein Deutsches Requiem, for instance, 
consists in part of a ‘preserved’ acquaintance or ‘cognitive contact’ (Byrne 
2010) with some elements of that composition. In contrast, factual memory, 
which preserves propositional content (see e.g. Owens 1999) is 
‘phenomenologically poor’ (Teroni 2015): there is not a great deal that it is like 
to recall the facts like ‘Brahms composed Ein Deutsches Requiem’. In contrast to 
many cases of ‘remembering’ above, and to memory experiences, factual 
memory barely registers as ‘memory’ at all (we often refer to instances simply 
as ‘knowledge’ or ‘facts’).267  
Factual memory does not involve memory experiences (see e.g. Teroni, 
2015), even though it is tempting to take the fact that memory experiences 
sometimes accompany factual memories as indicating some epistemic role, such 																																																								
266 Space does not permit an in-depth discussion of the positions and arguments. However, they are helpful 
in pointing to some of the long-standing and current debates in literature on memory.  
267 Asher Koriat highlighted the matter in conversation in Grenoble 2014.  
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that memory experiences provide our evidence, or justification, for our factual 
memories (the view I dismiss in §9). If this were correct, then the majority of 
our current beliefs would not be justified since, as David Owens notes: 268  
 
We have probably forgotten why we adopted many of our current beliefs and 
even if we could dredge the evidence for them up from memory, we couldn’t 
do this for more than a tiny subset of our beliefs at any one time. (Owens 
1999) 
 
On an alternative view, factual memory preserves the rationality of a belief 
(Owens 1999, pp. 319f.), regardless of whether we recall our original 
justification (Stoneham 2006). It thus has prima facie epistemic authority: ‘we 
are entitled to persist in believing something remembered providing nothing 
comes to our notice which should make us desist’ (Owens 1999, p. 319). And 
since believing that p is to have ‘finished inquiring into p by forming the view that 
p’ (p. 317) relinquishing the reasons for our attitudes is permissible, and 
arguably the norm: 
 
Once a question is decided, we close the books on it and throw away the 
evidence: deliberately retaining evidence for future consultation is a sign of 
doubt, an attitude appropriate to the scientist who is interested in the 
likelihood of various things and has a professional obligation to suspend 
judgement but quite unsuited to the everyday believer. (Owens 1999, p. 317) 
 
On this view, factual memory has the following features: (i) has prima facie 
epistemic authority, which (ii) allows us to relinquish the reasons for attitudes, 
and (iii) it is phenomenologically poor. With regards to the disputed feature of 
memory—whether (b) factual recall aims at resolving an issue (i.e. from the 
																																																								
268 We sometimes cite information from memory experiences when offering reasons for our beliefs. Fabrice 
Teroni (2015) argues that memory experiences can play an important (non-epistemic) explanatory role in 
some cases.  
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second objection from §9)—a (memory) belief is the result of an inquiry that 
has been settled, rather than one that requires resolution.  
 If this account of memory is correct,269 the explanatory contribution 
made by an explicit role for factual memory is clear. Choice Blindness subjects 
form an attitude at the point of initial selection for which the reasons may or 
may not be retained (and in typical will not be). So requesting reasons for a 
selection already places the subject in a difficult situation. In cases where the 
choices are manipulated so that the opposite of their selection is presented, this 
difficulty is compounded since the subject now has reason to question her 
original selection. The combination of a gap in or distortion of memory, 
combined with a reason to doubt her original selection means that responding to 
a request for reasons will require further consideration of features that speak in 
favour of the presented selection. And one method of acquiring these reasons 
would be to re-open (or persist with) the inquiry based upon those features. An 
appropriate variety of inquiry—one that would provide the ‘direction or 
purpose’ to the ‘stream of thought’ (Shah 2003; see §8) and would allow for a 
feeling of ownership over the outcome 270 —would be one characteristic of 
deliberation as described above. The characteristics of factual memory—and in 
particular its phenomenological paucity—also lend credence to the claim that a 
move between a process of recall and a process of deliberation can go 
undetected.  
Over the last two sections, we have removed a number of obstacles to 
thinking that deliberation could—at least in part—play a role in subjects’ 
responses to requests for their reasons. We have also seen that deliberation is 
the right kind of process in terms of shaping the direction of our thought 
processes in attempting to respond to a gap in or distortion of memory. And in 																																																								
269 Some version of this position is supported by, for example, Tyler Burge (1993); Michael Dummett 
(1994); David Owens (1999), but is not without its detractors (see e.g. Lackey 2007). 
270 If we are to take seriously the idea that the subjects form an attitude in favour of the new selection (as 
evidenced by their apparent willingness to argue ‘unequivocally’ for it), then merely listing some features of 
the presented selection will not do. The subject will need to feel that they are the author of thoughts, or at 
feel able to endorse them (in other words to be able to accept the reasons as her own). However, space 
prohibits extensive discussion of this issue.  
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§8 we noted that deploying deliberation can result in the distortion or 
substitution of attitudes, most obviously where there is has been some change in 
the individual or environment (with a change in the environment being a key 
element of the Choice Blindness methodology). What remains is to further the 
positive case for the deployment of deliberation in subjects questioned about 
their own attitudes.  
 
 
12. Transparency and self-knowledge  
 
In this section I will further the case for the proposed model by considering the 
question of why a subject in conditions such as those present in Choice Blindness 
experiments might engage in deliberation in response to an inquiry into her own 
attitudes. The answer I propose is that engaging in deliberation is a 
commonplace, though not always intended, occurrence in ordinary subjects’ 
attempts to essay their attitudes, and that conditions such as those experienced 
in Choice Blindness experiments simply its likelihood.  
A good deal of self-knowledge literature over the last decade or so271 has 
been preoccupied with a case of transparency that is related to, but distinct 
from, the transparency of doxastic deliberation discussed above (see §8). The 
literature follows remarks by Gareth Evans (1982), among others, with regard 
to the possibility that we can come to know our own minds via world-directed 
inquiry. Evans’s own remarks refer largely to self-knowledge of belief, 272 
although more recent attempts (e.g. Boyle 2009; Byrne 2011) discuss the 
possible application of the idea to a variety of states and attitudes, such as desire, 
intention, and even pain (see e.g. Byrne 2011, p. 213). 273  Transparency 																																																								
271 See, for example, Moran (2001); Byrne (2005, 2011); Boyle (2011); and Fernandez (2013). 
272 A frequently cited remark is: ‘In making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak … directed 
outward—upon the world. If someone asks me “Do you think there is going to be a third world war?,” I 
must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were 
answering the question “Will there be a third world war?” (Evans 1982, p. 225). 
273 ‘I know that I feel a pain in my elbow, not by attending to myself, or my own mind, but by attending to 
the painful disturbance in my elbow. (My elbow hurts: hence, I feel a pain in my elbow.)’ (Byrne 2011, p. 
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accounts of self-knowledge come in markedly different styles but, by way of 
example, Alex Byrne’s (2011) ‘Gallois-style’ doxastic schema sees a would-be 
self-knower engaged in an ‘inference from world to mind’ (p. 203):274 
 
p 
I believe that p 
 
Transparency accounts are taken to explain at least one important feature of 
self-knowledge in that they mark a contrast between the first-person case of 
coming to know one’s mind and the standard way of coming to know the minds 
of others. For assuming one can and does approach questions of one what one 
believes via some transparency method—by considering the matter without 
‘essential reference’ to oneself or one’s belief (see Edgley 1969, p. 90; in Moran 
2001)—one tends not to relate oneself in this way to the ‘question of what 
someone else believes’ (Moran 2001 p. 60), or at least approaching it in that 
way would often lead one astray (see Byrne 2011).  
But while transparency accounts are successful in at least this respect, 275 
a number have run into a common difficulty: questions of the variety Do you 
think that p? can be read in more than one way. They can be read as an invitation 
to deliberate or ‘make up one’s mind’276 about p, or as a question about whether 
one already thinks that p. In the former case, treating the question Do you think 
that p? much as one would treat the question Is p true? is well and good. 
However, clearly we do not wish to make up our minds upon each attempt to 
respond to inquiries about what we think. More to the point it seems clear that 
we don’t. And such a strategy would be risky for cases in which one wishes to 
gauge what one already thinks. For if there is a tendency for one question to 																																																																																																																																																						
213). 
274 The step is unpopular among non-inferentialists (e.g. Boyle 2011) and inferentialists (e.g. Cassam, 
forthcoming) alike. Matthew Boyle suggests ‘only a madman could draw such inferences’ (2011, p. 227) 
while Quassim Cassam suggests they are ‘patently invalid’ (forthcoming). Byrne recognizes the problem and 
offers a ‘partial’ response (see e.g. 2011, pp. 204ff.). 
275 Alex Byrne (2011) takes the method to explain what he calls ‘peculiar access’, but also argues that it 
explains why self-ascriptions of belief place us in an epistemically ‘privileged’ position.  
276 Cassam (forthcoming) 
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collapse into the other, 277  then the subjects response must be ‘brute’ or 
‘spontaneous’ (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 506) to be reliable in that respect, 
since ‘reasoning aimed at answering the question whether p … would 
contaminate the result by possibly altering the state that one is trying to assay’ 
(p. 507).  
The implications of this difficulty for transparency views of self-
knowledge, in general, are debatable. Some argue that the disruptive potential 
of the deliberative process for attitudes in place prior to the initiation of a self-
knowledge procedure leave an important feature of self-knowledge—a kind of 
epistemic security—unexplained (see Gertler 2011),278 while others are less 
concerned with explaining the supposed epistemic features of self-knowledge in 
the first place (see e.g. Moran 2001). For the current discussion, the issue of 
primary concern is that if transparency accounts of self-knowledge are broadly 
descriptive of how we come to know our minds, we have good reason to think 
that deliberation is a commonplace, if not always intended or detected, 
occurrence in ordinary attempts to respond to inquiries into our attitudes.279 
And this can present a challenge whenever one attempts to assay an attitude in 
place prior to the self-knowledge procedure. For, unless one’s responses are 
brute or spontaneous, the process will risk contamination by becoming, even in 
part, a case of making up one’s mind. It is a short distance from here to 
imagining how one might come to offer factors or features that surface during 
deliberation among the reasons for a previously expressed attitude.  
In the discussion so far, we can see how a subject might engage in 
deliberation even when ordinarily attempting to answer questions about her 
own attitudes. We can also see a number of ways in which the risk of slipping to 
into a (partially) deliberative process—as opposed to a purely recollective 
																																																								
277 Edgley (1969) takes the questions ‘Do I think that P?’ and ‘Is it the case that P?’ to be first-personally 
indistinguishable, but this is stronger than what is required for our present purposes.  
278 Brie Gertler (2011) offers a more in-depth discussion of the problem that has been possible here, which 
applies to both Alex Byrne’s and Jordi Fernandez’s transparency accounts of self-knowledge.  
279  This is not to suggest it is ubiquitous, although the question of exactly how reliable transparency 
procedures are lies outside of the scope of this paper.  
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process—will be exacerbated by the Choice Blindness set-up and result in the 
attribution of self-knowledge failure. Firstly, responding to requests for the 
decisive factors or features in one’s decision-making process assumes of the 
subject a degree of access to that process that is at best controversial—there is a 
significant risk of a memory gap or failure in that respect. Secondly, the 
presentation of a choice other than the one originally selected is enough to 
defeat the prima facie authority of memory, thus reopening what may well have 
been a previously shut case. Thirdly, a change in salient features of the 
environment (via ‘manipulated’ choice) will register as self-knowledge failure 
whenever the subject is drawn into considering (and refers to) the features of 
the presented, rather than original, selection.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Existing explanations of a specific variety of self-knowledge failure—
exemplified in Choice Blindness research—fail in a number of respects: they fail 
to explain the broad spectrum phenomena that appear to fall under the 
category, and are often maximally mutilating to our conception of humans as 
introspectively competent rational decision makers. Focusing on Choice 
Blindness research, I have proposed and defended an alternative model that 
highlights the roles of memory and deliberation in the production of 
confabulatory reports. While the model relies on an assumption, it is one that 
few have challenged, and even optimists about introspective reliability accept: 
that our access to our cognitive processes is incomplete. As long as we are 
willing to accept that assumption, we have a model of Choice Blindness, and 
potentially other varieties of self-knowledge failure, that allows us to concede 
vulnerability to self-knowledge failure while avoiding more alarming 
conclusions about our cognitive abilities and rational status.  
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